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Decarbonisation of the global economy requires an energy transition of exceptional 
scope, depth and speed, and a doubling of the current level of investment in low-carbon 
technologies. However, the risk perception of individual market participants—a key 
determinant of the pace at which these technologies will be deployed—is an under-
addressed theme in the academic literature.  
 
In this thesis the risk-return preferences and investment attributes that are attractive to 
different types of investors are investigated, with a view to informing the design of 
financial incentives introduced by Governments. In Chapter 2 the literature assessing the 
impact of technology-specific financial incentives on the levels of investment in low 
carbon technologies from local citizen investors is evaluated. It is concluded that feed in 
tariffs, grants and tax incentives can be successful in mobilising greater levels of 
investment from non-traditional investors, but that soft loans are less effective as a stand-
alone instrument. In the following chapter, a novel analytical approach is introduced to 
explore the use of financial incentives in key jurisdictions to overcome barriers to 
investment from local citizen actors. The importance of instrument design over 
instrument choice emerged from this analysis. The requirement for incentives at 
feasibility and development stages of renewable projects also emerged as a distinguishing 
feature of projects with citizen involvement, reflecting the high risk-aversion of these 
actors, as well as their inability to manage risk across a portfolio of projects. At later 
project stages, market-independent supports (feed in tariffs, grants and tax incentives) 
were found to have been effectively deployed, however, more market-based instruments 
(feed in premiums and quota schemes) were also found to be effective if tailored to the 
specific needs of citizen investors. In Chapter 4 the risk-return preferences of a 
representative sample of citizen investors in Ireland—a market with no citizen investment 
tradition—were explored using a choice experiment. A high level of interest in investing 
in wind, solar, biomass and waste-to-energy projects was uncovered, however, a majority 
of citizens were found to be highly risk-averse, and investment amounts were low 
compared to equity required for larger projects.  
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These findings suggest that greater levels of investment capital could be mobilized from 
citizen investors using specifically tailored incentives. However, these actors can only 
make a limited overall contribution, and promoting greater levels of investment from 
professional investors is crucial if climate objectives are to be met. In Chapter 5, semi-
structured interviews and an on-line survey were therefore used to compare attitudes to 
stranding risk for investors in power generation assets with investors in financial assets. 
Asset stranding risk was found to be a more prominent issue for the former cohort, 
suggesting that as you move along the investment chain—away from physical assets and 
towards financial assets—far less is known about climate risk, and it becomes 
increasingly challenging for investors to manage it.  
  
Managing the risks face by different investor cohorts emerges as an important means of 
mobilising greater levels of investment and reducing the cost of capital for low-carbon 
technologies, which in turn has the potential to increase the speed of energy transition. 
Understanding the risk-return preferences of different cohorts of investors, however, 
remains both understudied and underappreciated in the climate policy and climate finance 
literature. The findings from this study both address this literature gap and uncover 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
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1.1. Background and context 
If 'dangerous' climate change is to be avoided, immediate and rapid decarbonisation must 
be achieved over the coming decades, particularly in developed economies (Anderson & 
Bows, 2011; Rogelj et al., 2010; Edenhofer, 2014). Parties to the Paris Agreement of 
December 2015 agreed to maintain global temperatures ‘well below 2° C above pre-
industrial levels’, and to ‘pursue efforts’ to limit temperature increases to below 1.5 
degrees (UNFCCC, 2015). Staying within the 2° C temperature target would require an 
energy transition of exceptional scope, depth and speed, and an estimated $3.5 trillion in 
energy-sector investments each year until 2050 across the energy generation, industry, 
transport and buildings sectors (Covington, 2017; IEA, 2018), which is about double the 
current level of investment.  
 
In comparison to traditional technologies in the power, heat and transport sectors that rely 
on fossil fuels, many low-carbon technologies such as solar photovoltaics (PV), wind 
turbines, combined heat and power (CHP) installations and biofuel boilers are modular, 
relatively small scale (typically <50 MW installed capacity) and decentralized. These 
new technologies are expected to play an increasingly important role in transition to a 
low carbon economy over the coming decades (Ruggiero, Varho & Rikkonen, 2015; 
Sioshansi, 2016), and many countries are therefore incentivising their up-take (IEA, 
2015). The widespread deployment of these new technologies, however, is potentially 
disruptive for traditional business models (Engelken et al., 2016; Johnson & Suskewicz, 
2009), which poses challenges for traditional investors, and opens up business 
opportunities for new types of investors.  
 
Over the last decade, investor perceptions of risk and return have become an important 
stream of research in the energy finance, energy policy and energy economics literature. 
The importance of the risk and profitability characteristics of investments have 
traditionally been accepted as highly influential over investor behaviour for all 
investors—from local citizens to institutional investors (Markowitz, 1952; Dinica, 2006). 
Modern Portfolio Theory, for example, suggests that the risk and return characteristics of 
specific technologies or investment opportunities should not be viewed alone, but 
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evaluated in terms of how the investment affects the risk and return of the entire portfolio 
(Markowitz, 1952), while the ‘asset pricing’ branch of the finance literature explores, 
inter alia, the extent to which investors correctly price risk into asset values (Sharpe, 
1963). Portfolio theory has also been applied to managing risk and maximising 
performance for power sector investors, because the generation portfolios of energy 
companies are similar, at least in some respects, to financial portfolios (Bazilian & 
Roque, 2008).  
 
Much of this literature therefore assumes that investors, whether electric utilities, 
insurance companies, pension funds, or citizen and community investors, are rational, 
rent-seeking agents who compare opportunities according to the perceived risk-adjusted 
returns.  Lower risk perception for renewable energy projects or higher risk perception 
for fossil fuel projects could therefore affect investors' cost of capital, which in turn is a 
key factor for determining the rate of technology diffusion and the pace of low-carbon 
transition.  
 
1.1.1 The need for financial incentives 
We are in the midst of an energy transition, but there is a considerable shortfall in private 
finance provided by traditional investors compared to the requirements for global 
decarbonisation (Eleftheriadis & Anagnostopoulou, 2015; Haigh, 2011; Simshauser, 
2010; McInerney & Johannsdottir, 2016). An extensive literature points to a combination 
of technological, economic, institutional and political barriers which result in sub-optimal 
levels of investment in low-carbon technologies (Polzin, 2017). Several factors have been 
highlighted within this context. 
 
First, the characteristics of the technologies themselves may affect risk-return 
perceptions. For example, low-carbon technologies may have longer payback periods and 
higher upfront investment costs (Zhang, Shen & Chan, 2012). Second, investors may 
have biased perceptions and preconceptions that favour status quo energy production 
models over innovative alternatives (Masini & Menichetti, 2013); or they may perceive 
new technologies to be riskier and unreliable (IPCC, 2011). Third, these challenges  have 
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been exacerbated since the financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in a very significant 
increase in short-term and speculative investments (Jones, 2015). Fourth, traditional 
banks are also struggling with stricter reserve requirements under Basel III, while 
sovereign and utility balance sheets are beset with considerable challenges (Eleftheriadis 
& Anagnostopoulou, 2015; Haigh 2011; Simshauser, 2010). While professional investors, 
such as financial institutions, utilities and businesses, have therefore been active in 
providing private finance for distributed power generation technologies, these 
technologies face a number of barriers to optimal deployment. 
 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), there is a role for 
public policy in overcoming these barriers to investment under these circumstances, so 
that the full mitigation potential of distributed low-carbon technologies can be realised 
(IPCC-WGIII 2001, 752).  
 
The requirement for better Government engagement with the private sector to mobilise 
new resources, spur innovation and advance know-how is commonly recognised 
(Morgado & Lasfargues, 2017). The most obvious means of engagement is through the 
provision of financial incentives, which can be crucial in affecting investor risk-return 
perceptions. Distributed energy technologies, such as on-shore wind and solar PV, are 
increasingly cost-effective, yet they generally require some form of Government support 
to galvanise investment. There is a comprehensive literature exploring the effectiveness 
of different types of financial incentives in mobilising investment from professional 
investors (Abolhosseini & Heshmati, 2014; Bobinaite & Tarvydas, 2014; Marques & 
Fuinhas, 2012; Mickwitz, 2003; Oak et al., 2014; Ozcan, 2014; Polzin et al., 2015; 
Somanathan et al., 2014). One finding emerging from this literature is that both the 
choice and design of financial incentives, including feed in tariffs and premia, quota 
based systems, tax incentives, grants, and soft loans, can be highly influential over 
investor risk-return preferences (Fouquet & Johansson, 2008; Butler & Neuhoff, 2008; 
del Río & Bleda, 2012; Saunders, Gross, & Wade, 2012; Couture & Gagnon, 2010).  
 
1.1.2. Citizen investors 
Within this context, one important theme in the finance literature which has been less 
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comprehensibly addressed is how to mobilise investment from non-traditional actors, 
such as citizens and community groups. The design of appropriate financial investments 
targeting this cohort of investors is a relatively underexplored theme.  
 
This literature takes as its starting point that distributed low carbon technologies will 
become increasingly important in low-carbon transition. The International Energy 
Agency, for example, estimate that wind and solar PV alone have the potential to 
contribute 22% of electricity sector emissions reduction by 2050 (IEA, 2015). 
Furthermore, these technologies have characteristics that make them particularly 
attractive to local citizen investors, acting either individually, as members of a 
community group, or as party to a project by a professional developer (Enzensberger, 
Fichtner & Rentz, 2003), not least their maturity, modularity, high reliability, the 
simplicity of the energy generation process, and availability of technical service providers 
(Yildiz, 2014). Citizen participation schemes and local community ownership have 
therefore been identified as a potential new source of private finance for low carbon 
technologies (Bergek & Berggren, 2014). 
 
The wider social science literature identifies a second potential benefit from mobilising 
citizen investment in low-carbon technologies—enhancing social acceptance of these 
technologies. A lack of “social licence” to operate has been identified as a key factor in 
preventing distributed energy projects from proceeding, even in cases when capital is 
available, and local discontent can be highly costly and even fatal for projects (Van 
Rensburg, Kelley & Jeserich, 2015). Wustenhagen et al.’s (2007) Social Acceptance of 
Renewable Energy Innovation framework, identified three dimensions of social 
acceptance: procedural justice related to decision making; trust between the community 
and developers; and how costs and benefits are distributed (Figure 1) (Wüstenhagen, et al., 
2007). An extensive literature has explored these discrete aspects of societal acceptance 
(Borch, 2018; Shackley & Green, 2007; Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan, 2012; Stokes 2013; 
Szarka et al., 2012; Walker, 2011; Wolsink, 2007).  
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Focusing on the third aspect of Wustenhagen’s framework—how costs and benefits are 
distributed—promoting local ownership of distributed renewable energy technologies has 
been identified as one means of ensuring that the benefits of low-carbon transition are 
widely distributed across society (Bergek et al., 2013; Linnerud & Holden, 2015, Ruggiero 
et al., 2015). This work suggests that promoting greater levels of citizen investment from 
community and citizen groups could contribute to addressing both the investment shortfall 
and the social licence to operate. 
 
Much research has been undertaken on the benefits of community and citizen investment, 
(Bergman & Eyre, 2011; Bolton & Foxon, 2015; Devine-Wright, 2014; Viardot, 2013), 
however, little is known about citizen investor preferences for distributed renewables 
(Borgers & Pownall, 2014; Gamel, Menrad & Decker, 2017; Salm, Hille & 
Wüstenhagen, 2016), and a lack of rigorous academic research on the risk-return 
preferences of these investors has been noted in previous studies (Salm, Hille & 
Wüstenhagen, 2016; Gamel, Menrad & Decker, 2017). Furthermore, while the 
importance of financial incentives and subsidies have been underlined by many studies 
(Curtin, McInerney & Ó Gallachóir, 2017; Curtin, McInerney and & Johannsdottir, 2018; 
Gamel, Menrad & Decker, 2017; Fleiß et al. 2017; Yildiz, 2014), the design of financial 
incentives that are attractive to local citizen investors, and which would be effective in 
mobilising investment, is another underdeveloped theme in the academic literature 
(Stigka, Paravantis & Mihalakakou, 2014; Yildiz 2014; Curtin, McInerney & Ó 
Gallachóir, 2017). According to Yildiz (2014, p. 678) “the literature on citizen 
participation in the financing of renewable energy infrastructures is sparse considering 
its empirical importance”. Coming to a better understanding of the unique risk-return 
preferences of citizen investors, and designing incentives that are attractive to them, 
could reduce the overall costs to society of low-carbon transition while increasing its 
pace.  
 
1.1.3. Professional investors 
There is a recognition that local citizen investors can make a greater contribution to low 
carbon transition as investors, however, the importance of mobilising greater levels of 
investment from traditional investors has also been identified in many studies (Polzin et 
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al., 2015; Polzin, 2017; OECD, 2017; Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures, 2017; Covington, 2017). There is a growing literature which explores the 
ways in which energy transition itself could affect risk-return perception of professional 
investors. Krause, Bach and Koomey (1989) first applied the concept of “stranded assets” 
to the climate policy arena by identifying the potential for “early obsolescence” of 
infrastructures built up around fossil fuels under low-carbon transition, which they 
determined could pose risks to the value of physical and financial assets (Simshauser, 
2017).  
 
This is a theme that has garnered greater analytical attention as international political 
momentum to address climate change has gathered pace over the past decade. For 
example, Article 2.1 c of the Paris Climate Agreement included the objective of “making 
finance flows consistent with pathways towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate resilient development” (UNFCCC, 2015). A parallel scientific development is the 
increasing prominence given to carbon budgets: that is, the amount of cumulative 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere consistent with meeting a particular 
climate objective. The first budget estimates were provided by Meinshausen et al., (2009) 
and Allen et al., (2009). Further estimates have subsequently been provided under 
different assumptions in a wide number of studies (Rogelj et al., 2016). The concept was 
mainstreamed into climate policy analysis by the IPCC’s synthesis report of 2014, 
which provided estimates for budgets consistent with various levels of warming. Recent 
budget estimates have focused on achieving the 1.5 °Celsius target (Goodwin et al., 2018; 
Millar et al., 2017). These carbon budget estimates gave rise to the concept of  
“unburnable carbon”, which refers to the fossil fuel reserves that cannot be burned which 
is consistent with staying within a particular carbon budget (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 
2011), an idea that has attracted considerable analytical and public attention (Ben 
Caldecott 2017; Griffin, Jaffe, Lont, & Dominguez-Faus, 2015; Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures, 2017; Vergragt, 2004), and has clear implications for 
investor risk perception and capital allocation decisions.  
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If these assets are effectively “unburnable”, their worth could be vastly reduced and they 
could therefore fail to produce the return hoped for (Caldecott, Tilbury & Carey, 2014). 
In other words, these assets may become “stranded”. While there are a number of 
possible definitions of stranded assets, we adopt the definition proposed by Caldecott 
(2014, p 7), that ‘stranded assets are assets that have suffered from unanticipated or 
premature write-downs, devaluations, or conversion to liabilities”. In September 2015, 
the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, warned that there was a danger that 
assets of fossil fuel companies could be left stranded by tougher rules to curb climate 
change, and that investors faced “potentially huge” losses because this action could make 
vast reserves of oil, coal and gas “literally unburnable”. The Financial Stability Board, 
which reports to G20 governments and is chaired by Governor Carney, subsequently 
launched a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (2017), which 
recommended that climate-related financial disclosure should be incorporated into 
mainstream public annual financial statements (Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures, 2017). The European Commission, meanwhile, has proposed a regulation 
which introduces obligations on how institutional investors and asset managers integrate 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in their risk processes. Nor is this 
threat of “stranding risk” just theoretical—Ernst and Young (2017) estimated that €143 
billion has already been written off against assets that had lost value between 2010 and 
2016, which they largely attributed to energy transition (EY, 2017); while Blackrock, the 
world’s largest fund manager, has begun requiring investment managers to incorporate 
climate risk into investment appraisals (Financial Times, 2016). 
 
Central to the question of stranding risk, therefore, is the extent to which climate risks are 
appreciated by actors in the financial system, and the extent to which they are integrated 
into the price of assets across the investment chain, both physical and financial (Chenet, 
Thomä & Janci, 2015). Stranding risk has clear implications for physical assets which 
tend to be the most illiquid, including both the underlying fossil fuel reserves, and 
infrastructures that rely on fossil fuels (power stations, transport assets, real estate etc.). 
However, asset impairment can also affect more liquid financial assets such as stocks and 
bonds, which, in turn, could feed through to investment portfolios owned by institutional 
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investors, or indeed the balance sheets of financial institutions. Finally, the value of 
portfolios and creditworthiness of financial institutions has the potential to feed into 
systems risk, and to undermine the stability of the financial system (Partington, 2018). 
The premise of the stranding literature is that stranding risks may be mispriced for a 
number of reasons at various points along the investment chain (Harnett 2017; Silver 
2017; Thomä & Chenet, 2017). 
 
Notwithstanding its crucial importance for the pace of low-carbon transition, however, 
the climate risk perception of professional investors has been left “almost unaddressed” 
until recent times (West, 2019). While there is a literature exploring stranding risk 
focused on either physical or financial assets (See Chapter 5), there are no studies that 
look across the investment chain, that compare and contrast perceptions on stranding risk 
for owners of physical compared to owners of financial assets. Perception of stranding 
risk, and how it could affect investment decisions therefore remains an understudied 
theme and an open question within the climate finance and climate policy literature, 
despite the clear implications of these issues for capital allocation decisions, and even for 
the stability of the financial system.  
1.2. The Irish Policy Context  
There are notable differences across countries in terms of how investors perceive the risk-
adjusted returns of investment opportunities and there is, therefore,  considerable value in 
exploring different country frameworks individually. Ireland is a particularly interesting 
case to study. As an EU Member State, it is required to reduce emissions from non-
emissions trading sectors (buildings, transport and agriculture) by 20% by 2020 and 30% 
by 2030. In addition, 16% of energy must come from renewable sources by 2020 
(European Commission, 2008). Policy, in particular the introduction of a FiT (the 
Renewable Energy Feed in Tariff (REFIT) Scheme) in 2006, has been successful in 
attracting investment capital into the wind sector. Renewable electricity generation has 
expanded rapidly: only 7% of electricity was generated from renewables in 2005, but by 
2017 this had increased to 30% (SEAI, 2018). However, notwithstanding this progress, 
according to the European Commission Ireland lags considerably behind in achieving its 
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renewable energy targets, leaving an exposure to potential fines and/or compliance costs 
to make up the shortfall (Deane, 2017).  
 
A second interesting characteristic of the Irish case is that investment activity has been 
dominated by traditional investors, such as utilities, professional project developers and 
financial institutions (Curtin, McInerney & Johannsdottir, 2018). There is only one wind 
farm of 3.9 megawatt (MW) held in community ownership from a total installed capacity 
of over 3000 MW. In countries such as Denmark and Germany, by contrast, over half of 
total investment has come from local citizens (BMWi, 2016; Danish Energy Agency, 
2014; Curtin, McInerney & Johannsdottir, 2018; Mey & Diesendorf, 2018). Furthermore, 
a “sea change in social support” against wind power has been noted (NESC, 2014). The 
Government’s Irish Energy White Paper (2015) acknowledges the important of having a 
“social licence to operate” and envisages transitioning from an energy system “from one 
that is almost exclusively Government and utility led, to one where citizens and 
communities will increasingly be participants”, and includes commitments to use 
economic incentives to support the growth of citizen investment (DCCAE, 2014), and a 
new renewables support scheme requires developers to invite citizen community groups 
within a 5 km radius to invest in their project (DCCAE, 2018)   
 
Prior research has found that the different levels of citizen investment across countries 
grounds in country-specifics including, inter alia, the regulatory environment, support 
from local advisory organisations, a tradition of local activism, a relatively high 
sensitivity to environmental issues among citizens, and the presence of citizens with the 
financial resources to invest (Dewald & Truffer, 2011; Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz, 
2015; Gamel, Menrad & Decker, 2017). However, there is also an extensive literature 
which explores the motivation of citizen investors, which tends to focus on identifying 
more generalisable characteristics across countries (Fleiß et al., 2017). It is an open 
question in the literature if the successes achieved in countries such as Denmark and 
Germany in mobilising citizen investment can be replicated in countries such as Ireland, 
Spain or the US, which do not have the same long-standing citizen investment tradition.  
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In addition to the rapid deployment of distributed renewables, Ireland also has a well-
developed financial services sector. Sustainable and green finance forms a key strategic 
priority in Ireland’s International Financial Services strategy. Euronext Dublin is already 
the exchange of choice for many leading international listings of debt, and the 
development of European Green Bond standards will fuel further growth, with €6 billion 
in green bonds already listed on the exchange. It is one of the leading hedge fund service 
centres in Europe focused on administration, insurance, aircraft leasing and payments. A 
thriving green finance cluster has emerged within this sector in recent years, and a 
considerable number of professional services providers are focused on supporting green 
asset management (Sustainable Nation, 2018).  
 
For these reasons, Ireland provides a useful testing ground for evaluating the risk-return 
perspectives of traditional and non-traditional investors across the investment chain.  
1.3. Research objectives and methods 
Within the context of the global investment trends in low-carbon assets outlined above, 
the overarching aim of this study is to investigate how the risk-return perceptions of 
investors affect investment decisions in low-carbon assets.  
 
The specific research objectives are: 
1. To explore the risk-return preferences and investment attributes that are important 
for citizen investors, and to identify barriers to these investors at different project 
stages; 
2. To investigate how financial incentives can be designed that are attractive to 
citizen investors; and 
3. To measure, compare and contrast perspectives on stranding risk from climate 
change for owners of physical and financial assets.   
 
A variety of methods are employed to explore these questions. Overall, the research 
approach involves progressing from a broad and general to an increasingly specific 
analytical focus. Each chapter of this thesis represents an individual published paper 
(Chapter 5 is under review at the time of writing), and for this reason each employs a 
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different methodology. In Chapter 2 a “systematic literature review” methodology was 
used, which is a common approach employed for presenting summaries of empirical 
evidence from across a range of disciplines. To ensure the robustness of the findings, 
clear inclusion and exclusion criteria were developed which were used to screen research 
results and to identify relevant studies. The general findings from this study fed into the 
research approach and focus of Chapter 3, where a comparative case study methodology 
was employed. Case studies are considered suitable for documenting “how” and “why” 
questions, including processes such as market innovation, where the focus is on exploring 
contextual conditions (Yin, 2003). They tend to report more information than, for 
example, a statistical study covering the same cases, and therefore provide a strong 
empirical grounding for a hypothesis (Odell, 2001), as was required in this study.  
 
This finding in turn fed into the more quantitative approach employed in Chapter 4, a 
survey on a representative sample of Irish citizen investors, using an online survey, 
developed over a number of iterations, incorporating an Adaptive Choice-Based Conjoint 
(ACBC) to explore risk-return preferences for renewable energy investment options and 
attributes. This approach has been used extensively in the general investment decision 
literature (Clark-Murphy & Soutar, 2004; Franke et al., 2006; Shepherd, Zacharakis & 
Baron, 2003; Shepherd, 1999), as well as the renewable investment literature (Salm, Hille 
& Wüstenhagen, 2016; Lüthi & Wüstenhagen, 2012). The primary output from the 
ACBC were derived utility values for each respondent that illustrated their relative 
preference for one investment attribute over another investment attribute, and their risk-
return preferences.  
 
Finally, in order to assess attitudes to and awareness of stranding risk from climate 
change across the Irish investment chain, in Chapter 5 semi-structured interviews were 
combined with an online survey of key figures in the Irish asset management and 
ownership community. The semi-structured interviews targeted key ‘gatekeepers’, 
following the approach employed by Harnett (2017) and Eleftheriadis and 
Anagnostopoulou (2015), and akin to the iterative approach suggested by the Delphi 
method (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). As proposed in Rice (2015), responses were used to 
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refine the on-line questionnaire, thereby ensuring that it was focused on key issues 
relevant to skills and expertise of prospective respondents. This “convenience sampling” 
approach is common within qualitative business studies to evaluate the preference of 
“elite” figures from business and finance, and is considered more apt than a more 
systematic sampling techniques (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
 
While the specific focus in Chapters 4 and 5 is on Irish citizen and institutional investors 
respectively, the themes that emerge have clear ramifications beyond Ireland. The 
findings are relevant to researchers and policy makers in countries seeking to understand 
the risk-return preferences of different types of investors under energy transition, and 
seeking to promote greater levels of investment in low-carbon technologies from these 
actors.  
1.4. Contents Summary 
In order to achieve these objectives, the chapters of this thesis are constituted of academic 
papers. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have been peer reviewed and published in academic journals, 
while Chapter 5 is currently under review. The content of each chapter is briefly set out 
below. 
 
In Chapter 2 a systematic review of the literature assessing the impact of technology-
specific economic and financial incentives promoting greater levels of investment in low 
carbon technologies from local citizen investors is presented. This paper focused in 
particular on the impact of feed in tariffs compared to quota schemes, grants, tax 
incentives and soft loans. The analysis underscored the importance of understanding the 
preferences of target demographics, the local context, as well as the characteristics of the 
technologies in question, and suggested that interventions should be considered as part of 
wider policy packages. While identifying challenges to be overcome through instrument 
design, it found that feed-in tariffs, grants and tax incentives can be successful in 
mobilising greater levels of investment from local citizen investors, but that soft loans 
tend to be less effective as a stand-alone instrument.  
 
To investigate what types of financial incentives are effective at the feasibility, 
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development, construction, and operation stages of project development, a comparative 
case study of their use in Denmark, Germany, the UK, and Ontario, Canada is presented 
in Chapter 3. A requirement for incentives such as grants and soft loans at the feasibility 
and development stages emerged as a distinguishing feature of projects with citizen 
involvement, reflecting the greater risk aversion, lack of technical experience and 
financial capacity and inability to balance risk across a portfolio of projects for these 
actors. At later project stages, market-independent supports (FiTs, grants and tax 
incentives) were found to have been effective in mobilising investment, but it was also 
found that market-based supports (feed in premiums and quota schemes) could be 
tailored to the specific needs of local community actors.  
 
Little is known about citizen investor preferences outside of mature markets such as 
Denmark and Germany, or if the experiences in these countries can be replicated 
elsewhere. For this reason, in Chapter 4 the results from a survey exploring the attitudes 
of 1,280 Irish citizens to investing in wind, solar, biomass and waste-to-energy projects 
are presented. A high level of interest in investing in these technologies was discovered, 
particularly among high-income households with some investment experience. 
Investment amounts, however, were low compared to equity required for large projects, 
suggesting that citizen investors may not be a significant source of finance in these cases. 
Key barriers identified included lack of savings and no access to loan finance. A majority 
of citizens were found to be highly risk-averse and were motivated by financial attributes 
such as return and minimum investment holding period.  
 
Finally, the extent to which ‘stranding risk’ was affecting risk-return preferences of 
professional investors was investigated in Chapter 5. Semi-structured interviews were 
combined with an on-line survey to determine if attitudes to stranding risk, and methods 
used to value and manage it, were similar for investors in power sector and financial 
assets. Stranding risk emerged as a more prominent issue for power sector investors, who 
were more confident in their ability to assess and manage stranding risk and had taken 
more decisive actions. Respondents also emphasized the greater significance of stranding 
risk for the least liquid asset classes, and also the importance of portfolio diversification 
 28 
for risk management.  
 
In Chapter 6 the key findings of this thesis are presented in relation to the three research 
questions outlined above. The overall contribution of this dissertation to the academic 
literature is set out, and policy implications are explored. Finally, several promising 
avenues for future research are identified.  
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Chapter 2: Financial incentives to mobilise local citizens as 







If the ambitious objectives of the international community, agreed in the Paris Agreement 
of December 2015, are to be met, rapid emissions reductions must be achieved over the 
coming decades. Two of the key policy challenges faced by Governments in meeting this 
challenge are investment shortfalls in low carbon technologies (and the consequent need 
to mobilise greater levels of private finance) and lack of citizen “buy-in” for low-carbon 
transition.  
 
The International Energy Agency has estimated that investment of $44 trillion in a 
portfolio of low carbon technologies (LCTs) is required in the period 2015-2050 in order 
to decarbonise the energy system in line with a 2°C climate mitigation target (IEA, 2014). 
There is widespread agreement that given the state of sovereign and utility balance 
sheets, and with traditional banks struggling with stricter reserve requirements under 
Basel III, new sources of capital for investment in low-carbon assets are required 
(Eleftheriadis & Anagnostopoulou, 2015; Haigh, 2011; Simshauser, 2010; Yildiz, 2014). 
 
While traditional investors, such as financial institutions, utilities or businesses, have 
been active in providing private finance for LCTs,1 there is potentially a much greater 
role to be played by local citizen investors. These actors can be engaged in three distinct 
ways: as private individual investors in LCTs; as investors in a community-owned 
project; or as investors in a local project led by a professional developer (Enzensberger et 
al., 2003).  
 
LCTs are modular, often relatively small scale (typically <50 MW installed capacity) 
compared to traditional fossil fuel and nuclear generation (typically hundreds of MW), 
and decentralized, making them more financially appealing to local citizen investors and 
somewhat less so to traditional investor classes (Yildiz, 2014). Furthermore, individuals 
tend to control more funds than has historically been the case because of changes in 
pension regulation and administration (Foreign and Colonial, 2013). Citizen participation 
 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the definition of LCTs is limited to technologies for individual usage (for example 
electric vehicles, photovoltaic panels, solar thermal systems, etc.) and larger renewable energy supply technologies (for 
example wind farms, biogas technologies, and solar PV farms). Nuclear energy is therefore excluded.  
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schemes and local community ownership have therefore been identified as a potential 
source of private finance for LCTs (Bergek et al., 2013; Viardot, 2013; Yildiz, 2014).  
 
With respect to citizen “buy in”, national accounts of the successes and failures of LCT 
deployment identify community and societal acceptance as a potentially significant 
barrier, but also a key enabler of success (Shackley & Green, 2007; Sovacool & Lakshmi 
Ratan, 2012; Stokes, 2013; Szarka et al., 2012; B. J. A. Walker et al., 2014; G. Walker, 
2011; Wolsink, 2007; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007).  
The ability to share local value is one of the key means of building social support for low 
carbon transition. Engaging local citizens as investors can help to promote behaviour 
changes such as conserving energy and reducing emissions (Heiskanen et al., 2010). 
Community group and individual citizen investment in LCTs can generate local income, 
result in more locally appropriate developments that are more likely to secure planning 
permission, contribute to understanding of climate and energy security issues, and create 
niches which positively interact with the wider regime in various ways (Bergman & Eyre, 
2011; Bolton & Foxon, 2015; Devine-Wright, 2014; Devine‐Wright, 2005; Dóci et al., 
2015; Li et al., 2013; Palm & Tengvard, 2011; Parag et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2008; 
Slee, 2015; Viardot, 2013; B. J. A. Walker et al., 2014; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007; Yildiz, 
2014; Yildiz et al., 2015). The experience of investing in a LCT can also positively 
dispose citizens to making future low-carbon investments (Boon & Dieperink, 2014; 
Dobbyn & Thomas, 2005; Keirstead, 2007), and greater levels of local ownership have 
also been found to coincide with higher rates of wind power deployment than “remote, 
corporate ownership” (Toke et al., 2008).  
 
There is a long traditional in countries such as Denmark and Germany of mobilising local 
citizens as investors in low carbon assets, both as individuals or members of community 
groups. There is, however, a growing interest among policy makers in other countries in 
approaches to incentivising and mobilising investments from these actors. For example, 
the UK Energy Infrastructure Act (2015) sets out a framework pursuant to which the 
Secretary of State may introduce regulations under which local residents and 
communities would have the right to a buy a minimum 5% equity ownership in 
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renewable energy projects in their area (DECC, 2015); the Scottish government outlined 
policies in 2015 where wind farm developers have to demonstrate that at least 10% equity 
ownership has been offered to local individual and community groups before applying for 
planning permission (Scottish Government, 2015); the Irish Energy White Paper (2015) 
places a considerable emphasis on individuals and community groups as potential 
investors in low carbon technologies (DCENR, 2015); and Ontario’s Green Energy and 
Green Economy Act (GEGEA) of 2009 introduced a FiT regime with strong incentives 
for community owned projects (Government of Ontario, 2009). 
 
These two key barriers to low-carbon transition, the investment shortfall and societal 
“buy-in”, have traditionally been addressed in policy with different instruments. 
Economic and financial incentives (EFIs), measures that provide actors with monetary 
compensation to adopt LCTs, in the form of taxes, grants, soft loans and other forms of 
subsidy (Bergek & Berggren, 2014; Mickwitz, 2003), have typically been introduced to 
mobilise greater levels of capital investment (De Serres et al., 2010; IEA, 2003; Painuly, 
2001). On the other hand, education, information, labelling, community involvement in 
policymaking, community engagement and awareness raising campaigns are 
recommended to address citizen and community acceptance issues (Owen, 2006; 
Verbruggen et al., 2010). What is less commonly recognised is that these barriers are 
interrelated, overlapping, and to some extent, mutually reinforcing (Juntunen & Hyysalo, 
2015; Yildiz, 2014).  
 
EFIs are often critical to the success of community energy projects (Parag et al., 2013), 
yet designing incentives appropriate for and/or specific to individual citizens and 
community groups is challenging. LCT investors have traditionally been characterized as 
rational, rent-seeking agents, but economic motivations and “rational” economic 
behaviour may not adequately explain LCT investment decisions (Masini & Menichetti, 
2013; Salm et al., 2016; Wüstenhagen & Menichetti, 2012), and this may particularly be 
the case at individual and community level.  
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While the case for promoting citizen and community investment in LCT projects is well 
developed, it is an open question in the literature as to which EFIs have been successful 
in mobilising local citizen investment in LCTs. While there have been many studies 
evaluating citizens willingness to pay a premium, usually via energy bills, for renewable 
power (Kostas & Sardianou, 2012; Soon & Ahmad, 2015), by contrast, the literature on 
citizen participation in the financing of in LCTs is under-developed (Stigka, Paravantis & 
Mihalakakou 2014; Yildiz 2014), and the design and use of EFIs worldwide (for 
example, for promoting uptake of energy efficiency technologies) has not been 
comprehensively studied (de la Rue du Can et al. 2014). According to Yildiz (2014, p. 
678) “the literature on citizen participation in the financing of renewable energy 
infrastructures is sparse considering its empirical importance”.  
 
Within this context we undertake a systematic literature review of EFIs directed towards 
local citizen investors, which are aimed at mobilising investments in LCTs. This paper 
makes a number of important contributions addressing gaps in the literature: first, it 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the literature on EFIs aimed at promoting 
investment by local citizens, a subset of the overall literature on EFIs; second, it assesses 
the critical factors in their success or failure; and finally, it sets out policy lessons for the 
design of these incentives.  
 
We proceed as follows: The following section presents a methodology for the systematic 
literature review; this is followed by an analysis of the findings of relevant studies 
identified, highlighting strengths, weaknesses and opportunities for further research; and 
we conclude with key policy insights.  
2.2. Methodology  
Systematic literature reviews offer an established methodological approach for presenting 
summaries of empirical evidence from across a range of disciplines, and generally 
incorporate the findings from both quantitative and qualitative studies (Keele, 2007). 
They are commonly used to consider whether a particular intervention has been 
 34 
successful in relation to a given societal problem (Hansen & Rieper, 2009; Keele, 2007; 
Petticrew & Roberts, 2008).  
 
In order to ensure the scientific validity of a systematic literature review it is important to 
precisely define the research question and to determine the type of primary studies the 
review is trying to locate. This is achieved by developing clear inclusion and exclusion 
criteria. These criteria are used to screen research results and to identify relevant studies, 
the findings of which are critically appraised (Keele, 2007; Petticrew & Roberts, 2008). 
 
2.2.1. Determining studies of interest 
We proceed to defining a clear search strategy and identifying explicit inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
qualitative analyses and case studies complement statistical analyses by capturing the 
effects of policies and institutions on other aspects of the system, and the effect of 
institutional, social and political factors on policy success (Somanathan et al., 2014). We 
therefore consider both quantitative and qualitative ex post assessments covering the 
impact of policy interventions, including reviews of empirical evidence, and interviews 
with and surveys of individual citizens and community groups. We exclude ex ante 
forecasts using economic models, as well as consultants’ reports and evaluations by 
Governments of incentive programmes. 
 
“Downstream” incentives targeting individuals and communities are our primary focus. 
We exclude evaluations of “upstream” incentives targeting manufacturers and 
“midstream” incentives targeting retailers (de la Rue du Can et al., 2014). Energy 
efficiency obligation schemes and emissions trading schemes, which are targeted 
primarily at companies, are therefore excluded, as are evaluations of how EFIs affect 
investment decisions by companies. We also exclude studies focusing on institutional 
investors (Barradale, 2014; Bolton & Foxon, 2015; Mathews et al., 2010; Wustenhagen 
& Teppo, 2006) and general assessments of the effectiveness of EFIs (Abolhosseini & 
Heshmati, 2014; Bobinaite & Tarvydas, 2014; Marques & Fuinhas, 2012; Mickwitz, 
2003; Oak et al., 2014; Ozcan, 2014; Polzin et al., 2015; Somanathan et al., 2014) that do 
not explicitly consider implications for local citizen investors.  
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EFI’s are generally distinguished from regulatory instruments (command and control), 
informational, and cooperative (or voluntary) policy interventions (Mickwitz, 2003), and 
studies covering these policy interventions are therefore also excluded. EFIs can be further 
sub-divided into those that are technology-specific or technology-neutral. The former 
might include, for example, an incentive to purchase a low-carbon vehicle or low-carbon 
heating system. The latter, on the other hand, would include instruments such as carbon 
taxation (Bergek & Berggren, 2014; Sierzchula et al., 2014). We include technology-
specific economic incentives in this review, but studies that address general instruments 
such as carbon taxation will only be included insofar as they are relevant to assessing the 
merit of a technology-specific incentive.  
In practice, this implies a focus on a specific set of EFIs. Further to analysis of IEA’s 
comprehensive database of economic incentives which have been implemented in the 
buildings, energy and transport sectors to promote LCTs,2 the IPCC’s typology of sector-
specific economic incentives (Somanathan et al., 2014, p. 1158), and reviews of several 
comprehensive analyses on financial incentives for renewables (Cansino et al., 2011; 
Solangi et al., 2011), we identified the following four categories of incentive for 
inclusion: 
• Feed in tariff (FiT), Feed in Premium (FiP) and quota schemes3 
• Tax incentives 
• Grants and subsidies 




3 A FiT is an agreement to pay a guaranteed amount over a set period of time for certain types of renewable heat and 
electricity. A guaranteed price tariff is a FiT scheme where a set rate is paid for each unit of electricity generated and 
supplied to the grid. FiPs are similar to FiTs, except that in this case a fixed premium is added to the market price when 
exporting electricity to the grid (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). There are two broad category of quota scheme. Quotas 
with tradable green certificates (TGCs) are certificates issued for every unit of renewable electricity. They allow 
generators to obtain additional revenue from the sale of electricity. Demand for TGCs originates from an obligation on 
electricity distributors to surrender a number of TGCs as a share of their annual consumption (quota). Under 
tendering/bidding systems, on the other hand, government invites renewable electricity generators to compete for either 
a financial budget or renewable electricity generation capacity. Within each technology band, the cheapest bids are 
awarded contracts and receive the subsidy (del Río and Bleda, 2012) 
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Several of these EFIs (in particular FiTs and quota schemes) often target large investors, 
and therefore only studies that explicitly consider the impacts on individuals and 
communities will be included. 
 
Not all studies that fit our inclusion criteria, however, fell into one of the four categories 
above. Many studies deal with incentives relevant to local citizen investors in a general 
manner, without focusing on a particular EFI. We therefore include a fifth category 
evaluating this literature (Section 3.1 below).  
2.2.2. Undertaking the research 
Based on a preliminary review of the literature, “economic incentive” and “financial 
incentive” were identified as terms that are used interchangeably in the literature to refer 
to instruments that provide actors with monetary compensation to engage in a particular 
activity. These terms are combined with “low-carbon” and “renewable energy” given the 
focus on LCTs. Finally, in order to ensure a focus on studies that address citizens and 
communities we further refined our search terms using the words “behaviour” and 
“community”. This resulted in the eight key word combinations given in Table 2.1. 
 







The following electronic databases were searched using these key word combinations to 
uncover relevant studies: 
• Web of Science 
• ABI/INFORM  
• Science Direct 
1 Financial incentive Low carbon Behaviour  
2 Community 
3 Renewable energy Behaviour  
4 Community 
5 Economic incentive Low carbon Behaviour  
6 Community 
7 Renewable energy Behaviour  
8 Community  
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In Web of Science, the eight phrases were entered as basic searches; in ABI/INFORM 
entire documents were searched using the eight phrases; and all fields were also searched 
using the eight key phrases in Science Direct. We used Google Scholar to identify further 
relevant journal articles using the same keyword combinations. In all cases, findings were 
restricted to English language peer reviewed articles published since 2005. Finally, the 
bibliography of key publications was used to identify further relevant publications. 
 
2.2.3. Critically appraised findings 
Systematic reviews specify the information to be obtained from each primary study 
against pre-determined evaluation criteria. While our primary objective is to exploring 
the effectiveness of EFIs in mobilising investments in LCTs, it is important to consider 
other evaluation criteria in order to come to a broader understanding of the “success” of a 
particular EFI. 
 
In addition to environmental effectiveness, IPCC proposed the following evaluation 
criteria for climate change policy: economic effectiveness (cost-effectiveness and 
economic efficiency), distributional equity and broader social impacts, and institutional, 
political, and administrative feasibility and flexibility (Somanathan et al., 2014). In our 
appraisal of studies, we consider these criteria where possible when evaluating the impact 
of a particular EFI (although, as discussed in the conclusions section, few studies 
implicitly or explicitly consider more than one of these criteria). 
2.3. Results and discussion  













Table 2.2 Search results 
 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were rigorously applied to these returns. Papers were 
discounted further to a review of the abstract or further a review of the full paper as 
necessary. In some cases, however, it was possible to discount search returns based on the 
title of the paper. In the case of all eight key word searches, it was unnecessary to scan 
returns after the first 500 entries because returns became consistently irrelevant. Finally, 
the bibliography of key publications was used to identify further relevant publications. In 
Table 3 (see Appendix) we present an overview of the 55 studies that met these criteria, 
and a summary of the key relevant findings in each case.  
 
2.3.1. Do EFIs mobilise citizen investment? 
There is a significant body of research that is not specific to a particular type of EFI, 
which identifies factors that influence the attractiveness of these incentives to local 
citizen investors. This work, much of it from the field of behavioural economics, suggests 
that while some individual citizens may respond in an “economically rational” manner to 
EFIs, this will not always be the case. For example, Frederiks et al., (2013), Schultz 
(2015), Allcott (2011), Costa and Kahn (2013) and Palm and Tengvar (2011) identified 





Financial incentive low carbon 
community  1,642  6,181  10  16,900 
Financial incentive low carbon 
behaviour  1,428  5,634   5   17,400 
Financial incentive renewable energy 
community  1,250   5,073   21   18,100 
Financial incentive renewable energy 
behaviour 1,514  6,034   6  18,000 
Economic incentive low carbon 
community 3,065 9,434  16  17,300 
Economic incentive low carbon 
behaviour 2,848    9,092   14 17,500 
Economic incentive renewable energy 
community  2,184   8,110   30    17,800 
Economic incentive renewable energy 
behaviour 1,903  7,676   18 18,000 
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the potential importance of social comparison and the influence of peers and neighbours 
in the community as a factor that can have a positive or negative impact on LCT 
investment decisions.  
 
Frederiks et al., (2013) identified several behavioural factors that need to be considered 
when designing EFIs, including myopia (high discounting of future benefits) and status 
quo biases. The prevalence of myopia in low car purchasing decisions is a particularly 
well-developed theme (Metcalf & Dolan, 2012; Lane & Potter, 2007), which may render 
individuals resistant to investing in LCTs even when EFIs are strong. Schultz (2015) 
found that in addition to EFIs, strategies such as prompts, commitments, feedback, and 
convenience can effectively promote pro-environmental behaviour – at least in some 
contexts, for some behaviours, and for some individuals. Frederiks et al., (2013) and 
Rode et al., (2015) identified the potential for EFIs to ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation, 
highlighting the importance of anticipating changes in individual’s motivational 
structures prior to “large-scale implementation” of EFIs so that negative or unintended 
impacts are avoided. 
 
These findings highlight the importance of considering EFIs as part of wider policy 
interventions (Michelsen & Madlener, 2016), and the need for complimentary, or in some 
cases supplementary, policy interventions in addition to EFIs (Lane & Potter, 2007) to 
promote investments in LCTs from local citizens. These interventions could include, inter 
alia, information provision or using the power of social comparison. It should be noted, 
however, that Momsen and Stoerk (2014) found using social comparison as a “nudge” to 
be ineffective in prompting individuals to choose renewable energy. 
 
A further strong conclusion from the literature is the importance of considering the target 
demographic when design EFIs, and the importance of avoiding “one size fits all” 
solutions. Kosenius and Ollikainen (2013), Fraune (2015), Greenberg (2009), and Egbue 
and Long (2012) found that demographic characteristics such as gender, age, and income 
are important factors in determining likelihood to invest in LCTs. Kosenius and 
Ollikainen (2013) additionally found that that regional differences existed in preferences 
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for renewable energy in Finland. It is not just demographic characteristics that are 
relevant, however. Coad et al. (2009) found that responsiveness to EFIs will vary by 
personality type, while West et al., (2010) found that “worldview” would also influence 
responsiveness to EFIs.  
 
These findings underscore the importance of market segmentation techniques to identify 
sections of the public that are more likely to invest in a particular LCT, such as early 
adopters (Lane & Potter, 2007), and to tailor incentives and measures to these markets. 
For example, information provision policies (such as the energy labelling for cars) may 
be effective in encouraging certain intrinsically motivated consumers to adopt green cars, 
whereas EFIs may be more persuasive for extrinsically-motivated consumers (Coad et al, 
2009). It should be noted, however, that the potential downside of this approach is that it 
could mobilise opposition from excluded sections of society (West et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, where EFIs are not cost-effective, they can result in increased electricity 
prices or taxes with the potential to undermined “buy-in” from wider society (see also 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3).  
 
A related though somewhat less developed theme explores differences between 
traditional investors and “new” local citizen investors. Bergek et al. (2013) and Linnerud 
and Holden (2015) found that investors in LCTs come from heterogeneous groups, from 
traditional investor classes to non-traditional small-scale investors such as farmers’ 
associations and individuals. Non-traditional investors may have varied levels of 
experience and divergent motivations for investing (Bergek et al., 2013; Linnerud and 
Holden, 2015), may have less business experience and financial strength than traditional 
investors (Bergek et al., 2013; Salm et al., 2016) and may have different investment 
preferences as a result (Salm et al., 2016). What therefore emerges from this subset of the 
literature is the need for discrete EFIs specifically targeted to the needs of local citizen 
investors, who will have different experiences, capacities, priorities and motivations 
compared to professional investors. There are opportunities to explore the specific types 
of incentives that might be attractive to these groups.  
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There are a considerable number of studies that identify the importance of the 
characteristics of the technology itself in the effectiveness of EFIs in motivating 
investments in LCTs. Some studies, such as Palm and Tengvar (2011), Stigka et al. 
(2014) and Claudy et al. (2010) found that, as well as socio-economic characteristics, 
trust, acceptance, knowledge, and understanding of the LCT in question can impact 
willingness to pay and invest in a particular LCT. These factors may also be prevalent 
when it comes to purchasing Electric Vehicles, where a lack of consumer confidence 
(Steinhilber et al., 2013) or uncertainty associated with the reliability of battery 
technology (Egbue & Long, 2012) may render EFIs ineffective in mobilising LCT 
investments. These studies highlight the importance of technology maturity, and the 
perceived advantages of one technology over another (Claudy et al., 2010; Egbue & 
Long, 2012), in motivating individual investment decisions, and underscore the 
importance of supplementary policies aimed at promoting understanding and acceptance 
of emerging technologies in addition to strong EFIs. This may including education and 
awareness raising, establishing trusted standards and regulations, or supporting strong 
warranties on emerging technologies. 
 
While some literature exists on the effectiveness of EFIs in incentivising individuals to 
investment in LCTs, there are comparatively few studies that assess the general 
effectiveness of EFIs in promoting participation in community energy schemes. While 
Hoffman and High-Pippert (2010) found that participants in community renewable 
energy schemes are motivated by contributing to the community as well as by economic 
considerations, by contrast Dóci and Vasileiadou (2015) found that personal gain was the 
primary motivating factor, although they also noted that other secondary hedonic and 
environmental motivations were also present. There is an opportunity, therefore, for 
further research to explore the relative importance and effectiveness of EFIs in 
motivating participation on community energy schemes (Sections 3.2 and 3.3).  
 
Finally, several studies highlight institutional and regulatory barriers, such as applying for 
planning permission, as important factors when considering LCT investment decisions. 
Palm and Tengvar (2011) find, for example, that rules by grid companies and regulations 
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are considered a hindrance to investment in micro-LCTs, whereas other studies highlight 
fragmented infrastructure (Egube & Long, 2012) or the absence of standards and 
regulations standards (Steinhilber et al., 2013), as factors which may render EFIs less 
effective, and potentially less attractive to local citizens unless they can be addressed. 
 
2.3.2. FiTs, FiPs and quota-based schemes 
The most popular EFIs to promote the adoption of renewable electricity are guaranteed 
price FiT and quota systems (Dusonchet & Telaretti, 2010), while FiPs are becoming an 
increasingly common instrument (Ragwitz, et al., 2012. FiTs have also been used to 
promote the adoption of renewable heating systems, though less commonly (Cansino et 
al., 2011). For the most part these EFIs have been used to mobilise investments from 
professional investors, project developers and utilities (Cansino et al., 2011), although the 
focus here is their attractiveness to citizens and communities. 
 
Some studies indicated that FiTs have advantages over quota-based schemes when it 
comes at promoting growth in community-owed generation (Meyer, 2003; G. Walker, 
2008; West et al., 2010). An important factor here is the actual FiT level as some 
countries offer higher FiT rates than others, and these have generally witnessed greater 
renewables deployment but reduced economic effectiveness. Fouquet and Johansson 
(2008) found that FiTs could be more appropriate for small and medium size investors, 
whereas quota schemes could create investment risk for independent power producers 
and opportunities for market dominance by larger players. Butler and Neuhoff (2008), 
Del Rio and Bleda (2012) and Mabee et al. (2012) found that FiTs could boost social 
legitimacy for deployment of wind turbines, while Feurtey et al. (2015) and Del Rio and 
Bleda (2012) found that quota schemes had tended to favour large wind farms at the 
expense of smaller independent producers, and had resulted in a geographical 
concentration of development, whereas FiTs had promoted geographically distributed 
development.   
 
A integral design feature of FiTs that makes them attractive to local citizen investors is 
the guaranteed level of support they provide over time, which results in additional 
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investment security (Dóci & Vasileiadou, 2015; Mabee et al., 2012; Lipp, 2011; 
Saunders, Gross & Wade, 2012). Sovacool and Lakshmi Ratan (2012) found that the 
certainty provided by the long-term FiTs resulted in access to lower cost finance for 
German individual investors, while Dóci and Vasileiadou (2015) concluded that 
Governmental policies should provide long-term and calculable EFIs such as FiTs to 
support these groups. This may be a particularly important consideration for local citizen 
investors given their relative lack of capital compared to traditional investors.  
It is unclear, however, if FiTs themselves are superior when it comes to attracting local 
citizen investors. Some studies identify the importance of specific design features of an 
EFI over instrument choice. Mabee et al. (2012), for example, found that the German FiT 
system identified a wider range of project sizes compared to a Canadian FiT scheme, thus 
offering more opportunities for local benefit; Saunders, Gross, and Wade (2012) found 
that a quota scheme introduced in 2002 in the UK was unattractive to community groups 
because of a number of unattractive design features, including the complexity of the 
scheme; while Linnerud and Holden (2015) found that the short duration and the abrupt 
termination of the quota and tradable green certificate scheme in Norway compared to a 
Swedish scheme contributed to additional risk and transaction costs, making it less 
attractive to new investor classes. Feurtey et al. (2015) found that a specifically designed 
community quota, stipulating that at least 30% of profits were to be redistributed to local 
communities, had contributed greatly to improving the level of local acceptance in 
Quebec. They therefore conclude that FiTs may be suitable for small projects (under 
10MW), while quotas could be more suited for medium and large projects, but that in 
both cases mandatory financial participation criteria may be required to ensure fair 
outcomes for local citizen investors.  
 
These studies highlight the importance of designing EFIs with the needs of local citizen 
investors in mind (Section 3.1), whatever the choice of EFI, and align with other research 
focussing on cost effectiveness, which also emphasises the importance of EFI design over 
choice of instrument (Huber at al., 2007). Few studies, however, explicitly consider the 
design features that are most attractive to local citizen investors and in many case these 
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findings are implied rather than explicitly stated. These are therefore questions that merit 
further research and investigation.  
 
A weakness in this literature is the absence of studies comparing the impact of FiTs 
compared to FiPs on local citizen investors. There is growing policy focus on FiPs, 
particularly within the EU in light of EU State Aid Guidelines, which foresee the gradual 
replacement of FiTs with the more market-price dependent FiPs (European Commission, 
2014). There is some evidence from Denmark to suggest that FiPs may be off-putting to 
local citizen investors compared to FiTs (Gotchev 2015; Meyer 2007) because these 
investors may be highly risk averse. It is unclear, however, whether it is the level of the 
financial incentive provided or the choice of instrument itself that is more important 
factor as far as local citizen investors are concerned and this is an area meriting further 
analytical attention.  
 
Other studies touch on the importance of complementary measures to support the central 
EFI, be it a FiT, FiP or quota-based scheme. Sovacool and Lakshmi Ratan (2012) for 
example, identified excellent information around tariffs as an important supplementary 
measure to the Germany FiT. In many cases, complementary measures have been 
deployed to address access to capital, which has been identified as a key barrier to local 
citizen participation (Lipp, 2011), particularly at the riskier early project stages, such as 
feasibility assessments, pre-planning development work, and planning applications. 
Yildiz (2014), Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz (2015) and Saunders, Gross and Wade 
(2012) all highlighted the availability of publicly supported soft loan programs as an 
important success factor which complemented FiTs in promoting the growth of local 
citizen investment in LCTs in Germany. There are opportunities for further research into 
the most effective way of addressing early stage project risk for local citizens, drawing on 
the experiences of different countries, as these experiences have not been 
comprehensively studied.   
 
Context-specific factors have also been identified in several studies and an important 
consideration in successful FiT implementation. Sovacool and Lakshmi Ratan (2012), 
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Dewald and Truffer (2011) and Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz (2015) found that the 
support of local citizen associations focused on energy and local decision-making 
provided the necessary background for successful deployment of LCTs in Germany. 
Dewald and Truffer (2011) found that market success was not sustainable in Spain 
because, by contrast, these necessary pre-conditions for success were not in place. These 
findings are consistent with Romero-Rubio and de Andrés Díaz (2015) who found that 
the greater focus on community energy in Germany compared to Spain in response to 
FiTs could be explained a number of context-specific factors including, inter alia, a 
relatively high sensitivity to environmental issues and a high number of people with 
sufficient financial resources to invest. These findings attest to the dangers associated 
with coming to general conclusions from the experiences of a particular country.  
 
Finally, some studies also identify a tension between mobilising local citizen investors 
and increasing electricity prices, which would have a countervailing impact on social 
legitimacy for LCTs (Section 3.1). For example, Del Rio and Bleda (2012) and Butler 
and Neuhoff (2008) found that total costs of FiT schemes have significantly increased in 
countries such as Spain and Germany, while Martin and Rice (2012) found that FiTs were 
a success in terms of promoting new investors in small-scale PV in New South Wales, 
but that the level of investor participation had been underestimated, resulting in cost 
overruns. While there is some evidence that using FiTs, quota-based schemes and other 
EFIs to mobilise local citizens as investors can reduce the overall costs to society or low-
carbon transition (by, for example, opening up optimal sites for renewables deployment 
(Nelson et al. 2016)), this is not a topic that has been explored in the academic literature. 
These findings highlight the importance of careful ex ante analysis of incentive 
programmes to ensure that they deliver the anticipated outcomes. 
 
2.3.3. Grants 
Grants, generally applied as a percentage of either the total installed cost or capital cost of 
an investment, are a widely used instrument employed to promote individual and 
community investment in LCTs. In 2010, grants and rebates were available in 42 out of 
195 countries globally to promote low-carbon heating, cooling and electricity generation 
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(Bobinaite & Tarvydas, 2014). Grants are the most widespread measure of support for the 
use of renewable energy sources for heating in the EU (Stevanović & Pucar, 2012), and 
are also commonly used in the US (Mundaca & Luth Richter, 2015).  
 
Several studies illustrate the effectiveness of grants in mobilising investment from 
individuals. It is clear from these studies that grants can encourage the adoption of 
capital-intensive LCTs by reducing high up-front costs, which is often cited a key barrier 
to investment (Painuly, 2001; Saunders et al., 2012). For example, Roulleau and Lloyd 
(2008), in an evaluation of grant incentives to promote uptake of solar water heating 
(SWH) internationally, found that grant programmes were generally successful in 
promoting technology adoption. Mahapatra and Gustavsson (2008) found that a grant 
programme was necessary for deployment of micro-LCTs to achieve critical mass in 
Swedish households. Chang et al., (2011) concluded that grants were successful in 
promoting SWH uptake in Taiwan, while Yang and Zhao (2015, in press) found that a 
Chinese grant (covering approximately 10% of cost) for LCT appliances was effective in 
targeting some segments of the population. 
 
Grant programmes have also been identified as important in promoting community 
renewable energy initiatives in some studies. Madlener (2007) found that rapid diffusion 
of wood fuelled district heating schemes in Vorarlberg, Austria, many of which were 
promoted locally and owned by communities and agricultural cooperatives, was 
dependent on the provision of attractive up-front capital grants, and, to a lesser extent, 
soft loans. Seyfang et al., (2013) and Saunders et al., (2013) found that many UK 
community energy groups were able to take advantage of EFIs, in particular grants but 
also FiTs, while Yin (2012) found that a grant programme was helpful for community 
wind initiatives in Oregon. 
 
Comprehensive assessments of grants programmes are, however, not common in the 
academic literature, nor are ex ante studies considering the cost-effectiveness of these 
programmes. While Roulleau and Lloyd (2008) found a German grant programme to be 
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cost-effective, they found cost-effectiveness assessments were not common in the 
programmes they evaluated.  
 
On the other hand, several potential downsides of grants programmes are identified in the 
literature. One potential weakness is that grants can increase capital and installation costs 
(Cansino et al., 2011). Chang et al., (2011) found, for example, that significant unit cost 
increases has occurred over the lifetime of the grant programme, leading to grant 
increases and supplementary incentives from local authorities. It has also been suggested 
that to avoid technology cost increases, grants based on total installed costs (Chang et al., 
2011) or use of both performance and cost criteria in grant programme design might be 
considered, but the success of schemes would then depend on the extent which industry 
can provide both high performance & low cost systems (Roulleau & Lloyd, 2008). 
Madlener (2007) identified techno-economic performance guidelines that greatly 
improved the technical efficiency and economic viability of plants as a key success factor 
in ensuring a cost-effective programme, and Chang et al., (2011) concluded that greater 
coherence between national and regional initiatives could improve cost-effectiveness.  
 
A further challenge is that grants can lead to stop-start investment cycles (Cansino et al., 
2011) arising from the sudden termination of support, rathar than the creation of a 
sustainable market for the LCT in question. Indeed Roulleau and Lloyd (2008) found 
evidence of stop-start investment cycles in a number of the programmes they evaluated. 
Seyfang et al. (2013) and Saunders et al., (2013) found that grants were important for 
community energy projects, but that a stable supply of funding is important for these 
local organisations to operate effectively over the longer term (Saunders et al., 2012; 
Seyfang et al., 2013). Seyfang et al. (2013) found that policy and regulatory threats and 
unpredicted policy changes were a real problem for many projects, while Saunders et al., 
(2013) found that constantly chasing grants was taking up too much of members’ time. 
The long duration of the programmes, which gives confidence to consumer and suppliers, 
has been identified as important design feature to counter policy and regulatory 
uncertainty (Chang et al., 2011; Roulleau & Lloyd, 2008).  
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There are also several studies that consider non-financial success factors in grant 
programmes. It has been argued that the administrative burden of applying for grants can 
be off-putting to potential investors (Cansino et al., 2011) and it is unsurprising therefore 
that Yin (2012) and (Madlener, 2007) identified the simplicity of application procedure as 
a key success factor. Mahapatra and Gustavsson (2008) highlighted the importance of 
technology reliability, trust in installers and personal contacts for information around the 
technology, while Yang and Zhao (2015, in press) highlighted the importance of 
knowledge, awareness and attitude to products and the subsidy program itself. These 
factors highlight the importance of supplementary measures to EFIs (Section 3.1 and 3.2) 
targeting additional barriers to investment, and the need for these incentives to be 
considered as part of wider policy packages.  
 
Some studies also highlight the differences in responsiveness to grant programmes in 
different geographical locations and different demographic cohorts. Mahapatra and 
Gustavsson (2008), for example, identified differences in individual preferences between 
Swedes and other nationalities, while Yang and Zhao (2015, in press) concluded that 
moderate grants do not significantly influence the entire population, but effectively 
influence people from high-income households. The study concluded that the subsidy 
programme should target higher-income groups to maximize the policy effect, and that a 
tailored programme would be required to target low-income groups. Madlener (2007) 
identified the pioneering work of innovators and early adopters as a key success factor in 
widespread technology adoption and diffusion in society. There are, however, potential 
downsides to these market segmentation techniques (Section 3.1). 
 
2.3.4. Tax incentives  
Tax incentives are the most widely used policy instrument globally to promote LCTs 
(Bobinaite & Tarvydas, 2014). The most commonly used tax incentives are deductions, 
exemptions or reduced corporate tax rates for businesses and income tax rates for 
individuals, but some countries have also introduced reduced property taxes and VAT 
rates to promote LCTs (Cansino et al., 2010; Cansino et al., 2011; Chandrasekar and 
Kandpal, 2005; Mundaca & Luth Richter, 2015; Solangi et al., 2011).  
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While there has been considerable empirical focus on the cost-effectiveness of carbon tax 
versus other EFIs (Lin & Li, 2011; Markandya et al., 2009; Montag, 2015), there has 
been a comparatively limited focus in the academic literature on the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in mobilising LCT investment.  
 
From evaluations with a focus on local citizens, it is clear that, like grants, tax incentives 
can be effective in mobilising investment from these actors. Roulleau and Lloyd (2008) 
found that a France scheme where a reduced VAT rate was introduced to complement an 
income tax rebate effectively promoted SWH deployment, as did a Greek scheme which 
offered a income tax rebates on the total installation cost. Black et al. (2014) found that a 
variety of state-level tax incentives, some of which were directed at individuals 
(including capital cost rebates, sales tax exemptions, and property tax exemptions), had a 
significant positive impact on wind energy growth in the Western States of the US. 
Solangi et al. (2011) in a review of solar policy globally, found that income tax credits for 
solar PV (used by both households and businesses) was the most important component in 
the growth in solar PV in the United States. Tax incentives have been particularly 
commonly used to promote the purchase of low-carbon vehicles, and their impact and 
effectiveness has been quite widely evaluated compared to impact of tax incentives on 
other LCTs. Sierzchula et al., (2014) found EFIs (reductions to registration taxes and 
annual car tax), positively correlated to a country’s electric vehicle market share, in the 
30 countries examined, while Kok (2015) and Rogan et al., (2011) found that the strong 
tax incentives introduced in Holland and Ireland respectively were highly effective in 
promoting purchasing behaviour towards lower CO2-emitting vehicles. 
 
As with grants, few of the studies provide comprehensive ex post assessments of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the instrument, and assessments of cost-effectiveness are 
somewhat uncommon. Where cost-effectiveness is considered, results are mixed. While 
Black et al. (2014) concluded that sales and tax rebate programmes had positive revenue 
effects without considering the additional wider positive economic impacts in society, 
other studies have identified cost-effectiveness concerns. Kok (2015) and Rogan et al., 
(2011) found that a rapid fall in government revenue resulted from the introduction of tax 
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incentives for low carbon vehicles, although the wider societal costs and benefits are not 
evaluated in these studies, while Roulleau and Lloyd (2008) found that France income tax 
rebates resulted in significant capital cost increases, which may have been attributable to 
the fact that the magnitude of the tax credit depended on the cost of the technology. 
Considering the wide usage of tax incentives globally, the absence of comprehensive 
cost-effectiveness evaluations in the academic literature is notable.  
 
Stop-start investment cycles were identified as an issue with tax incentives in the case of 
some schemes, highlighting the importance of long-term policy signals and programmes. 
For example, Roulleau and Lloyd (2008) found that policy changes resulted in market 
uncertainty in the case of the Greek scheme, and Solangi et al. (2011) found that an 
income tax credit for solar PV in the US was subject to continuous political uncertainty 
undermining its effectiveness.  
 
Other studies focus on the importance of design characteristics of tax incentives to 
improve effectiveness and their attractiveness to local citizens. Kok (2015) identified the 
“salience” of the tax (the visibility, transparency and the attention drawn to tax 
incentives) as an important success factor, while Yin (2012) found that neither a 
Production Tax Credit nor an Oregon Business Energy Tax had been designed with 
communities in mind and were not therefore conducive to community investment. These 
findings again highlight the importance of designing EFIs with local citizens in mind 
(Section 3.2).  
 
There are also a number of studies that compare tax incentives to other EFIs. Compared 
to grants, tax incentives have the disadvantage that they do may not generally address the 
upfront investment costs barrier (Cansino et al., 2011) and indeed Kok (2015) concluded 
that the upfront nature tax incentives is an important design consideration, while Roulleau 
and Lloyd (2008) found that the ex post reimbursement of investors (who received 




As with grants and FiTs, the importance of wider context-specific considerations is 
identified as an important consideration in Sierzchula et al (2014), who concluded that 
and tax incentives alone are important but not sufficient to guarantee high technology 
adoption rates. Finally, the overall impact of tax incentives on social acceptability of 
technology is not widely discussed in the literature. It should be noted, however, that tax 
incentives necessarily target tax-payers, and in some cases provide a higher level of relief 
to wealthier cohorts in society. The equity implications of a Greek tax incentive 
programme are questioned on this basis (Roulleau & Lloyd, 2008). 
 
2.3.5. Soft loans 
A loan is “soft” when the rate of interest charged on the loan is lower than the 
commercial rate charged by the banks and other financing institutions for commercial 
loans (Chandrasekar & Kandpal, 2005). Loans are a common LCT financing instrument, 
particularly in Germany where their use is important. Soft loans are often provided by 
commercial banks supported by Government, however, governmental organizations can 
also act as lenders (Bobinaite & Tarvydas, 2014).  
 
There is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of soft loans as a stand-alone EFI, based on 
limited evidence and few studies. Zhao et al. (2012) found that homeowners were 
attracted to financial incentives, but valued tax credits much higher than interest-free 
loans when it came to investing in LCTs, in part because local citizens were debt averse. 
Similarly, Chandrasekar and Kandpal (2005) found that an interest subsidy scheme 
provided for select LCTs by the Indian Government was not as attractive as an income 
tax benefit. According to Roulleau and Lloyd (2008), New Zealand introduced an 
interest-free loan for solar SWH appliances in 1978, covering 60% of cost, though the 
scheme was not found to be attractive to consumers, and was discontinued due to low 
take-up. Under the UK Green Deal scheme, loans were made available to homeowners to 
promote building retrofit. Marchant et al., (2015) found that while the concept was 
appealing, the cost of finance on offer (8 - 10%) was one of the key barriers to uptake. 
This finding is supported by ex-ante studies, which predicted uptake would be low unless 
much lower interest rates could be offered (Dowson et al., 2012; Hough, 2014). It should 
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be noted, however, that it is questionable if the loan could be considered “soft” in this 
case, and factors such as limited awareness of the programme and up front cost barriers 
were also identified as problematic (Marchant et al., 2015).  
 
In many cases, however, a soft loan may be combined with another financial incentive to 
make it more attractive as an EFI (Cansino et al., 2010, 2011). Perhaps the most 
important example of soft loans are those provided by the German state-owned KfW 
Bank. Strupeit and Palm (in press) and Yildiz (2014) found that while tax incentives and 
FiTs had been a central element to the German offering, the availability of low-interest 
loans, provided by KfW and issued through local banks, was an important success factor 
in the deployment of Solar PV in Germany. Overall there are few assessments of the 
effectiveness of soft loan programmes, and fewer still that evaluate soft loans as a stand-
alone EFIs, and their attractiveness and effectiveness in mobilising local citizen investors 
therefore emerges as another opportunity for further research.  
2.4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this study we undertake a systematic review of literature assessing the effectiveness of 
EFIs in mobilising local citizens as investors in LCTs. We do so in light of the potential 
financial contribution that this new and mostly un-tapped investor class could make to 
low carbon transition, and within the context of the relatively limited research focus on 
these actors.  
 
There are a number of limiting factors in this study. First, it is restricted to a review of 
technology-specific EFIs and their effectiveness in mobilising local citizens. It does not 
therefore assess the effectiveness of EFIs on actors such as businesses, professional 
developers, or utilities. Given the narrow focus, in several places the literature is sparse. 
While this makes drawing policy implications more challenging, it has allowed us to 
highlight several opportunities for further research. 
 
Second, consistent with de la Rue du Can et al., (2014) a key weakness we identify in the 
literature is that studies tend not to systematically and consistently evaluate the impact of 
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EFIs. Even where more comprehensive evaluations or cost-effectiveness evaluations 
were undertaken, the vast majority of studies did not systematically assess policy success 
using the IPCC evaluation criteria identified in section 2.3.  
 
Furthermore, the absence of well-defined objectives in the case of many programmes and 
interventions (Roulleau & Lloyd, 2008) makes their impact difficult to evaluate. Other 
complicating factors relate to context-specificity (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011; 
Somanathan et al., 2014), the use of instruments in combination with other measures 
(Cansino et al., 2010), and co-benefits and negative spillovers from policy interventions 
that are difficult to consider within a single analytical framework (Somanathan et al., 
2014). Finally, as with other studies (Bergquist et al., 2013; Brouillat & Oltra, 
2012; Kemp & Pontoglio, 2011) we find a great diversity of subtly different instruments 
within each category, and a relatively limited numbers of studies dealing with each 
instrument, all of which makes definitive conclusions difficult to draw.   
 
Notwithstanding these limiting factors, we proceed to drawing policy implications. Our 
review suggests that while some individual citizens may respond in an “economically 
rational” manner to EFIs, this will not always be the case. Considering the behavioural, 
social, institutional and regulatory barriers to investment faced by local citizens can 
therefore enhance the effectiveness of policy interventions. 
 
We find that FiTs and quotas, grants and tax incentives can be successful in mobilising 
greater levels of investment from local citizens, but that soft loans tend to be less 
effective as a stand-alone instrument. Our review also identifies potential disadvantages 
of using these instruments that need to be considered carefully, including cost-
effectiveness and social equity concerns. However, we identify approaches to mitigating 
these downsides through instrument choice and design. Overall we find that there is a 
need to come to a greater understanding of the costs, benefits and distributional impacts 
for society of mobilising local citizens as investors using EFIs, and for potential 




Our findings highlight the importance of understanding and responding to the specific 
needs of local citizens in EFI design. There may often be a requirement to include 
specific design features into FiTs, quotas, grants, and tax incentives, that will cater to the 
specific needs of this cohort. Providing regulatory stability and policy certainty emerges 
as an important success factor, as is understanding the characteristics of the target 
demographic, and indeed the characteristics of the LCT in question: if these factors are 
not considered in policy design, an EFI may not have the desired or predicted impact. 
Our findings also highlight the importance of introducing EFIs as part of policy 
packages (Michelsen and Madlener, 2016), where complementary measures can address 
non-financial barriers, such as lack of familiarity with the technology, technology 
immaturity, or low awareness of the incentive programme itself.  
 
Many studies also highlight the importance of context–specific considerations (Dewald & 
Truffer, 2011; Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz, 2015). We concur, therefore, with 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) that understanding the natural, social, policy and 
regulatory context under which economic incentives operate is necessary in order to 
measure success.  
 
Overall EFIs targeting local citizens that are carefully designed emerge as a potentially 
important means of mobilising private finance in LCTs. This in turn can engender greater 
levels of societal support for low carbon transition and contribute to addressing climate 






Table 2.3 Studies of interest 
Year Author Title Journal EFI Key findings  
2009 Allcott, Hunt Social norms and energy 
conservation 
Journal of Public 
Economics 
General Energy consumers are motivated by social comparison 
2013 Bergek, Anna; 
Mignon, Ingrid; 
Sundberg, Gunnel 
Who invests in renewable electricity 
production? Empirical evidence and 
suggestions for further research 
Energy Policy General Investors come from heterogeneous groups and may be 




What role for micro-generation in a 
shift to a low carbon domestic 




Subsidies and information activities alone were not 
sufficient to promote uptake of micro-generation 
technologies in the UK. Supporting niches 
recommended.  




Fiscal and economic impacts of state 
incentives for wind energy 





Tax incentive Tax incentives can be cost-effective and positive impact 
government revenues 
2008 Butler, Lucy; 
Neuhoff, Karsten 
Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota 
and auction mechanisms to support 
wind power development 
Renewable 
Energy 
FiT/Quota FiTs reduced costs to consumers and resulted in greater 
deployment of LCTs compared to quotas, and resulted 
in greater local benefits. 
	
 56 
2005 Chandrasekar, B 
Kandpal, Tara C 
Effect of financial and fiscal 
incentives on the effective capital 
cost of solar energy technologies to 
the user 
Solar Energy Soft loan Income tax credits may be more attractive to consumers 
than the provision of a low interest loan  





Subsidy programs on diffusion of 
solar water heaters: Taiwan’s 
experience 
Energy Policy Grant Grants were successful in mobilising investment but 
resulted in significant unit technology cost increases. 
2010 Claudy, M; 
Michelsen, C; 
O'Driscoll, A; 
Mullen, M  
Consumer awareness in the adoption 
of micro generation technologies: 
An empirical investigation in the 




General Awareness of a technology is a prerequisite for 
adoption and consumer awareness varies according to 
demographic characteristics.  
2009 Coad, A; de Haan, 
P; Woersdorfer, J 
Consumer support for environmental 
policies: An application to purchases 
of green cars 
Ecological 
Economics 
General Considerable heterogeneity in terms of support of 
information-provision or financial incentive policies to 
promote green car purchasing decisions. 
2013 Costa, Dora L; 
Kahn, Matthew E 
Energy conservation “nudges” and 
environmentalist ideology: evidence 
from a randomized residential 
electricity field experiment 




General Social comparison between neighbours can be an 
important motivator of behind energy conservation  
2012 del Río, Pablo; 
Bleda, Mercedes 
Comparing the innovation effects of 
support schemes for renewable 
electricity technologies: A function 
of innovation approach 
Energy Policy FiT/Quota Feed-in tariffs are likely to attract a wider variety of 
investors, deliver greater levels of local benefit result in 
less local opposition compared to quotas. 
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2011 Dewald, U; 
Truffer, B 
Market formation in technological 
innovation systems—diffusion of 




FiT/General Social legitimacy needs to be established for FiTs, and 
specific design features are also important for 
individual and community investment to be mobilised 
successfully. 
2015 Dóci, Gabriella; 
Vasileiadou, 
Eleftheria 
“Let’s do it ourselves” Individual 
motivations for investing in 




General Economic and normative motivations are important 
motivating factors for participation in community 
energy initiatives 
2015 Dóci, Gabriella; 
Vasileiadou, 
Eleftheria; 
Petersen, Arthur C 
Exploring the transition potential of 
renewable energy communities 
Futures FiTs Long term and stable EFIs like FiTs are important 
enablers of community energy groups 
2012 Egbue, Ona; 
Long, Suzanna 
Barriers to widespread adoption of 
electric vehicles: An analysis of 
consumer attitudes and perceptions 
Energy Policy General Financial and non financial measures are required to 
mobilise adoption of EVs among early adopters  




Lessons learned in France and 
Quebec regarding financial and legal 
mechanisms to develop renewable 
energy: A hybrid model as an 





FiT/Quota Quotas and FiTs can be designed to promote greater 
levels of community and individual ownership 
2008 Fouquet, Doerte; 
Johansson, 
Thomas B 
European renewable energy policy 
at crossroads—Focus on electricity 
support mechanisms 
Energy Policy FiT/Quota FITs are more appropriate than quota-based schemes 




2015 Fraune, Cornelia Gender matters: Women, renewable 
energy, and citizen participation in 
Germany 
Energy Research 
& Social Science 
General Lower ownership rate and average investment sum for 
women compared to men in community owned projects 
in South Westphalia  





Household energy use: Applying 
behavioural economics to 
understand consumer decision-




General Individuals are highly influenced by social comparison, 
neighbours and members of the community 




Using Social Cognition and 
Persuasion to Promote Energy 




General Using social-psychological principles in interactions 
with small-scale investors is effective in promoting 
LCT uptake 
2009 Greenberg, M  Energy sources, public policy, and 
public preferences: Analysis of US 
national and site-specific data 
Energy Policy General Differences in preferences for energy sources emerge 
by age, ethnicity/race and other demographic 
characteristic in US 
2010 Hoffman, Steven 
M; High-Pippert, 
Angela 
From private lives to collective 
action: Recruitment and 
participation incentives for a 
community energy program 
Energy Policy General Community participants are not exclusively 
economically motivated  in community energy 
initiatives in the US 
2015 Kok, Robert Six years of CO2-based tax 
incentives for new passenger cars in 
The Netherlands: Impacts on 
purchasing behavior trends and CO2 
effectiveness 
Transportation 
Research Part A: 
Policy and 
Practice 
Tax incentives Vehicle registration and annual car taxes are effective in 
promoting low-carbon vehicle uptake, and the 
“salience” of the tax is a key success factor. The cost-






Valuation of environmental and 
societal trade-offs of renewable 
energy sources 
Energy Policy General Willingness to pay for renewables is different for 
different groups in society. 
2007 Lane, Ben; Potter, 
Stephen 
The adoption of cleaner vehicles in 





General Targeting early-adopters and combining non-financial 
interventions might be required to promote LCT vehicle 
purchases  
2015 Linnerud, Kristin; 
Holden, Erling 
Investment barriers under a 
renewable-electricity support 
scheme: Differences across investor 
types 
Energy Quota Design considerations such as duration of the scheme 
can impact the extent to which  quota schemes to can 
mobilise new investors. New investor classes have 
different motivations and characteristics compared to 
traditional investors.  




FiT Certainty provided by FiTs can support community 
energy initiatives 
2012 Mabee, Warren; 
Mannion, Justine; 
Carpenter, Tom 
Comparing the feed-in tariff 
incentives for renewable electricity 
in Ontario and Germany 
Energy Policy FiT FiTs enable individual and community investment and a 
wider range of project sizes has the potential to generate 
greater local benefits. 
2007 Madlener, 
Reinhard 
Innovation diffusion, public policy, 
and local initiative: The case of 
wood-fuelled district heating 
systems in Austria 
Energy Policy Grant/Soft loan Grants can effectively and economically efficiently 
promote LCT investments by community groups, but 
design features of programmes as well as context-




An adopter-centric approach to 
analyze the diffusion patterns of 
innovative residential heating 
systems in Sweden 
Energy Policy Grant Grant programmes can be effective but need to be 
combined with other measures such as information 
campaigns and context-specify needs to be considered 
in programme design.  
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2015 Marchand, Robert 
D. 
Koh, S. C. Lenny 
Morris, Jonathan 
C 
Delivering energy efficiency and 
carbon reduction schemes in 
England: Lessons from Green Deal 
Pioneer Places 
Energy Policy Soft loan Soft loans may not be effective unless they provide an 
attractive proposition to households 
2013 Martin, Nigel; 
Rice, John 
The solar photovoltaic feed-in tariff 
scheme in New South Wales, 
Australia 
Energy Policy FiT FiTs are effective at mobilising new investors, but 
measures to control cost-effectiveness are required. 
2013 Masini, Andrea; 
Menichetti, 
Emanuela 
Investment decisions in the 
renewable energy sector: An 




General Investors in renewables are influenced by social and 
institutional norms and financial incentives may not be 
successful in overcoming these status quo bases and 
need to be flanked by additional measures.  
2012 Metcalfe, Robert; 
Dolan, Paul 
Behavioural economics and its 









From intention to action: Can 
nudges help consumers to choose 
renewable energy? 
Energy Policy General The default nudge increased the share of individuals 
who choose renewables while all other nudges prove 
ineffective among German students 
2011 Palm, J; 
Tengvard, M 
Motives for and barriers to 
household adoption of small-scale 






General The perceived relative advantage of the technology, the 
complexity of the innovation, social influence, and 
knowledge of grants and costs can influence household 
responsiveness to EFIs in Swedish households. 




Motivation crowding by economic 
incentives in conservation policy: A 
review of the empirical evidence  
Ecological 
Economics 
General Financial incentives may in some circumstance "crowd 
out" altruistic motivation resulting in unintended and 
negative policy outcomes.  
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2011 Rogan F; 
Dennehy E, Daly 
H. E; Howley M; 
and Ó Gallachóir 
B. P.  
 
Impacts of an Emission Based 
Private Car Taxation Policy – One 
Year Ex-Post Analysis.  
Transportation 
Research  
Tax incentives Tax incentives can be effective in mobilising 
investment in low-carbon vehicles but impacts on 
Government revenues need to be considered in 
instrument design.   
2015 Romero-Rubio, 
Carmen;de 
Andrés Díaz, José 
Ramón 
Sustainable energy communities: a 
study contrasting Spain and 
Germany 
Energy Policy FiT/Soft Loan The ability of FiTs to support community energy is 
enabled by social, economic, institutional and financial 
pre-conditions being in place 
2008 Roulleau, T; 
Lloyd, C. R 
International policy issues regarding 
solar water heating, with a focus on 
New Zealand 
Energy Policy Grant/Tax incentive/Soft 
loan 
Grants and tax incentives can be effective in promoting 
individual LCT investments, but cost-effectiveness 
issues need to be considered and addressed in 
programme design. Grants have the advantage of 
addressing the upfront investment barrier more 
effectively, and but EFIs can result in stop-start 
investment cycles and raise equity concerns. Soft loans 
may not be effective unless attractive terms are offered 
2016 Salm, S; Lena 
Hille, S; 
Wustenhagen; R.   
 
What are retail investors' risk-return 
preferences towards renewable 
energy projects? A choice 
experiment in Germany 
Energy Policy 
 
General Local citizen investors may use simple heuristics to 
make investment decisions compared to traditional 
investors in LCTs. 
 
2012 Saunders, R. W.; 
Gross, R. J. K. 
Can premium tariffs for micro-
generation and small scale 
renewable heat help the fuel poor, 
and if so, how? Case studies of 
innovative finance for community 
energy schemes in the UK 
Energy Policy FiT/Quota/Grant/soft 
loan 
Grants can be effective in getting community 
organisations off the ground, but the stable source of 
finance offered by FiTs over time may be essential for 
these of organisations to operate effectively over time. 








General Prompts, commitments, feedback, social norms, 
incentives, and convenience can effectively promote 
pro-environmental behaviour 
2013 Seyfang, Gil; 
Park, Jung Jin; 
Smith, Adrian 
A thousand flowers blooming? An 
examination of community energy in 
the UK 
Energy Policy Grant/FiTs Grant and FiT funding is important for community 
energy groups and policy and regulatory uncertainty is a 





van Wee, Bert 
The influence of financial incentives 
and other socio-economic factors on 
electric vehicle adoption 
Energy Policy Tax incentives Vehicle registration and annual car taxes are effective in 
promoting EV uptake, but need to be combined with 
other policy interventions. 
2015 Solangi, K. H. 
Islam, M. R. 
Saidur, R. 
Rahim, N. A. 
Fayaz, H. 





Tax incentive Tax incentives can be effective in promoting solar PV 






Conceptualizing the acceptance of 




FiT The certainty provided by a long term FiTs resulted in 









Understanding the barriers to 
electric vehicles 
Energy Policy General Financial and non financial measures are required to 
mobilise adoption of Evs in German and UK  




Social acceptance of renewable 
energy sources: A review of 




General Socio-economic characteristics and knowledge of LCT  
can impact willingness to invest in LCTs. 
In press Strupeit, Lars 
Palm, Alvar 
Overcoming barriers to renewable 
energy diffusion: business models 
for customer-sited solar 
photovoltaics in Japan, Germany and 




FiT/Soft loan Soft loans effectively complement FiTs by providing an 
attractive financial proposition to risk-averse small-
scale investors 
2010 West, J; Bailey, I; 
Winter, M. 
Renewable energy policy and public 
perceptions of renewable energy: A 
cultural theory approach 
Energy Policy General Whether individuals are individualistic, hierarchical or 






Do subsidies work better in low-
income than in high-income 
families? Survey on domestic 
energy-efficient and renewable 




Grant Grants can effectively target some but not all segments 
of the population and need to be combined with 
information campaigns to increase effectiveness.  
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2014 Yildiz, Özgür Financing renewable energy 
infrastructures via financial citizen 
participation – The case of Germany 
Renewable 
Energy 
FiTs/Soft Loans FIT-system combined with a publicly supported loan 
programs had a decisive impact on community energy 
growth 
2012 Yin, Yao A socio-political analysis of policies 
and incentives applicable to 
community wind in Oregon 
Energy Policy Grant Grant programmes can effectively support community 
energy initiatives by alleviating the burden of raising 
upfront capital, and simplicity of application procedures 
can also be important 
2012 Zhao, Tingting; 
Bell, Lindsey; 
Horner, Mark W; 
Sulik, John; 
Zhang, Jinfeng 
Consumer responses towards home 
energy financial incentives: A 
survey-based study 
Energy Policy Tax incentive/Soft loan Income tax credits may be more attractive to consumers 
compared to interest-free loans, because consumers 
may be reluctant to become indebted 
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Chapter 3: How can financial incentives promote local ownership of 
on-shore wind and solar projects? Case study evidence from 






If 'dangerous' climate change is to be avoided, immediate and rapid decarbonisation must be 
achieved over the coming decades, particularly in developed economies (Anderson & Bows 
2011; Rogelj et al. 2010; Edenhofer 2014). Many industrialized countries are incentivizing 
the up-take of decentralized electricity supply technologies such as wind and solar 
photovoltaic (PV), which alone have the potential to contribute 22% of electricity sector 
emissions reduction by 2050 (IEA 2015). The widespread deployment of distributed 
generation technologies is potentially disruptive for traditional utility business models 
(Engelken et al. 2016; Johnson & Suskewicz 2009), and opens up business opportunities for 
new actors. These technologies, however, face several barriers to widespread deployment. 
For example, they are affected by a shortfall in private finance (McInerney & Johannsdottir 
2016), driven to some extent by the unwillingness or inability of traditional investors such as 
utilities to provide sufficient funding (Eleftheriadis & Anagnostopoulou 2015; Haigh 2011; 
Simshauser 2010).  
 
Moreover, individuals and communities may be slow to accept new technologies for various  
reasons (Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, & Bürer 2007). In particular, there have been growing 
levels of local community opposition to on-shore wind energy projects in “remote, corporate 
ownership” (Toke et al., 2008). Local discontent with renewable projects can be highly costly 
and indeed fatal for projects (Van Rensburg, Kelley, & Jeserich 2015), which provides a 
compelling policy imperative to understand how these objections can be addressed. Within 
this context it is notable that solar PV and on-shore wind power are particularly accessible for 
local citizen investors acting either individually, as member of a community group, or as 
party to a project by a professional developer (Enzensberger, Fichtner, & Rentz 2003). This is 
because of the maturity, modularity, high reliability, the simplicity of the power generation 
process, and availability of technical service providers for these technologies (Yildiz, 2014). 
There is considerable academic interest and interest from international bodies such as the 
International Energy Agency’s Renewable Energy Technology Platform (IEA-RETP) in 
exploring how sharing local value in renewable projects can build social support for low 
carbon transition. This literature suggests that local investment from citizen and community 
groups within proximity of a development, can generate local income (Callaghan & Williams 
2014), create jobs (Carpenter 2014), build autonomy and resilience, strengthen community 
cohesion, result in more locally appropriate developments, contribute to understanding of 
climate and energy security issues more generally, and create niches which positively interact 
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with the wider regime in various ways (Bergman & Eyre 2011; Bolton & Foxon 2015; 
Ricardo Energy and Environment 2017; Devine-Wright 2014; Palm & Tengvard 2011; Dóci 
and Vasileiadou 2015; Slee 2015; Viardot 2013; IEA-REDT 2016). 
 
There is also a growing literature that explores structural factors influencing the development 
of community and citizen renewable projects, which attempt to explain the concentration of 
local community energy projects in some countries and jurisdictions, and their absence in 
others. These include: grid connection and planning regulations, societal norms, a tradition of 
cooperatives4 and cultures of local energy activism (Bauwens, Gotchev, & Holstenkamp 
2016; Bolinger 2005; Breukers & Wolsink 2007; Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink 2008; Van 
Rensburg, Kelley, & Jeserich 2015).  
 
While technologies such as on-shore wind and solar PV are increasingly cost-effective, they 
generally require some form of Government support to galvanise deployment. There is a 
wide literature exploring the effectiveness of different types of financial incentives in 
mobilising investment from professional investors (Abolhosseini & Heshmati, 2014; 
Bobinaite & Tarvydas, 2014; Marques & Fuinhas, 2012; Mickwitz, 2003; Oak et al., 2014; 
Ozcan, 2014; Polzin et al., 2015; Somanathan et al., 2014). For this reason, there is also 
interest from an academic and policy perspective in determining what types of financial 
incentives5 are most attractive to local citizen investors. These incentives in the form of taxes, 
grants, soft loans, feed in tariff (FiT), feed in premium (FiP) and quota schemes6, have been 
identified as a crucial factor in growth of locally-owned renewable energy projects in certain 
jurisdictions (Parag et al. 2013; Curtin, McInerney, & Ó Gallachóir 2017a). Their use, 
however, has received less analytical attention. While there are some studies exploring the 
use of financial incentives to promote community energy (Bolinger 2001; Bauwens, Gotchev, 
 
4 A cooperative (also known as co-operative, co-op, or coop) is "an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-
controlled enterprise" 
5 Measures that provide actors with monetary compensation to adopt low-carbon technologies (Bergek and Berggren, 2014; 
Mickwitz, 2003) 
6 A FiT is an agreement to pay a guaranteed amount over a set period of time for certain types of renewable heat and 
electricity. A guaranteed price tariff is a FiT scheme where a set rate is paid for each unit of electricity generated and 
supplied to the grid. FiPs are similar to FiTs, except that in this case a fixed premium is added to the market price when 
exporting electricity to the grid (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). There are two broad category of quota scheme. Quotas with 
tradable green certificates (TGCs) are certificates issued for every unit of renewable electricity. They allow generators to 
obtain additional revenue from the sale of electricity. Demand for TGCs originates from an obligation on electricity 
distributors to surrender a number of TGCs as a share of their annual consumption (quota). Under tendering/bidding 
systems, on the other hand, government invites renewable electricity generators to compete for either a financial budget or 
renewable electricity generation capacity. Within each technology band, the cheapest bids are awarded contracts and receive 
the subsidy (del Río and Bleda, 2012) 
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& Holstenkamp 2016; Shi, Liu, & Yao 2016), comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness 
of particular incentives are not common (Curtin, McInerney, & Ó Gallachóir 2017a) and 
designing incentives that are appealing to local citizen investors within different contexts is 
challenging (Masini & Menichetti 2013; Wüstenhagen & Menichetti 2012; Yildiz 2014; 
Curtin, McInerney, & Ó Gallachóir 2017a; Stigka, Paravantis, & Mihalakakou 2014; Salm, 
Hille, & Wüstenhagen 2016; Linnerud & Holden 2015). 
 
Within this context, the research question proposed in this paper is how financial incentives 
can be used to promote local community ownership of on-shore wind and solar PV projects.  
Our aim is to investigate the use of financial incentives in key jurisdictions to promote local 
citizen investment in solar PV and on-shore wind projects, and to determine which policy 
supports have been successfully employed. In particular, we focus on understanding the risk 
and return for community investors at different stages of project development, from the early 
feasibility and development to the later construction and operational phases This paper 
contributes to a growing body of research that explores the effectiveness of financial 
incentives at mobilising citizen and community investment, and explores the potential 
applicability of these findings for promoting citizen investment in jurisdictions with limited 
experience of citizen participation. On this basis we present a framework which summaries 
key policy solutions to overcome barriers for these investors at different renewable project 
stages.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the research approach; in section 3 the 
case study findings are presented focusing on “the unique patterns of each case” (Eisenhardt 
1989, 540); in Section 4  we discuss “patterns across cases” (Eisenhardt 1989, 540); Section 5 
concludes.  
3.2. Research Approach 
This paper employs a comparative case study methodology. Case studies are considered 
suitable for documenting “how” and “why” questions, including processes such as market 
innovation, where the focus is on exploring contextual conditions (Yin 2003). They tend to 
report more information than, for example, a statistical study covering the same cases, and 
therefore provide a strong empirical grounding for a hypothesis (Odell 2001). Furthermore 
case studies can be used to synergistically combine quantitative and qualitative data from a 




We have chosen Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom (UK) and the Canadian state of 
Ontario7 as our cases based on several criteria. First, in all cases financial incentives have 
successfully been introduced to promote deployment of on-shore wind and solar PV 
technologies. The cases selected are therefore distinguishable from countries where 
community and local citizen involvement in renewables is in its infancy, such as Ireland, 
Spain, and many parts of the United States. Second, these incentives have specifically 
targeted local citizen investors in all cases. Third, it is recommended that selected cases 
illustrate a difference in a particular phenomenon by comparing instances in which it occurs 
with instances where it does not (Odell 2001). For this reason, we selected the cases of 
Denmark and Germany because mobilising local citizen investors has been a key feature of 
low-carbon transition in these countries for several decades. By contrast, the use of financial 
incentives targeting local citizens is a more recent occurrence in the other two cases. The 
choice of cases therefore allows us to explore the role of financial incentives within different 
contexts, and to compare the differences between countries, but also intertemporal within 
countries. This is particularly important in considering the implications of our findings for 
promoting investment from citizens in countries without a tradition of community investment 
in renewables. 
 
To build our cases we followed the following steps (Fig. 1): 
1. We undertook a systematic literature review of relevant academic literature (Curtin and 
McInerney, 2017), and a review of relevant “grey literature” reports from consultancies 
and community groups; 
2. We conducted a detailed desk analysis of relevant legal acts, policy frameworks and 
official government policy documentation in the four jurisdictions;  
3. We reviewed statistical data on renewable deployment and local citizen investment 
trends in each case; 
4. In some cases, it was not possible to determine the impact of a particular incentive on 
local citizen investment trends based on the above steps. For this reason, we undertook 
interviews with experts with intimate knowledge of the use of financial incentives to 
promote citizen investment in Denmark and Ontario, to enhance our understanding of 
the effectiveness or particular instruments;  
 
7 While Ontario, unlike the other cases, is a state, and therefore guided by the Federal Government in its energy policies to 
some extent, electricity generation is primarily governed at the provincial level (Krupa, Galbraith, and Burch 2015). 
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5. Finally, we conducted a one-day workshop in Ireland with 60 key stakeholders, which 
included presentations from experts on community energy from the UK and 
Germany/Switzerland, as well as many Irish experts. The objective was to present 
interim research findings, and to elicit feedback on the theoretical, policy and practical 
relevance of these conclusions for promoting citizen and community development in 
an immature market.  
 
Figure 0.1 Methodology 
 
A comprehensive list of sources is given in the Appendix. 
3.3. Case Study Findings  
In presenting our results we first present a short historical overview of the importance of 
wind and solar PV in the power generation mix, highlighting the participation of local citizen 
investors. In each case, we then assess the use of financial incentives and the emergence of 
“typical” business models. Key data from each case are summarized in the Table 1 below. 
 
Table 3.1 Key data of case studies 
 Proportion of total electricity 




Wind Solar PV 
Denmark8 53 40.5 .29 Over half of total wind investment from local 
citizen investors. 
 
8 Danish Energy Agency (2015) Energy in Denmark 2014 (Danish Energy Agency 2014) 




•Desk review of legal frameworks, policy documents etc.
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25.8  9 5.0 Over half of total investment in wind and solar 
from local citizen investors. 
UK11 19.1 9.5 .6 Low initial level of local citizen investment, 
growing gradually from 2000 and more rapidly 
from 2009 to 2015.  
Ontario12 28.7 4.4 Less than 
.1 
Low levels of community and citizen 




Investments in wind and solar PV from local citizens 
Denmark is a pioneer in the development of wind energy technologies (Ratinen and Lund 
2015), and is a leader in the deployment of wind energy supported by local citizens. In 2014 
over half of Denmark’s electricity was generated from renewables, with wind accounting for 
40% of total generation (Table 1). Of total wind generation, 40% was from off-shore turbines 
(Energienet 2015). 
 
Local citizen ownership has been a key aspect of the Danish model. As early as 1990 several 
thousand wind energy guilds existed. These were often small projects owned by farmers, 
private households or local companies (Oteman, Wiering, and Helderman 2014). By 2001, 
150,000 households owned or held shares in wind projects (Walker 2008). In 2015 small 
private wind energy operators were responsible for 50% of total electricity market share 
(Vindenergi Danmark 2015).  
 
The use of financial incentives to promote local citizen investment 
The development of renewable energy in Denmark gained impetus following the energy 
crises of the 1970s. High energy taxes were introduced (supplemented by carbon taxes since 
1992) to promote energy efficiency, creating an early incentive to explore alternatives to 
fossil fuels (Nachmany et al. 2014). 
 
In 1979, a grant covering 30% of the purchase price of a wind turbine was introduced. As 
wind power economics improved during the 1980s, the investment subsidy was gradually 
reduced before elimination in 1989 after a total Government investment of €38 million 
(Meyer 2003). While early producers received a price for their electricity relative to retail 
rates, the grant proved attractive to local citizen investors (Oteman, Wiering, and Helderman 
 
10 BMWi (2016) Zeitreihen zur Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland (BMWi 2016) 
11 DECC (2015) Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2015 (DECC 2015a) 
12 ISEO (2015) 2014 Electricity Production, Consumption, Price and Dispatch Data (ISEO 2015) 
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2014), who were responsible for all early investment. In this period, the income from wind 
farms received favourable tax treatment, interest on loans for purchase of shares in a wind 
turbine was tax deductible, and businesses could depreciate the value of a wind turbine by up 
to 30% annually (Bolinger 2001). 
 
A fixed FiT was introduced by the Danish Government in 1993 (IRENA 2012). This was 
combined with a tax refund for income from wind power generation for individuals who 
participate in wind energy co-operatives, introduced in 1997 (IEA 2016). Together these 
incentives delivered strong growth in wind capacity through the remaining part of the 1990s 
(Meyer 2007). Furthermore, grants were available by the Danish Energy Agency to covering 
feasibility assessments (Middelgrunden Cooperative 2000). By 2002, wind already accounted 
for 15% of the country’s electricity generation, and 40% of installations were run by local 
wind energy guilds (Gotchev 2015). Income from shares in wind farms remained tax 
deductible up to a certain limit. In these early years, projects were smaller and easier to 
finance, not least because of the presence of “ethical” banks such as Fælleskassen providing 
loans for wind turbines at below-market rates (Bolinger 2001).  
 
The intention to move to a more market-orientated support scheme was flagged in the 
Electricity Reform Act (2001). However, implementation was postponed several times 
(Danish Ministry of Economy & Trade, 2003; Meyer & Koefoed, 2003) and a FiP was 
eventually introduced in 2003. These developments resulted in slow-down in investment. 
Since 2009, wind investment has begun to recover. This has been attributed to an increase in 
the premium available to wind energy producers, and the reforms introduced in 
the Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources Act (2008). This Act introduced a number of 
initiatives to promote local acceptance and participation, deemed necessary given increased 
local objections to wind developments, as well as the progression towards larger and more 
complex wind turbines (Danish Energy Agency 2012; Oteman, Wiering, and Helderman 
2014). The Act required projects developers to offer for sale at least 20% of the ownership 
shares to the local population within 4.5 km of developments. It also introduced a specific 
measure to mitigate early-stage project risks for citizen investors in the form of loans to local 
groups covering project feasibility studies, up to a maximum of approximately €70,000. In 
addition to the state guarantee, local citizens tend to have access to project finance, generally 
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from commercial banks, as projects have an established track record and are considered low 
risk. 13  
 
Figure 3.2 Danish incentives over project time and stage 
 
 
3.3.2. Germany  
 
Investments in wind and solar PV from local citizens 
Germany is a pioneer in the deployment of distributed renewable energy technologies for 
electricity generation, and also in the involvement of local citizen as investors in low-carbon 
transition. In 2014 nearly 26% of Germany’s electricity was generated by renewables with 
wind and solar PV accounting for over 9% and 5% of this total respectively (Table 1). 
Citizen-led energy initiatives are a cornerstone of the German energy transition. Almost 46% 
of all investment across wind, solar and other renewables has come from individual and 
community groups (Trend Research 2013). Of total citizen investments, 54% comes from 
individuals, 26% from shareholdings in renewable projects and 20% from cooperatives 
(Trend Research 2013). Collective citizen ownership of renewable energy technologies is 
particularly widespread in the area of onshore wind power and solar PV, as well as biomass 
technologies.  
 
The use of financial incentives to promote local citizen investment  
 

























Public concern around nuclear power spurred the German Government to introduce Research 
and Development (R&D) policy supports to promote renewables in the late 1970s. However, 
by the end of the 1980s Germany’s electricity supply system was dominated by very large 
utilities relying on coal and nuclear generation (IRENA 2012). The appearance of climate 
change as a concern and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident acted as catalysts for change.  
Following a pilot programme which provided grants for wind power deployment in 1989, the 
first Electricity Feed-In Act (1990) introduced a FiT for renewable electricity. The Act 
obliged utilities to connect new independent power producers to the grid, thereby reducing 
the risk that FiT-approved would not achieve grid connection, and de-risking the early stage 
investments. Subsequent incentives have focused to a greater extend on the construction and 
operation phases of project development.  
 
The introduction of the FiT is widely considered a turning point for both the deployment of 
wind power and the role of local citizen investors in Germany’s electricity market (Jacobsson 
& Lauber 2006; IRENA 2012). By offering an undifferentiated FiT, in practice on-shore 
wind power, the most cost-effective renewable energy source, was favoured. Additional 
supports for wind power included loans at preferential rates and significant tax advantageous. 
For example, citizen investors in German wind partnerships could aggressively write off 
depreciation against all forms of income, including wage income until the late 1990s 
(Bolinger 2001). As a result of these incentives early investors were mainly small 
independent power producers, including individual citizens and collectively owned projects 
(Jacobsson & Lauber 2006; Bolinger 2001).  
 
While the first FiT was not financially attractive for solar PV investments, some utilities 
began offer local supports for PV (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). More significantly, the 1,000 
Solar Roofs Initiative, a grant programme launched in 1991, provided up to 70% of upfront 
costs for these installations. This grant programme was followed in 1999 with the 100,000 
Solar Roofs Initiative, under which German state-owned development bank (KfW) offered 
loans to individuals and small companies at low interest rates (under 2%)  covering the full 
cost of projects, with the objective of delivering 300 megawatts (MW) of installed capacity 
(Weiss & Sprau 2002). These soft loan programmes were expanded to cover all renewable 
projects, with finance covering both development and construction costs (IEA-RETD 2016). 
While applications for preferential loans programmes were initially low, this changed with 
the Renewable Energy Act (2000/305), which introduced a FiT regime differentiated 
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according to technology type and project size, including a much more attractive tariff for 
solar PV projects. The Act has undergone four amendments (2004, 2009, 2012, and 2014). 
Several studies point to the combined impact of the FiT and the widespread availability of 
soft loans covering development and construction costs as key success factors in the German 
case (Yildiz 2014; Strupeit&Palm 2016; IEA-RETD 2016). 
 
A number of reforms to incentive programmes have been introduced in the since 2012 with 
the objective of transition toward more market-based support mechanisms. This have 
included significant cutbacks in the FiT levels for new projects (2012 and 2014), and 
replacing the FiT with an optional (2012) and then mandatory (2014) FiP for new projects 
based on a contracts for difference14 approach. As of 2017, the FiT will be replaced by a 
competitive bidding model (tenders) for larger projects. These changes have created 
challenges for smaller independent producers (Bauwens, Gotchev, & Holstenkamp 2016; 
Wassermann, Reeg,&Nienhaus 2015). None of the successful bids for the Federal 
Government´s first solar park tender for 157 MW came from individuals or smaller 
independent producers, suggesting that the new scheme may have created barriers to entry for 
these actors (IEA-RETD 2016). 
 
Finally, a proliferation of regional and local level advisory services and citizens groups 
provided expertise and management services, often on a pro bono basis, to community 
projects (Schreuer 2015). Indeed regional clusters of energy community energy projects are 
located in places where support services are offered (Holstenkamp&Müller 2013).  
 
Figure 3.3 German incentives over time and project stage  
 
14 Under this approach generators sell energy into the market but to reduce exposure to changing electricity prices, a variable 
top-up from the market price to a pre-agreed. At times where the market price exceeds the strike price the generator is 






3.3.3. The UK 
 
Investments in wind and solar PV from local citizens 
In contrast to Denmark and Germany, the UK has been a relatively late adopter of distributed 
renewable energy technologies such as solar PV and wind. In total 19% of electricity was 
generated from renewables in 2014. 9% of this total came from wind and less than 1% from 
solar PV (Table 1). By 1990 there was virtually no locally owned renewable energy 
generation (Breukers & Wolsink 2007). Since the year 2000, however, there has been an 
increase in local citizen investment (Bolinger 2005; Toke, Breukers,&Wolsink 2008). By 
2013 the level of community renewable electricity capacity installed had risen to 66 MW, 
with another 200 MW was in development, 85% of which were in wind was accounted for by 
wind and 14% by solar PV (Carpenter 2014). A number of partnership projects between 
community groups and professional project developers were also in development or 
completed (DECC 2015d). While the role of local citizen investors therefore remains 
marginal, it is growing fast.  
 
The use of financial incentives to promote local citizen investment 
Renewable energy deployment in the UK15 traditionally focused on large-scale, utility and 
private-sector driven wind power applications (Walker et al. 2007; Breukers & Wolsink 
 
15 The UK consists of four countries: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. While overall energy policy is 























2007). The early liberalisation of the UK energy sector (1989) was followed by the 
introduction of a Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), introduced in the Electricity Act of 
1989, which required electricity distribution operators to purchase a specified amount of non-
fossil fuel energy from suppliers. Contracts were awarded to the lowest cost projects 
following a competitive tendering process, thereby favouring large companies with strong 
financial backing. The administrative burden to participate in the scheme as well as the 
absence of tax incentives and capital investment subsidies at this time further undermined the 
attractiveness for local citizens (Bolinger 2005; Breukers & Wolsink 2007).  
 
A Renewables Obligation (RO) (Utilities Act, 2000) scheme followed in 2002, required 
electricity suppliers in England and Wales to supply an increasing portion of electricity from 
renewables. This scheme was equally unattractive to community groups due to the higher 
costs associated with the smaller-scale projects that they tended to propose (Breukers & 
Wolsink 2007). Other barriers to community group participation included the complexity of 
application process and the perceived higher risk (Saunders, Gross, and Wade 2012). While 
the RO itself was phased out in 2016 and replaced with a contract for difference support 
scheme (DECC 2015b), community groups have identified a number of concerns with the 
latest scheme, including the high administrative and upfront costs, tight timelines, and 
penalties for contract withdrawal (DECC 2015c). 
 
The beginning of the new millennium is often cited as a turning point with respect to local 
and community engagement in renewable energy projects (Bolinger 2005; Toke, Breukers, & 
Wolsink 2008; Walker et al. 2007). The change in direction came in part as a response to 
planning and permitting difficulties experienced by larger commercial wind projects. Giving 
the local community a financial stake in the success of a project came to be seen as a way to 
bolster community support (Bolinger 2005; Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink 2008; Walker et al. 
2007; DECC 2014), but also as a way of educating the public (Walker et al. 2007). 
 
In this period a number of pilot programmes were launched focused on providing grant 
support to exemplar community energy projects along with earlier stage advice and support, 
including the five-year Community Renewables Initiative (CRI), launched in 2002 (Walker 
2008). This was followed by a Low Carbon Communities Challenge in 2009, under which 
advise and support on project development was provided and grant support was made 
available to cover investment costs for 20 ‘test-bed’ communities projects across England, 
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Wales and Northern Ireland (DECC 2012). National programmes were supplemented at local 
and regional level with grants. 
 
Many UK community energy groups were initially able to take advantage of grants, but 
found a stable supply of funding to be important to operate effectively over the longer term 
(Saunders, Gross & Wade 2012; Seyfang, Park & Smith 2013). A major turning point in 
supporting local community energy projects was reached with the introduction of technology 
and project size differentiated FiTs in the Energy Act (2008/21) (DECC 2014), which entered 
into effect in 2010. Payments through the mechanism replaced the RO for small-scale (5 
MW, raised to 10 MW in 2015) projects (DECC 2015c). In general FiTs cannot be combined 
with grants programmes, although some exceptions have been made (DECC 2015c).  
 
The rates of tariffs available under the programme have been subject to considerable 
uncertainty with cuts announced on several occasions, including in the first year of the 
scheme (DECC 2011), and in December 2015, along with a more stringent digression 
mechanism (OFGEM 2016). These have been justified on the basis of high take up and the 
declining cost of installation and hardware, especially for solar PV (DECC 2014) but 
community groups have complained that the cuts themselves have damaged confidence in the 
community energy sector (Quantum 2015).  
 
FiTs, however, were not found to overcome all hurdles faced by community energy projects 
(Nolden 2013; Bauwens, Gotchev & Holstenkamp 2016). Particular challenges in raising 
early stage finance from the private sector were identified due to their weak balance sheets of 
community groups (DECC 2014). A grant of up to approximately €26,000 was therefore 
made available for feasibility assessments, and a non-recourse loan of up to €167,000 for pre-
planning development work (DECC 2014). Similarly, schemes have been introduced by the 
Scottish and Welsh administrations (DECC 2015c).  
 
A number of tax advantages were also available for community investors. This included 
schemes to provide up to 30% tax relief to investors in new companies, early stage start-ups 
and in social enterprises. In 2015, however, the UK Treasury announced that community 
energy projects benefiting from subsidies would be excluded from these schemes (CEE 
2015). According to community groups, these changes will negatively affect the business 
case for projects. Challenges notwithstanding, the package of incentives, and the FiT in 
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particular, has proven itself popular among community groups, and has driven the expansion 
of this sector (CEC 2015). 
 
Finally, there has been a growing emphasis on encouraging communities and industry to 
work collaboratively together on schemes of mutual interest (DECC 2015d). To this end, a 
voluntary approach was trialled whereby developers offer between 5-25% of shares to local 
communities where project size exceeds €3.2 million (DECC 2015d). The UK Government 
has legislated to create reserve powers within the Infrastructure Act (2015/7) that, if 
exercised, would make this voluntary approach mandatory. 
 
Figure 3.4 UK incentives over time and project stage 
 
 
3.3.4. Ontario, Canada 
 
Investments in wind and solar PV technologies from local citizens 
The Canadian state of Ontario has been a relative latecomer to deploying wind and solar 
energy, but has sought to mobilize local citizens as investors as a central dimension of its 
low-carbon transition. While in 2006 virtually no wind or solar PV electricity was generated, 
by 2014 renewables accounted for 24% of electricity generated with over 4% coming from 
wind and under 1% from solar PV (Table 1).  
 
Between 2010 and 2015, 4,627 MW of renewable contracts have been awarded by the 

















central feature with some form of community and/or Aboriginal (First Nation and Métis) 
participation in 22% of total contracts issued (IESO 2015).16 Furthermore, an additional 
20,000 micro FiT contracts have been issued for small solar PV installations representing 181 
MW of capacity (IESO 2015), which included applications from many farmers, business 
owners and homeowners. Some community groups pursued their first projects as a result of 
the micro-FiT programme by aggregating a number of these contracts (Lipp 2016).  
 
The use of financial incentives to promote local citizen investment 
The Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program (RESOP) (2006) introduced a FiT for 
renewable energy in Canada. This programme encouraged a high concentration of larger 
developers due to high costs of applications, among other factors. This was followed by the 
Green Energy and Green Economy Act (2009/12), which introduced a technology 
differentiated FiT, offering stable prices and long-term contracts. Compared to the RESOP 
the price schedule for the FIT offered a considerably more attractive return for investors.  
 
The new programme was divided into two streams, the FIT stream and the micro-FiT stream. 
The micro-FiT programme for projects not exceeding 10 kW focused on homeowners and 
small businesses. It also introduced streamlined application and contract issuance procedures. 
Ontario’s FiT policy has been compared to the German FiT scheme. It comprises a set of 
prices for multiple technologies, differentiated according to project size – in both cases as the 
project size decreases the tariff increases (Stokes 2013; Mabee, Mannion & Carpenter 2012), 
although the German scheme has a greater number of options (Mabee, Mannion & Carpenter 
2012). 
 
A distinctive design feature of the 2009 FiT was the strong additional incentives and supports 
for community-owned projects. There was a particular emphasis on promoting projects 
owned by Aboriginal communities, who are an acutely disadvantaged minority in Ontario. 
Aboriginal peoples face even greater barriers in participating in renewable projects than 
ordinary community groups (Krupa 2013, 2012), yet nearly all future electricity 
developments will occur within their territories (Krupa, Galbraith & Burch 2015).  
 
 
16 This includes a small number of hydro and biomass projects. 
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The key incentive mechanism was an “adder” to the FiT, an additional amount per kilowatt-
hour of energy produced over standard FIT rates, related to the percentage of equity 
ownership by Aboriginal and other community groups (Cameron 2011). As can be seen from 
Table 2 below, this “adder” varied by technology, and was higher for Aboriginal groups than 
other local community groups. In addition to the “adder” Aboriginal groups in Canada are 
exempt from taxation for many activities.17 
 
Table 3.2 Maximum adder to FiT price schedule (c/KWh) 
 Aboriginal Groups Other Community Groups 
Wind 1.5 1 
Solar PV 1.5 1 
Hydro .9 .6 
Biogas .6 .4 
Biomass .6 .4 
Land Fill .6 .4 
Source: (Cameron 2011, 12) 
 
A 2011 review of the programme found that the FiT rules using a first come, first served 
approach disadvantaged community/Aboriginal participation, because these project types 
tended to take more time to organize and were more challenging to finance (ISEO 2012). 
Subsequently, under the second phase of the FiT, commercial projects with equity 
participation of 15% from local or Aboriginal communities received additional points on 
their application. Furthermore, 25 MW of the FiT was set aside projects that had 50% equity 
ownership from cooperatives (this legal form was given specific recognition) and a further 25 
MW was set aside for projects with 50% equity ownership from Aboriginal groups (Lipp 
2016). Further to these requirements, a significant number of FiT contracts were issued 
involving community participation, and a majority of cooperatives active in the renewable 
sector were established in response to FiT 2 (People Power Planet 2016).  
 
In 2013, as a result of concerns around the cost to the exchequer (Krupa, Galbraith & Burch 
2015), it was announced that ‘large’ renewable projects (over 500 kW) would be removed 
from the FiT programme (IESO 2013). A competitive tendering process was introduced for 
these projects. The degree of community engagement and ownership, including equity 
ownership from cooperatives, Aboriginal groups, local landowners and municipalities, were 
included as important criteria in this tendering process. As a result 13 of the first 16 projects 
 
17 Correspondence with Dr. Joel Krupa, University of Toronto, 14 April, 2014 
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(5 wind, 7 solar PV and 4 hydroelectric) contract offers included participation from one or 
more Aboriginal communities, including five with more than 50% Aboriginal participation. 
Additionally, 75% of the successful proposals had received support from local municipalities, 
and more than 60% had support from abutting landowners. None of the projects, however, 
involved participation from a cooperative or a non-Aboriginal community group.18  
 
Under the FiT for medium sized projects (10kW to 500kW), which remains in place, 968 
applications have been received representing a total of 582 MW. Of these 13% had 
Aboriginal community participation, 35% had municipal and public sector participation and 
25% had community participation (IESO 2016). Finally, under the micro-FiT approximately 
50 MW of solar PV is to be procured between 2013 and 2017, and the majority of this will 
come from individuals, small business and some community groups. 19 
 
The FiT, however, was not the only support introduced for community projects. A number of 
incentives were made available to address key barriers to community participation, such as 
access to finance to cover establishment and early stage project feasibility assessments and 
planning applications studies (The Federation of Community Power Co-ops 2015). These 
programmes were streamlined into the Energy Partnership Program, which provides grant 
funding to cover the early-stage legal, technical, financial and due diligence and soft costs of 
community energy projects supported by the FiT. Charities, not-for-profits and cooperatives 
are eligible for the fund as well as projects developed by individual Ontario residents, such as 
farmers. These grants have been an important factor in getting community projects off the 
ground (The Federation of Community Power Co-ops 2015). 
 
Figure 3.5 Ontarian incentives over time and project stage  
 
18 Interview with Dr. Christine Koenig, Ontario Sustainability Services Inc. Tuesday 5 April, 2016 





This aim of this study is to systematically investigate the use of financial incentives to 
promote local citizen investment over the different stages of solar PV and on-shore wind 
energy project development, with a view to determining which have been effective in 
mobilising investment for local citizen and community actors. Our case studies reveal the 
importance of introducing financial incentives at both the early and later stages of these 
projects in order to establish a business case for local citizen participation. 
 
Our case studies reveal the crucial importance of incentives to overcome early risks at the 
feasibility and development stages of project development. Attendees of our workshop 
emphasised the importance of this insight and underlined the importance of considering the 
needs of citizen investors at the early high-risk project development stage. One attendee with 
community project development experience emphasised that professional developers can 
generally offset these risks by developing a portfolio of projects, whereas this is an option not 
generally available to local citizens. Early-stage project supports are particularly evident in 
the cases of Ontario and the UK, and, in more recent years, in Denmark. In these three cases, 
non-recourse loans and grants were introduced to cover feasibility and development costs for 
local citizen initiatives. In Germany, however, while soft loans were available to cover some 
of the development costs, examples of specific financial incentives targeting feasibility 
assessments are less common. The low risk environment in Germany for citizen investment 
was emphasised by attendees of our workshop. This can perhaps be attributed to the approach 















application,  thereby reducing early-stage project risks (IEA-RETD 2016). It perhaps also 
reflected the proliferation of local and regional groups and agencies available to support local 
citizen groups (Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz 2015; Dewald & Truffer 2011), and the 
high numbers of developer-led initiatives in the wind sector where early stage project risks 
are ameliorated by the professional entity.  
 
In all cases, incentives have also been introduced at the later (construction and operation) 
phases of project development. Stakeholders and experts that attended our workshop 
emphasised the challenges that community and citizen investors tend to experience as they 
seek to move to the construction phase of a project, in particular raising private debt finance 
to supplement grants, soft loans and their equity stake. We find that, while in the UK, 
Denmark and Germany early adopters and pilot projects were encouraged using grant-based 
supports, the introduction of a FiT was a crucial turning point and critical success factor in 
mobilising local citizen investors at scale in all four cases. A key characteristic of FiTs is that 
they provide a stable long-term income stream, and therefore reduced risk and make it easier 
to access bank funding, which appears particularly important for local citizen actors. In all 
cases, the favourable tax treatment of income from renewable energy projects emerges as an 
important supplementary consideration. Indeed, the removal of tax incentives in the UK has 
undermined the business case for many renewable energy projects since 2015.  
 
These findings could be interpreted to support claims of the attractiveness of the FiTs 
themselves for local citizen investors (Fouquet & Johansson 2008; Butler & Neuhoff 2008; 
del Río & Bleda 2012; Saunders, Gross & Wade 2012; Couture & Gagnon 2010). This would 
be of concern within the context of the transition from FiTs to increasingly market-based 
supports, which is evident in all four cases. It is noteworthy, for example, that when Denmark 
transitioned from a FiT to a FiP in 2003, no new guilds were established in the period from 
2003 to 2007 (Gotchev 2015; Meyer 2007), and several existing guilds ceased to exist 
(Gotchev 2015).  
 
However, our cases reveal that there are more important considerations than the choice of 
instrument per se. For example, specific design features were an important factor in the 
success of FiTs. In Ontario, the UK and Germany, FiT programmes were differentiated 
according to project size and technology type, opening up niche opportunities for local 
citizen actors the UK. In Ontario, adders, set asides and mandates have been used to 
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counteract the advantages of commercial organisations in bringing capital-intensive projects 
to fruition and in accessing finance. However, it is notable from the Ontarian example that 
consistent and increasingly strong supports were required to get community projects over the 
line, underlining the challenge of technical capacity for community groups. This was a point 
repeatedly emphasised by attendees of our workshop, and the role of trusted intermediaries in 
providing training, skills development and access to expertise was identified as an important 
success factor if specifically tailored financial incentives are to be available of by citizens and 
community actors.  
 
Furthermore, while the case of Denmark demonstrates that the transition from a FiT to the 
FiP was not seamless, the 2009 reforms illustrates that the latter incentive can be designed so 
that it is attractive to community groups. Additionally, the case of Ontario illustrates that 
quota-based tendering schemes can also be designed in a manner which is advantageous to 
local community groups. The German and UK quota/tendering schemes, however, appear not 
to have been designed with these actors in mind and have created barriers to entry for these 
actors. Ultimately, therefore, we would concur with the findings of studies (Feurtey et al. 
2015; Curtin, McInerney & Ó Gallachóir 2017a) that emphasise the importance of specific 
design features, and the importance of provision of stable financial revenues (Simcock, Willis 
& Capener 2016), as opposed to the choice of financial incentive per se. This could be 
particularly important with the context of migration to more market-based supports within the 
EU (Ragwitz et al. 2012) and elsewhere.  
 
Our cases illustrate that the cost-effectiveness of FiT schemes has been questioned, which has 
resulted in abrupt changes to the levels of support available. This regulatory uncertainty has 
clearly undermined the confidence of local citizen investors, who appear less resilient in the 
face of these changes than more traditional investor classes. Governments would argue that 
controlling the cost of low-carbon transition is a necessary priority to deliver continued 
societal buy-in. On the other hand, local citizens often provide their time on a voluntary basis 
(Rijpens 2013; IEA-RETD 2016), and their participation in projects has been found to open 
up access to  optimal sites (for on shore wind, or for example, south-facing roof tops), 
thereby reducing cost (Nelson et al. 2016). In many cases community objections greatly delay 
and increase the cost of community projects (Van Rensburg, Kelley & Jeserich 2015), and 
involving communities could reduce these project risks and costs. The net cost-effectiveness 




In this study, we evaluated the use of financial incentives introduced at different solar PV and 
wind project stages, and their importance in mobilising local citizen investment in Germany, 
Denmark, the UK and the Canadian state of Ontario. This study is, however, limited by a 
number of factors. First, it is restricted to the study of financial incentives, and we 
intentionally exclude consideration of socio-cultural and political traditions that are important 
in explain the success or failures of community-led renewable energy projects, particularly in 
Germany and Denmark. Unlike the use of financial incentives, these factors have been 
discussed exhaustively in the literature. However, cultural and political traditions cannot be 
replicated across jurisdictions and out interest here is in considering the lessons from these 
countries that can be applied in third countries. Second, we restrict ourselves to cases where 
community energy is somewhat developed in order to identify lessons for jurisdictions where 
community energy is in its infancy. e. Finally, we acknowledge that our findings are based on 
a qualitative evaluation. We consider this study explorative in nature, with the intention of 
opening up new areas for further empirical evaluation, and we do not therefore present our 
conclusions as a definitive last word on this topic.  
 
Notwithstanding these limiting factors, we proceed to draw conclusions and implications, 
summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3.3 Overview of findings 
 
    
 Early Stage Late stage 
Financial 
barriers  
- Inability to balance risk across portfolio of 
projects 
- Lack of investment capital and weak balance 
sheets 
- High financial exposure 
- Technical skills deficit 
- High risk aversion than traditional investors  
- Accessing loan finance 









- Grants  




- Feed in tariffs reduce market risk  
- Quota-based auctioning schemes can be tailored 
for citizen investors (using contract set asides or 
adders)  
- Favourable tax treatment  
- Access to technical advice and expertise 





Previous studies have identified context-specific factors to explain the concentration of 
community energy in certain jurisdictions. While we do not deny the importance of factors 
such as a strong tradition of local activism, it is clear that citizens and communities respond 
to financial incentives, even in the absence of such a tradition, for example in the UK. This 
suggests that even without context-specific advantages, the introduction of specifically 
tailored financial incentives can be effective in mobilising citizen investment. Our findings 
suggest that financial incentives must be considered at both the early and later stages of a 
project’s lifecycle. The requirement for early-stage incentives is a distinguishing feature of 
projects with citizen involvement, and appears central to the value proposition of many 
successful projects. This reflects the greater risk aversion of this cohort of investors, and their 
inability to balance risk between a portfolio of projects, as is the case with professional 
project developers. Incentives are therefore required at the feasibility and development stages 
to mitigating these higher early-stage project risks, although other measures such as setting 
out clear planning, grid access and other procedures are also important. The importance of 
early stage support for local community energy projects, while commonly acknowledged in 
the policy world, is not a topic that has received attention in the academic literature. It is 
therefore an area which merits further exploration. 
 
With respect to incentives introduced at later construction and operation phases, we conclude 
that market-independent supports such as FiTs and grants have been important in mobilising 
local citizens as investors. However, in contrast to previous literature, an implication from 
this study is that market-based supports such as FiPs and quota-based schemes, which are 
becoming increasingly popular within the EU and globally, can also be designed in a manner 
that is attractive to citizen investors. However, market-based supports, which are becoming 
more widespread in their use as wind and solar PV mature, have a mixed track record when it 
comes to mobilising local citizen actors — while they can be deigned with these actors in 
mind, this has not always been the case. The timelines for citizens and community groups to 
organise project will tend to be longer due to their lack of technical skills and expertise, and 
the greater difficulty they are likely to experience in accessing finance, and this is an 
important consideration in designing support mechanisms, in particular market-based 
approaches such as auctioning or tendering schemes. Areas we highlight for further research 
include: the extent to which local citizens are put off by the greater investor risk associated 
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with market-based incentives merits further exploration; and the net cost-effectiveness of 
incentivising citizen and community investors in low carbon transition. These findings add a 
new dimension to the growing academic and policy debate about how Governments can 
effectively mobilise investment from local communities and citizens in distributed renewable 
technologies. Findings should be of particular interest to policy makers in countries such as 






Chapter 4: Energizing local communities—What motivates Irish 







Distributed energy generation technologies such as solar photovoltaics (PV), wind turbines, 
combined heat and power (CHP) installations and biofuel boilers are expected to play an 
increasingly important role in transition to a low carbon economy over the coming decades 
(Ruggiero, Varho & Rikkonen 2015; Sioshansi 2016). These technologies may be 
particularly attractive for local citizen investors because of their maturity, modularity, high 
reliability, the simplicity of the power generation process, and availability of technical 
service providers (Yildiz, 2014).  
 
In pioneering countries like Denmark and Germany, over half of total investment has come 
from local citizens (BMWi 2016; Danish Energy Agency 2014; Curtin, McInerney & 
Johannsdottir 2018; Mey & Diesendorf 2018). However, in many other countries that are 
rapidly deploying distributed renewables (such as Ireland, Spain, and the UK), investment 
has been dominated by traditional investors, such as utilities, professional project developers 
and financial institutions (Curtin, McInerney & Johannsdottir 2018).  
 
The social acceptance of distributed renewables has emerged as a major factor in hindering 
technology deployment (Walker, Wiersma & Bailey 2014; Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan 2012; 
Wüstenhagen & Menichetti 2012), but also as a key enabling factor in low-carbon transition 
(Shackley & Green 2007; Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan 2012; Stokes 2013; Szarka et al. 2012; 
Walker 2008, 2011; Wolsink 2007; Jami & Walsh 2017). Encouraging citizen investment in 
local projects has been identified in a wide-ranging literature as one means of galvanising 
buy-in and acceptance for distributed renewable technologies (Bergman & Eyre 2011; Bolton 
& Foxon 2015; Dóci, Vasileiadou & Petersen 2015; Palm & Tengvard 2011; Parag et al. 
2013; Rogers et al. 2008; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink & Bürer 2007; Yildiz et al. 2015; Devine-
Wright 2014). Greater levels of local ownership has, for example, been found to increase the 
pace of technology deployment in some cases (Toke, Breukers & Wolsink 2008). However, 
the extent to which citizen investors are willing to provide investment capital for these 
projects is an open question. 
 
Prior research has found that the high levels of citizen investment in some countries grounds 
in country-specifics including, inter alia,  the regulatory environment, support from local 
advisory organisations, a tradition of local activism, a relatively high sensitivity to 
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environmental issues among citizens, and the presence of citizens with the financial resources 
to invest (Dewald & Truffer 2011; Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz 2015; Gamel, Menrad, 
and Decker 2017). These differences in contexts suggest that the experiences of countries 
with high citizen investor participation might not be replicable elsewhere.    
However, there is also an extensive literature which explores the motivation of citizen 
investors, which tends to focus on identifying more generalisable characteristics of this 
cohort across countries. Some studies identify the primacy of financial motivation 
(particularly within the current low-interest rate environment) (Fleiß et al. 2017). On the 
other hand, many studies have found that economic motivations and “rational” economic 
behaviour may not adequately explain citizen investment decisions (Masini & Menichetti 
2013; Wüstenhagen & Menichetti 2012; Borgers & Pownall 2014; Gamel, Menrad & Decker 
2016; Salm, Hille & Wüstenhagen 2016). Citizens appear to judge investments differently to 
professional investors (utilities & financial institutions, for example), & a variety of non-
financial factors have been identified which significantly influence attitudes towards 
investments in renewables (Gamel, Menrad & Decker 2017). For example, citizen investors 
may have less business experience and financial strength than traditional investors (Salm 
2017; Bergek, Mignon & Sundberg 2013) or may be influenced by their attitude towards a 
particular technology (Claudy, Peterson & O’Driscoll 2013). The importance of non-financial 
factors can be explained to some extent because citizens do not need to satisfy the minimum 
return requirements of shareholders and/or clients (Salm 2017; Bergek, Mignon & Sundberg 
2013).  
 
Notwithstanding these findings, little is known about citizen investor preferences for 
distributed renewables (Borgers & Pownall 2014; Gamel, Menrad & Decker 2017; Salm, 
Hille & Wüstenhagen 2016), and a lack of rigorous academic research on the risk-return 
preferences of these investors has been noted in previous studies (Salm, Hille & 
Wüstenhagen 2016; Gamel, Menrad & Decker 2017). Furthermore, while the importance of 
financial incentives and subsidies have been underlined by many studies (Curtin, McInerney 
& Ó Gallachóir 2017b; Curtin, McInerney & Johannsdottir 2018; Gamel, Menrad & Decker 
2017; Fleiß et al. 2017; Yildiz 2014), the design of financial incentives that are attractive to 
local citizen investors, and which would be effective in mobilising investment, is another 
underdeveloped theme in the academic literature (Stigka, Paravantis & Mihalakakou 2014; 
Yildiz 2014; Curtin, McInerney & Ó Gallachóir 2017a). 
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Grounded on the necessity to study different country frameworks individually, as well as the 
lack of research on the design of financial incentives, in this paper we focus on mobilising 
financial participation from local citizen investors in Ireland. The introduction of a 
competitive bidding system in 1993, and its subsequent replacement by a Feed in Tariff (FiT) 
scheme in 2006, has been successful in attracting investment capital into the Irish wind sector 
(O’Gallachoir, Bazilian & McKeogh 2010) and wind energy accounts for 24% of total 
electricity generated in 2014 (SEAI 2016a). However, under Ireland’s current trajectory there 
may be a shortfall in meeting Ireland’s EU renewable energy target for 2020 (SEAI 2017). 
Objections to planning permissions against wind farms, pylons and transmission cables have 
been an important factor in slowing the pace of deployment (Mullally & Byrne 2015), 
causing significant delays, and in some cases the abandonment of projects. 
 
In contrast to Germany and Denmark, investment has been almost entirely dominated by 
utilities and private developers. There is only one wind farm of 3.9 megawatt (MW) held in 
community ownership from a total installed capacity of over 3000 MW. While there has 
traditionally been popular support for technologies such as wind power, a “sea change in 
social support” has been identified (NESC 2014). For this reason, the Government’s Irish 
Energy White Paper (2015) envisages transitioning from an energy system “from one that is 
almost exclusively Government and utility led, to one where citizens and communities will 
increasingly be participants”, and includes commitments to use economic incentives to 
support the growth of citizen investment (DCCAE 2014).  
 
There has been some academic focus on understanding citizen acceptance of renewables 
projects within an Irish context (Van Rensburg, Kelley & Jeserich 2015; Brennan & Van 
Rensburg 2016). One study that explored citizen preferences between different models of 
participation found a preference for lower levels of risk and involvement (Hyland & Bertsch 
2018b), but without considering citizen risk-return trade-off and investment preferences.  
 
Within this context, key research questions addressed in this paper are as follows: are citizens 
from a country lacking a tradition of citizen investment like Ireland interested in becoming 
investors in distributed renewable energies? If so, what is the risk-return trade-off favoured, 
and what other financial characteristics and investment attributes are important for potential 
citizen investors, and what key barriers to investment exist? We seek to draw implications 
from our findings for the design of financial incentives. These are questions of significant 
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interest to researchers and policy makers seeking to understand how to motivate local citizen 
investment in distributed renewable technologies.  
 
We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the research framework and the methodology 
that will be used in the study; Section 3 presents an overview of the data; Section 4 discusses 
the results; in Section 5, the implications of these results are analysed within the context of 
the research questions. Section 6 sets out conclusions along and policy recommendations, and 
identifies areas for future research.  
4.2. Methodology  
In order to better understand citizen investment preferences for distributed renewables, we 
undertook a survey of Irish citizens which contained an adaptive choice-based conjoint 
(ACBC) experiment. This involved undertaking an online survey, developed over a number of 
iterations, which employed a stated preference approach to investigate retail investors’ 
preferences in renewable energy projects.  
 
4.2.1. Stated preferences 
Revealed preferences approaches are often preferred over stated preferences because they infer 
from known data and observed choices, rather than relying on subjective preferences, which 
cannot be observed. However, stated preferences can, in certain cases, support the investigation 
of individual preferences in markets where there is a lack of historical data (Louviere 2000). 
This is the case for citizen investment in distributed renewables in Ireland, which is an 
immature market. Furthermore, we decided to apply a stated preference approach because past 
behaviour cannot necessarily predict future decisions in the renewable energy sphere, because 
the market is highly dynamic in response to a variety of factors, including changes in incentive 
design, technology maturity and economies of scale (Golden 1992).  A final consideration 
when applying a stated preference approach was that when conducting interviews with 
reference to past actions, survey respondents may experience difficulties to retrieve accurate 
details, or may have a tendency to give incorrect answers to hide “negative” behaviour.  
 
4.2.2. ACBC 
Within the broad range of stated preferences approaches, we applied a conjoint analysis, more 
specifically an ACBC featured by Sawtooth Software. Both choice-based conjoint analysis 
(CBC) and adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA) provided alternatives, however, ACBC offered a 
number of advantages. ACBC includes features from both CBC (e.g. entire investment 
	
 94 
opportunities are presented and compared against other investment opportunities) and ACA 
(e.g. it is very interactive and the survey adapts to respondent’s answers) (Sawtooth Software 
2014; Hauser, Ding & Gaskin 2009). While, ceteris paribus, an ACBC will be longer, it tends 
to capture more data from each respondent due to its adaptable design. It also recognises non-
compensatory20 decision-making rules (Orme 2009).  These rules are derived when 
respondents eliminate non-acceptable options and then choose between the remaining 
alternatives. Furthermore, conjoint analysis has been used extensively in the general 
investment decision literature (Clark-Murphy & Soutar 2004; Franke et al. 2006; Shepherd, 
Zacharakis & Baron 2003; Shepherd 1999), as well as the renewable investment literature 
(Salm, Hille & Wüstenhagen 2016; Lüthi & Wüstenhagen 2012). The primary output from 
ACBC are derived utility values for each respondent that illustrate their relative preference for 
one investment attribute over another investment attribute. 
 
4.2.3. Investment attributes and barriers 
In order to set-up the components for the ACBC, consisting of attributes and their sub-levels, 
we proceeded to investigate major framework conditions that Irish citizens perceive as 
crucial to their potential engagement with distributed renewables. It is important to choose 
attributes and levels that are relevant to the problem being analysed. They should be credible, 
comprehensible and provide a meaningful context (Gamel, Menrad & Decker 2016).  
To identify attributes and levels suitable to the Irish market, we began with an extensive 
literature review, drawing in particular from Salm et al (2016) and Gamel et al (2016). On 
this basis, we identified attributes and levels that were suitable for the Irish market, which we 
used as a basis for  six semi-structured interviews with Irish experts,21 including professional 
investors, community groups and government officials. On this basis, we identified the 
following six investment attributes that were deemed most important to Irish citizen 
investors: return on investment, technology, partner, minimum holding period, risk of losing 
investment capital and location.  
 
In the case of return on investment, this was treated as a continuous pricing attribute with 
unique prices shown to respondents between 1.25% and 8.75%. Experts proposed this range 
to reflect the typical return on investment available in the Irish market, depending on the 
timing of the investment, risk profile and other investment characteristics. For each of the 
 
20 Where an attribute level is unacceptable and cannot be compensated by an increase in another desirable attribute level. 
21 Irish Wind Energy Association, Tipperary Energy Agency; NTR PLC; National Treasury Management Agency; 
Electricity Association of Ireland, and Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment. 
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remaining five attributes, experts identified three levels (Table 1) to reflect investment 
characteristics that are typically available in the Irish market, or are likely to feature 
prominently in the next phase of low-carbon development. In the case of “technology”, on-
shore wind is a mature technology, while solar PV and biomass-based technologies were 
deemed to have considerable near-term potential. In the case of “partner”, the scale and 
technical challenges of developing a project means that individuals will generally require a 
collaborator, and the three levels reflect the options deemed to be most likely. In the case of 
“minimum holding period”, an investment will often have a minimum period before which it 
can be sold for tax or other reasons, and the three options reflect options that are typically 
available. In the case of risk of losing investment capital, while every investment has some 
level of risk, we included a “no risk” option to reflect a case where project risk is fully taken 
on by another party (for example, a government entity through the provision of a non-
recourse loan). Finally, the three levels for “location” reflect the degree of proximity of the 
project to the respondent’s local area. 
 
Table 4.1 Attributes and levels 
Attribute Level 





Biomass (heat and renewable gas generated from 
wood, manure and other organic materials) 
Partner 
 
A community group (such as a cooperative) 
A private sector project developer 
A public-sector company  




10 years  
Risk of losing investment capital 
 
No risk (0% risk) 
Low risk (less than 10% risk) 
Moderate risk (between 10 and 25% risk) 
Location 
 
In your local area 
In the county where you live 
Anywhere in Ireland 
 
In expert interviews, we also identified six potential barriers to investment that might be 
relevant to the Irish market, which survey respondents were required to rank (Table 2).  
Table 4.2 Barriers 
Not enough savings 
Lack of experience making investment decisions 
No access to loan finance 
High level of risk 
Lack of trusted information about renewable energy technologies 




4.2.4. Survey structure 
Given our objective was to assess the general appetite for investment among Irish citizens, as 
well as barriers to investment, it was necessary to situate the ACBC component within a 
broader questionnaire. The survey was therefore structured as follows: all respondents were 
asked if they were interested in investing in renewables “if their ideal investment criteria 
were met”. If they answered “yes” or “maybe” they were asked how much they would be 
willing to invest, and were then directed to the ACBC section.  
The choice experiment itself was made up of four parts as follows:  
1. “Build your own” (BYO): where respondents could select their ideal investment 
opportunity by choosing from one of the attribute levels in each attribute (this section 
excluded return on investment and risk, as respondents are expected to prefer high 
returns and low risk).  
2. Screening task: where respondents evaluated four investment options at the same time, 
with different attributes, and were required to indicate if they were suitable or not. 
Respondents were offered 24 choices in total (6 windows), in which the options 
presented revolved around the BYO with one or two variations each time.  
3. “Must haves” and “unacceptables”: where respondents were asked if a particular 
attribute levels were “must have” or “unacceptable”, based on previous response 
patterns.  
4. “Choice tournament”: respondents were asked to choose between one of three 
competing investment options. This part of the survey was focused on exploring the 
remaining differences in the investment opportunities that had been identified, allowing 
for a better estimation of zero-centered utilities for the attribute levels of lower-tier 
important attributes. 
 
Finally, all respondents (whether interested in investing or not) were directed to a barriers 
question, and were asked to provide basic socio-demographic information. The structure of 
the survey is given in Figure 1. 
 







Cint,22 an international market research company that specialises in online consumer surveys, 
was recruited to provide a panel to complete the survey. 23 Cint has a panel book of over 
58,000 Irish panellists. We requested them to fill a quota of 1,000 respondents to complete 
the full survey, representative of the Irish population by age and gender. A screening question 
was used to identify those with an interest in investing, and this group completed the choice 
experiment. After conducting a pilot survey to ensure respondents understood the choice 
cards, the survey was administered via email, incrementally inviting respondents until 1,000 
had completed the choice experiment.  
  
To fill this quota, 1,680 Irish adults partly or fully completed the survey. Of those, 400 only 
partially completed the survey, leaving n=1,280 completed surveys. Of these respondents, 
Table 3 gives a breakdown of responses to the screening question concerning willingness to 
invest. Only those who answered “yes” or “maybe” undertook the full choice experiment and 
“no”-respondents were directed to the barriers section (see Appendix for further details).  
 
22 https://www.cint.com/ 




Table 4.3 Summary of responses 




Yes 515 40 Yes Yes Yes 
Maybe 485 38 Yes Yes Yes 
No 280 22 No Yes Yes 
Dropped out 400     




4.3.1. Interest in investing 
 
The first research objective was to identify if Irish citizens demonstrated an interest in 
investing in distributed renewable technologies. 78% of respondents (n=1000) demonstrated 
some interest in investing (we describe these as the willing to invest cohort), of whom 40% 
responding “yes” and 38% responded “maybe” (Table 3). The remaining 22% (n=280), 
whom we describe as the not willing to invest cohort, responded “no”.  
 
Willingness to invest was associated with certain characteristics (Appendix). For example, 
household income was somewhat higher in the willing to invest cohort. While 65% (n=832) 
of households with income under €25,000 indicated a willingness to invest, this was a lower 
proportion than among wealthier households. Another difference is that the willing to invest 
cohort was significantly more likely to have some investment experience (nearly half having 
“some” or “a lot” of investment experience). By comparison 86% (n=241) of the not willing 
to invest cohort had no investment experience. Older males also appear somewhat 
overrepresented in the willing to invest cohort. 
 
To test the statistical significance of these associations, we undertook Chi squared tests. As 
can be seen (Table 4), all citizen characteristics apart from “location” show a statistically 
significant association with willingness to invest at the two-sided 95% confidence intervals. 
To test the strength of associations we determined Cramer’s V in each case, interpreting 




Household income and investment experience showed moderately strong associations with 
willingness to invest: as income and experience increased, so did willingness to invest. Age 
showed only a weak association, with older respondents slightly more likely to invest. We 
had anticipated that those living within close proximity to an existing renewable project 
might be less likely to consider investing. Our results show, however, that those closer to an 
existing wind energy development were slightly more likely to considering investing. This 
aligns with research which suggests that public objections to renewable energy projects may 
soften as the project progresses (Eltham, Harrison, and Allen 2008). There was a negligible 
association between willingness to invest and gender or location (whether a respondent lived 
in a city, town or rural area). 
 
Table 4.4 Chi Squared and Cramer’s V statistics ranked according to effect strength 






Income 108.00 5 0.00 0.29 Moderate association 
Investment 
Experience 94.90 2 0.00 0.27 Moderate association 
Age 17.30 4 0.00 0.12 Weak association 
Proximity 14.4 2 0.00 0.11 Weak association 
Gender 4.90 1 0.03 0.06 Negligible association 
Location 1.30 2 0.52 0.03 Negligible association 
 
The willing to invest cohort were asked how much they might be willing to invest. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, smaller investment amounts were more popular, with 31% (n=305) 
indicating that they would be willing to invest up to €500, while only 7% (n=68) would 
consider investment amounts of “up to €50,000” or “more than €50,000”. On the other hand, 
45% were willing to invest “up to €5,000”. 





In order to explore the effect size of household income on investment amount, we looked at 
the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient statistic, which is a nonparametric measure 
of the strength and direction of association that exists between two variables measured on an 
ordinal scale (Rea & Parker 1992; Göktas & Isçi 2011). We found a statistically significant 
association (p < .000) between the investment amount and household income, with a 
moderate positive effect size (.344), meaning that households with higher income are likely 
to consider increased investment amounts (see appendix). 
 
4.3.2. Investment characteristics 
 
Focusing on the “willing to invest” cohort, we measured the importance of each investment 
attribute for citizen investors' choices. Importance scores are calculated by examining how 
much each attribute of the investment contributes to the overall utility of an investment 
option. They are standardized to sum to 100 for across all attributes (Orme 2010b).  
The mean importance values given in the Table 5 illustrate that financial characteristics such 
as return on investment, risk of losing investment and minimum holding period are very 
important considerations for Irish citizen investors. Standard deviations are relatively high in 
all cases, suggesting considerable heterogeneity in the sample.  
 

















Risk of losing investment 20.8 13.0 
Minimum holding period 19.4 11.1 
Renewable technology 16.9 11.9 
Project partner 10.7 7.6 
Location 6.2 4.2 
 
 
We proceeded to estimating part-worth utilities of attribute levels using a hierarchical Bayes 
(HB) model. This model is called "hierarchical" because it has two levels. At the higher level, 
it assumes that individuals’ parameters (part worths or betas) are described by a multivariate 
normal distribution. At the lower level it assumes that, given an individual’s betas, his/her 
probabilities of achieving some outcome (choosing an attribute in this case) is governed by a 
particular model, such as multinomial logit or linear regression. Initial crude estimates of 
betas are estimated for each respondent to use as a starting point. New estimates are then 
updated using an iterative process and in each iteration an estimate is made for each 
parameter, conditional on current estimates of the others. In other words, the HB algorithm 
produces betas that fit each individual’s outcome reasonably well, but “borrows” information 
from other respondents to stabilize the estimates (Orme 2010a) .  
 
The HB model fits well because it complements missing individual data by data from the 
overall group, and conjoint analysis is a prime example of an application that benefits from 
HB estimation (Orme 2007). For this reason, it has become increasingly prominent in market 
research over the past decade (Allenby, Bakken & Rossi 2004). 
 
The part worth utility reflects the relative desirability of an attribute level compared to other 
levels within the same attribute. Within the attribute “minimum holding period”, for example, 
it indicates the desirability of investments with a 2, 5 or 10 year holding period. The higher a 
utility, the more positively the specific attribute level influences decision-makers to opt for a 
certain investment (Tabi, Hille & Wüstenhagen 2014). They are zero-centred, meaning the 
values for each attribute sum to zero.  
 
Table 6 presents the average utilities for the different attributes along with the standard 
deviations and with 95% confidence intervals (this gives a range of values designed to 
include the true value of the parameter with a minimum 95% probability). As can be seen, 
investors have a strong preference for high return, low-risk projects and investments with 
	
 102 
shorter holding periods. This is quite an intuitive finding. To a lesser degree, citizen investors 
prefer solar PV to wind projects, and both are preferred to biomass. It is not clear why 
investors expressed a preference for solar PV, as all technology options were presented on a 
like-for-like basis. It may be that individuals are more familiar with solar panels generally 
and may be pre-disposed to investing in a technology they are familiar with, or it may be that 
opposition to wind technology negatively affects their preferences (see discussion). The 
location of the project and potential project partners are less important, although citizens 
demonstrate a slight preference for community-led projects that are not located in their local 
area. Standard deviations are again relatively high, suggesting considerable heterogeneity in 
the sample.  
 
Table 4.6 Zero-centred utilities and standard deviations at 95% interval of the posterior distribution (hierarchical Bayes 
model with normally distributed utilities) 




95% interval of 
posterior 
distribution 
Price PRICE: 1.25 -68.9 58.8 -72.5 : -65.3 
  PRICE: 8.75 68.9 58.8 65.3 : 72.5 
Technology Solar electricity 26.6 48.4 23.2 : 29.2 
  Wind on-shore -2.6 49.5 -5.7 : 0.5 
  Biomass (wood and 
other organic 
material) 
-24.0 49.8 -27.1 : -20.9 
Partner Private sector project 
developer 
-4.4 34.2 -6.5 : -2.3 
  Public sector 
company 
1.6 29.2 -.2 : 3.4 
  Community group 2.8 37.1 0.5 : 5.1 
Location In your local area -0.6 20.3 -1.9 : 0.7 
  In your county -1.7 16.2 -2.7 : -0.7 





2 years 31.6 49.1 28.6 : 34.6 
5 years 18.9 28.5 17.1 : 20.7 
10 years -50.5 51.1 -53.6 : -47.4 
Risk No risk 45.6 43.9 42.9 : 48.3 
  Low risk 13.3 24.2 11.8 : 14.8 
  Moderate risk -58.9 59.0 -62.6 : -55.2 
 
These findings are reflected in the number of respondents who found a particular investment 
attribute unacceptable. Few respondents (under 5% in all cases) found a technology, project 
location or project partner attribute unacceptable, whereas over 13.7% (n=137) of 
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respondents found investments with moderate levels of risk unacceptable and 13.1% (n=131) 
found a minimum holding period of 10 years to be “unacceptable” (Table 7).24 
 
Table 4.7 Number of respondents who found a particular investment attribute unacceptable (% of “willing to invest cohort”) 
 % 
Renewable technology 
Solar PV 1.8 
Wind on-shore 3.9 
Biomass (wood and other organic material) 4.7 
Project Partner  
Private sector project developer 2.5 
Public sector company 1.8 
Community group 2.1 
Location  
In your local area 1.9 
In your county 1.3 
In Ireland 2.0 
Minimum holding period 
2 years 1.4 
5 years 1.2 
10 years 13.1 
Risk of losing investment 
No risk 1.1 
Low risk 1.4 
Moderate risk 13.7 
 
An intuitive way of exploring the risk-return preferences of citizen investors is by exploring 
how much they would need to be compensated in percentage return on investment (ROI) 
terms, to accept an alternative attribute level (say wind in the attribute “technology”) to their 
preferred level (solar PV) of this attribute.  
 
The average part worth utilities serve as a basis for calculating the marginal willingness to 
accept (WTA) a switch between different attribute levels. It is calculated by subtracting the 
part worth score (u) of a particular attribute level (j) from the maximum part-worth utility 
(uijmax) of the same attribute (i). This score is multiplied by the price (p) of one utility unit, 
which is derived from the highest return (pmax)  less the lowest return (pmin) (8.75-1.25%) 
 
24 The number shown represents the % of respondents who considered the attribute to be unacceptable. 
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divided by the difference in their part-worth utilities (u pjmax  - u pjmin) (- 68.9 less 68.9). This 
formula is given in below (Figure 3).  
 




We find that citizens require a very high level of annual compensation (5.7%) for moderately 
risky investments over investments with no risk, suggesting that they are highly risk averse. 
For investments with a 10-year minimum holding period, an annual risk premium of 4.5% is 
required compared to investment with a 2-year minimum holding period, which suggests that 
citizens are uncomfortable with long term investments. Citizens require an additional annual 
return of 1.6% if they are to invest in wind (compared to solar PV), and 2.8% ROI premium 
for biomass compared to solar PV (Figure 4), which suggests that PV is quite strongly 
favoured. However, the results with respect to “partner” and “location” suggest that citizens 
are relatively agnostic between these attribute levels.   
 
Figure 4.4 Willingness to accept changes in preferred investment attribute for return on investment premium (%) 
 
 
 It is noteworthy that the standard deviations of the part-worth utilities were relatively high 
(Table 6). This points to considerable heterogeneity within the willingness to invest cohort. It 
is useful, therefore, to explore the extent to which typical types of investors within the overall 
“willing to invest” cohort can be identified. To do so we used respondents’ individual utilities 




























































































This analysis was conducted with the Convergent Cluster & Ensemble Analysis (CCEA) 
module offered by Sawtooth. CCEA groups respondents based on their individual part-worth 
utilities for all attributes levels, starting with the “k-means” method, but also using density-
based, distance-based and hierarchical solutions as inputs. CCAE therefore employs several 
different forms of cluster analysis. To determine a finding’s reproducibility, each replication 
is compared with previous replications (Orme & Johnson 2008).  
 
We chose a two-segment solution in our simulation with a 99% replicability level. We 
describe the first segment, which accounted for 63% (n=632) of the willing to invest cohort, 
as “risk-averse” (Table 8). The most important consideration for this group is avoiding even 
moderately risky investment options. They also prefer shorter investment periods, which 
could also be interpreted as a low appetite for riskier longer-term investment options. Finally, 
they are slightly more motivated by investing with community groups and public companies 
than their more yield-orientated compatriots. We describe the second segment, who 
accounted for the remaining 37% (n=368) of willing to invest cohort, as “pure yield”. This 
group is primarily motivated by gaining a high return on investment and is somewhat more 
willing to consider riskier investment options, as long as they are compensated with a higher 
ROI (Table 8).    
 






PRICE: 1.25 -55.74 -91.52 
PRICE: 8.75 55.74 91.52 
Solar PV 25.15 29.16 
Wind on-shore -1.91 -3.78 
Biomass -23.24 -25.39 
Private sector project -5.43 -2.76 
Public sector company 2.54 0.01 
Community group 2.89 2.75 
In your local area -1.44 0.72 
In your county -0.77 -3.28 
In Ireland 2.21 2.56 
2 years 42.32 13.13 
5 years 17.27 21.66 
10 years -59.59 -34.79 
No risk 54.82 29.67 
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Low risk 17.66 5.93 
Moderate risk -72.48 -35.6 
NONE 44.46 -131.71 
Group Size 632 368 
 
4.3.3. Barriers 
We asked respondents, both the cohorts who were willing to invest and those who were not 
willing to invest, to rank the importance of key barriers that would prevent them from 
investing in renewable energy projects. To interpret results, we ascribed a value of between 
one (lowest ranked) and six (highest ranked) to each barrier. The relative importance of the 
barrier within each cohort is therefore important in interpreting results, not the absolute 
values. 
 
For those who were not willing to invest, the financial factors (insufficient savings and access 
to loan finance) were important, but a lack of confidence or experience making investment 
decisions was what differentiated this cohort from the willing to invest cohort (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 4.5 Importance of barriers for not “willing to invest” cohort (weighted average of 280 responses) 
 
 
Financial considerations, specifically, not enough savings and no access to loan finance were 
ranked as the most important barriers for the willing to invest cohort. However, opposition to 
renewable energy in the community was ranked considerably higher for this cohort, while 
lack of experience making investment decisions and risk were less important considerations 
































In this section, we consider our results within the context of our three research questions: are 
Irish citizens interested in investing in distributed renewable technologies; what investment 
characteristics and barriers are important to them; and what are the implications for the 
design of financial incentives? 
 
4.4.1. Interest in investing and barriers 
The findings of this survey indicate that there is a high level of latent interest in investing in 
renewable energies among Irish citizens. This suggest that trends in citizen investment 
evident (in Germany and Denmark, for example) could be replicated in countries such as 
Ireland, given the availability of appealing investment options.  
 
Within the willing to invest cohort, over two thirds of respondents would be willing to invest 
“up to €2,000”, with 45% willing to invest “up to €5,000”. We found a moderately strong 
association between higher household income and investment amount, as well as a lower 
willingness to invest in households with lower income. In interpreting this result, it is 
important, therefore, to be cognisant of the fact that our sample was somewhat skewed 
towards lower income households. As can be seen (appendix) approximately 37% of our 
sample had a gross household income of €50,000 or above (44% of the willing to invest 












































€50,522 (CSO 2017) (appendix). Nevertheless, for some households, unwillingness to invest 
reflects inability, as is clear from the high priority given to “not enough savings” as a barrier. 
To put the preferred investment amount in context, capital investment requirements for a 
typical windfarm development are in the region of €1.6 - €2million /MW (SEAI 2016b).  
This implies a capital investment requirement at least €6.4 million for a 4MW wind farm (the 
size of Templederry, the only community-owned wind farm in Ireland). and in the case of a 
10 MW wind farm, the capital investment requirement would be at least €16 million. In both 
cases 75% would typically be financed with debt at financial close. Hence the equity 
requirement would be at least €1.6 million for a 4 MW - wind farm or €4 million in the case 
of the 10MW farm. With 200 community investors25 the equity requirement would therefore 
be €8,000 (4MW) to €20,000 (10MW) for each investor in these examples.  
 
It is also important to note that early stage development costs are estimated to be 8.6% of 
total engineering, procurement and construction costs (Mott MacDonald 2010). This would 
be at least €6,880 each on average for a 10 MW wind farm and €2,672 on average for a 4 
MW wind farm (with 200 local investors). This must all be invested pre-financial close, and 
is therefore at risk before it is clear if the project is viable. 
 
The vast majority of wind farms under operation or planned far exceed the 4 MW threshold. 
Our findings therefore suggest that partnership models between private developers and 
citizen investors are the most likely option for wind farm development, rather than fully 
community-owned projects. This is particular within the context of the longer timelines and 
technical challenges often faced by community-led projects (McDonnell 2014; Songsore & 
Buzzelli 2014). These findings align with an analysis which sought to inform Irish 
Government policy, which found that offering investment options to the community in 
developer-led projects could be less complex to implement (Ricardo Energy and 
Environment 2017). However, smaller wind farms such as Templederry could potentially be 
developed by community groups.  Other options include seeking to attract a higher number of 
investors (than 200), or seeking participation from citizen investors interested in making a 
higher than average investment (more than €5,000). 
 
 
25 We use 200 community investors for illustrative purposes because this is the number of investors in Templederry wind 
farm. We acknowledge, however, that a greater number of investors might be attracted.  
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Solar PV is anticipated to become an important technology in the next phase of renewable 
deployment in Ireland (DCCAE, 2015), subject to the introduction of a support scheme which 
is currently under consideration. Based on interviews and available data (DCCAE 2017) we 
estimate an investment cost ranging from €1 – 1.75 million/MW (for large scale and domestic 
roof mounted respectively), of which 75% would be provided by debt. It is worth noting that 
although capital costs for PV are lower than those for wind power, the capacity factor for 
Solar PV in Ireland is in the region of 11% compared to approximately 30% for wind. 
Assuming 200 community investors, the equity stake would be up to €8,750 on average for a 
4MW Solar PV project.  
 
Given these investment requirements, medium to large solar farms of 10MW or greater 
would be more likely to be developer-led with citizen investment. The average size of a 
ground-mounted solar PV project in Europe, however, is approximately of 3MW (Statistica 
2018), and small to medium scale projects proliferate in many countries such as Germany, 
Italy and the UK (IEA-REDT 2016; Castello & De Lillo 2013; CEBR 2014). Small to 
medium-scale solar farms could therefore offer the greatest potential for community-owned 
projects in Ireland, particularly given the opposition in some communities to wind projects.   
Our results suggest that the absence of a sufficient return on investment and access to capital 
are the biggest obstacles for many citizens: both for those who are willing to consider 
investing and for those who are not. This finding is reinforced by the fact that the willing to 
invest cohort was wealthier on average that the not willing to invest cohort. The social equity 
considerations of subsidising community and citizen investment therefore require careful 
consideration in policy design (Section 5.3).  
 
The lack of business experience and financial strength of citizen investors identified in 
previous studies (Bergek, Mignon, and Sundberg 2013) is also supported by our results. This 
finding was reinforced by the moderately strong association between investment experience 
and willingness to invest, which was also noted. 
 
4.4.2. Investment characteristics 
Irish citizen investors are primarily concerned with the financial characteristics of 
investments. We find that the majority of citizen investors are highly risk averse, and do not 
like investments with long minimum holding periods. Our findings support studies that 
identify citizen investors as highly risk averse (Hyland & Bertsch 2018a; Gamel, Menrad, & 
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Decker 2017). However, from our cluster analysis, we find that there is a segment of 
investors who are primarily motivated by higher yields, and who have an appetite for a 
moderate level of risk. 
 
This suggests that a majority of citizen investors would prefer to be involved with projects 
after financial close, when they have been substantially de-risked. This finding again 
underlines the potential role for partnership and joint venture approaches between local 
citizens and private developers. For example, private developers could grant preference 
shares at the very early stages of project development to local citizens. This would allow the 
local community to be part of the development without putting any capital at risk. Once the 
project is operational, the preference shareholders will receive dividends (subject to 
covenants of senior lenders). On the other hand, the “pure yield” investors may be willing to 
take on greater risk and may wish to have greater control  over projects. These partnership 
models, it should be noted, have been subject to significant challenges in practice, and the 
importance of building relations of trust between actors has been identified in previous 
research (Goedkoop & Devine-Wright 2016). 
 
Solar PV projects were more attractive to citizen investors compared to wind and biomass 
projects. These projects tend to have lower up-front investment costs and are generally 
smaller in scale compared to wind projects. For these reasons, countries such as Germany 
have found it easier to mobilise citizen and community investment in solar PV compared to 
wind, particular when it comes to fully community-owned projects (McInerney & Curtin 
2017). Wind projects have also tended to illicitly greater levels of local opposition for a 
variety of factors, which may undermine the attractiveness of this technology for some 
citizens (Cashmore et al. 2018). Solar PV will likely be a central technology in many 
countries’ decarbonisation pathways over the coming decades (IEA 2018), and our findings 
underline the key potential role citizens could play as investors in this technology, in Ireland 
and elsewhere.  
 
Irish citizens are relatively agnostic when it comes to potential partners and location of the 
projects, and did not indicate a preference for local projects, for example. We do not 
therefore detect a strong “NIMBY” effect in our results, although it is worth pointing out that 
the “risk averse” cluster (Table 8) assigns the lowest part-worth utility to “in your local area”. 
Our results suggest that citizens very marginally prefer partnerships with community groups 
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over energy utilities, with both options slightly preferred to partnerships with private 
developers.  
 
Some studies emphasize the importance of context-specific factors in explaining high levels 
of investment from citizens in countries such as Germany (Dewald & Truffer 2011; Romero-
Rubio & de Andrés Díaz 2015). Similarly, Hyland & Bertsch (2018), cautioned policy-
makers against assuming that findings from other countries can universally be applied. 
However, our finding point to the similarities in motivation between citizens across borders. 
The investment attributes that are attractive to Irish citizen investors (high return, low risk 
and a preference for small investment amounts) are similar to these identified in surveys of 
German (Salm, Hille & Wüstenhagen 2016; Gamel, Menrad & Decker 2016) and Austrian 
(Fleiß et al. 2017) citizens. However, “partner” was a relatively more important investment 
attribute for German citizens, who preferred community groups more strongly.  
Perhaps the difference can be explained by the fact that our study includes a mechanism for 
exploring the risk-return trade-off facing citizens, whereas in Hyland and Bertsch (2018) no 
reward is offered for accepting a higher level of risk. It is perhaps inevitable that citizens 
would favour models with lower levels of risk when no reward for higher risk taking is 
offered.  
 
4.4.3. Design of incentives 
From a policy perspective, the high risk-aversion of citizen investors, and the importance of 
financial factors (no savings or low access to debt finance) as barriers, suggest that there 
might be a role for Government in managing risk and ensuring access to capital, particularly 
at the early riskier stage of project development.  
 
Non-recourse loans, soft loans, and grants have all been introduced to address barriers to 
local citizens at early (feasibility and development) project stages in countries such as the 
UK, Denmark, Germany and Canada (McInerney & Curtin 2017). In Germany, for example, 
the widespread availability of soft loans covering development and construction costs has 
been identified as a key success factor (Yildiz 2014; Strupeit & Palm 2016; IEA-RETD 
2016). 
 
The high-risk aversion of citizen investors implies that market supports providing a 
guaranteed level of return might be more appropriate to mobilize this cohort. While previous 
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research indicates that it is the design of incentives rather than their choice per se which is 
most important (Curtin, McInerney & Ó Gallachóir 2017a; Huber et al. 2007), our findings 
suggest that FiTs might be more attractive to citizen investors compared to other more 
market-based instruments (FiPs and quota-based schemes) because of the greater certainty 
they provide for citizen investors. These might be considered for projects of a smaller scale 
(say under 5 or 10MW). More market-orientated supports for larger projects (FiPs or quota-
based schemes) can also be designed in a manner that incentivizes equity participation from 
citizen investors. For example, auctions can be designed with set-asides for community actors 
or with a points systems which favours citizen participation (Curtin, McInerney & Ó 
Gallachóir 2017b; Curtin, McInerney & Johannsdottir 2018). Higher levels of subsidy, 
however, could result in higher electricity costs. 
 
For the cohort of “pure yield” investors identified in our segmentation analysis, increasing 
the ROI of investment opportunities is the main option for galvanizing their participation. 
The tax treatment of profits, and tax breaks for income from shares in community or other 
forms of community projects, might be highly effective in mobilising these actors.  
Within the context of providing financial supports, the socio-economic distinction between 
the willing to invest and the not willing to invest cohorts needs to be considered. The latter 
tend to be poorer households. Policy must be designed to ensure that poor households are not 
cross subsidising wealthier households, i.e. to avoid a situation where those who do not have 
the ability to invest face higher electricity prices via the recovery of a subsidy through 
increased electricity charges. It is also important that investment is open to lower-income 
households and approaches to lowering barriers to entry (by ensuring access to low-cost 
capital, for example) might therefore be considered.  
 
For those willing to invest less than €2,000 (55% of the willing to invest cohort), these 
amounts may not make a significant material contribution from a project finance perspective, 
and projects with smaller-scale investment amounts will be developer-led. Mobilising 
smaller-scale investors, however, can help build buy-in, understanding and societal support 
for low carbon transition. Options to mobilise these investors might therefore be explored, 
such as a Government-supported crowdfunding platforms that could aggregate very small 




Finally, lack of experience making investment decisions emerges as an important barrier to 
investment. This is a challenging to overcome, but it could be addressed by providing 
independent and trusted advice on the technologies themselves, and on the technical, 
financial and legal aspects of making investment decisions. 
4.5. Limitations and conclusion 
Citizen investment in renewable energies can help build social support for low-carbon 
transition and can mobilise a new pool of capital for low carbon investment. In this study, we 
surveyed Irish citizens in order to understand their potential interest in investing in distributed 
low-carbon technologies. We explored their risk-return trade-offs and other investment 
attributes that are important for potential citizen investors, as well as the key barriers to 
investment, with a view to drawing implications for the design of financial incentives. 
This study is limited by a number of factors. We depend on stated rather than revealed 
preferences of respondents. However, by providing engaging, realistic and real-time 
investment choices to respondents, we attempted to minimize social desirability bias. We also 
use a relatively large sample of potential investors. Nevertheless, we do not interpret these 
findings to suggest that all potential investors would act on their stated preferences 
immediately, even if an investment in which their “ideal investment criteria” became 
available. Further research might explore the attractiveness of renewable investment 
opportunities compared to alternatives, such as equities, bonds, pensions etc.  
While we made efforts to ensure representativeness, our sample was somewhat skewed 
towards lower income households, and this needs to be considered when interpreting 
findings. For example, we found that investment amounts were relatively small compared to 
the requirements for many renewable energy projects, but that wealthier households were 
willing to consider higher amounts. A final limiting factor is the number of dropouts (n=400). 
One might speculate that these participant were less interested in the subject matter, and 
therefore less interested in investing. For this reason the very high numbers that were willing 
to consider investing (78%) might be interpreted with some caution. Finally, we did not 
explore the issue of whether investors’ motivations are primarily economic or hedonic, a 
subject that has been the focus of previous research. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings illustrate that, despite the lack of tradition in 
investing in renewables, and the absence of exemplar pilot projects and models, there is an 
interest in investing in distributed renewables from a majority of citizens surveyed. However, 
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our findings also suggest that the level of investment capital that might be forthcoming is low 
relative to the equity requirement for a typical wind farm.  
 
The key barriers to investment relate to high risk aversion, lack of access to investment 
capital, but also a lack of confidence in making investment decisions. This underscores the 
importance of addressing barriers at the riskier early stage of project development, and of 
ensuring that low-cost investment capital, as well as trusted information and advice, is 
accessible to citizen investors. It also highlights the ongoing requirement for education and 
communication with citizens on renewable energy policy objectives. 
 
The design of appropriate incentives that maximise cost-effectiveness depends on 
understanding these citizen investor preferences, and in particular their unique risk-return 
trade-off. On the one hand greater levels of subsidy may be required to mobilise citizens 
compared to professional investors. On the other hand local citizens often provide their time 
on a voluntary basis (Rijpens 2013; IEA-RETD 2016), and their involvement has been found 
to open up access to the optimal sites, thereby reducing project cost (Nelson et al. 2016). The 
net impact of these factors will determine the impact on overall electricity costs, and is a 
possible area for further research.  
 
Finally, our findings contribute to the literature on exploring the extent to which “rational” 
economic behaviour explains low carbon technology investment decisions. Our conclusions 
support previous research (Dóci & Vasileiadou 2015; Gamel, Menrad & Decker 2016; Fleiß 
et al. 2017) which found that  “personal gain” was the primary motivating factor behind 
citizen investment, but that secondary motivations were also present. 
 
While this study focused on Ireland, the findings are relevant for the many other countries 
that are seeking to promote participation from citizens and community groups in the 








Table 4.9 Socio-demographics characteristics 
  Willing to invest Total % of Total Yes No 
   1,000 280 1,280   
Gender 
Male 453 106 559 44 
Female 547 174 721 56 
Age 
Under 21 43 22 65 5 
21-35 320 92 412 32 
36-50 351 86 437 34 
51-65 229 50 279 22 
More than 
65 57 30 87 7 
Income 
Under 
25,000 283 152 435 34 
25,000-
50,000 279 91 370 29 
50,000-
75,000 246 24 270 21 
75,000-
100,000 124 0 124 10 
100,000- 
150,000 47 9 56 4 
More than 
150,000 21 4 25 2 
Location 
A city 395 102 497 39 
A town 306 95 401 31 
A rural 
area 299 83 382 30 
Experience  
A lot 71 4 75 6 
Some 389 35 424 33 
No 540 241 781 61 
Proximity 
Very 
close 80 16 96 8 
Close 215 35 250 20 
Not close 705 229 934 73 
Investment 
Amount 
Up to 500 305 N/A 305 24 
Up to 
2,000 248 N/A 248 19 
Up to 
5,000 218 N/A 218 17 
Up to 




50,000 49 N/A 49 4 
More than 
50,000 19 N/A 19 1 
 
Table 4.10 Average gross household Irish income by gross income deciles (2015) 













7th decile 62,028.20 
8th decile 75,999.56 
9th decile 
97,093.88 
10th decile 159,996.72 
Source: CSO (2017) 
 
Table 4.11 Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation 





Investment amount Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .344** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 
N 1000 1000 
Household income Correlation Coefficient .344** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000   





Chapter 5: A risky business? Attitudes amongst Irish investors in the 
power and finance sectors to risks of stranded assets arising from 




5.1. Introduction  
Meeting internationally-agreed climate targets would require an estimated $3.5 trillion in 
energy-sector investments each year until 2050 (Covington, 2017; IEA, 2018), about double 
the current level of investment. Approaches to mobilising greater levels of capital investment 
in green assets has therefore garnered considerable analytical attention (Hall et al, 2017; 
OECD, 2017).  
 
Within the finance literature, the ‘asset pricing’ branch takes the perspective of traders, and 
explores, inter alia, the extent to which investors correctly price risk into asset values. 
Modern Portfolio Theory, for example, suggests that the risk and return characteristics of 
specific technologies should be evaluated in terms of how the investment affects the risk and 
return of the entire portfolio (Markowitz, 1952), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model holds 
that investors hold well-diversified investment portfolios (Barber & Odean, 2013) or energy 
generation portfolios (Bazilian & Roque, 2008), consisting of the market portfolio and risk-
free investments. 
 
Within the energy sector, it is therefore widely held that investors—whether electric utilities, 
insurance companies, pension funds, or even retail investors—compare opportunities, and 
choose to buy and sell assets, according to perceived risk-adjusted returns (Wüstenhagen & 
Menichetti, 2012). High risk perception feeds into the cost of capital, which in turn is a 
central determinant of the pace that relevant technologies are deployed in the marketplace 
(Dinica, 2006; Barber, Huang & Odean 2016).  
 
A particularly important risk that has come to the fore is that fossil fuel reserves and associated 
assets could face “stranding” in a carbon-constrained world. Stranded assets have been defined 
as ‘assets that have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations, or 
conversion to liabilities’ from climate change (Caldecott, 2014, p 7). Numerous studies have 
found that rapid transition to a low carbon economy would render a portion of known fossil 
fuel ‘unburnable’ (Caldecott, 2017; Economist, 2013b; Griffin et al., 2015; Leaton, James; 
Ranger, Nicola; Ward, Bob; Sussams, Luke; Brown, 2013; McGlade, 2013; Vergragt et al., 
2011). The primary focus of this literature has been on evaluating stranding risk at one point 
in the investment chain (Figure 5.1) (Chenet et al., 2015)—for physical assets. This includes 
known reserves of coal, oil and gas (CTI, 2011, 2013, 2015a; McGlade & Ekins 2015; Linquiti 
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& Cogswell 2016; Newell, Qian & Raimi 2016), but also power generation assets that are 
dependent on these reserves (Green & Newman 2017; Pfeiffer et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 5.1 Stranded assets across the investment chain 
 
Source: Adapted from (Chenet et al., 2015) & (WRI/UNEP 2012) 
 
A secondary focus of this literature has been on evaluating stranding risk exposure for financial 
assets. This includes assessing the implications of stranding risk for the shares of fossil fuel 
companies (CTI, 2017, 2014, 2015b; HSBC, 2013; Heede & Oreskes, 2016; Byrd & 
Cooperman, 2018), for the quality of the debt issued by companies and countries exposed to 
stranding risk (Comerford & Spiganti 2015; Malova and van der Ploeg 2017; Global Footprint 
Network 2016; Mercer 2015), or for investment portfolios (Mercer 2015; Credit Suisse 2015; 
BlackRock 2016; Haslam et al., 2018) and the balance sheets of financial institutions (Weber, 
Fenchel & Scholz Roland 2006; Asset Owners Disclosure Project 2017). However, a common 
factor is that these studies focus at singular point in the investment chain, and there few studies 
which compare and contrast stranding risk for physical compared to financial assets.  
 
Central to the question of stranding risk is the extent to which climate risks are fully appreciated 
by actors across the investment chain, and correctly priced. While the literature on investor 
perception of stranding risk is very limited considering its empirical importance, there have 
been some studies that indicate that financial and energy sector actors are unaware of stranding 
risk (Thomä & Chenet 2017; Harnett 2017; Silver 2017; Divestinvest 2018; Asset Owners 
Disclosure Project 2017), or that information asymmetries could affect perceptions of stranding 
risk for owners of physical assets compared to owners of financial assets (Global Investor 
Coalition on Climate Change 2013). One concern is that owners of financial assets may have 












Climate-related Financial Disclosures, 2017). This, in turn, could have implications for 
systemic stability (Partington, 2018). Again, however, this literature which looks across the 
investment chain and compares perceptions of owners and managers of physical compared to 
financial assets is sparse, especially considering its empirical importance. In fact, the risk 
perception of market participants in the energy and financial sectors within the context of 
energy transition has been left “almost unaddressed” until recent times (West, 2019). 
 
Within this context, the objective of this study is to measure, compare and contrast perspectives 
on stranding risk from climate change across the Irish investment chain; and to compare 
methods used to value and manage stranding risk, and barriers faced. We proceed as follows: 
Section 2 introduces the research framework and the methodology used in the study; Section 3 
presents an overview of the data; Section 4 discusses the results; in Section 5, the implications 
of these results are assessed within the context of the research questions. Section 6 sets out 
conclusions and policy recommendations and identifies areas for future research.  
5.2. Material and Methods 
Ireland is an interesting case because it has a well-developed green investment sector spanning 
physical and financial assets. Low-carbon transition has proceeded rapidly in the power 
sector—only 7% of electricity was generated from renewables in 2005, but by 2017 this had 
increased to 30% (SEAI, 2018). Furthermore, within the Irish financial services sector—which 
is one of the leading hedge fund service centres in Europe, focused in particular on 
administration, insurance, aircraft leasing and payments—a thriving green finance cluster has 
emerged in recent years, wherein a considerable number of professional services providers are 
focused on supporting green asset management (Sustainable Nation, 2018).  
 
In order to compare and contrast perceptions of stranding risk among owners and managers of 
physical compared to financial assets, we undertook interviews with, and an online survey of 
key figures in the Irish asset management and ownership community. Because of the focus on 
a limited number of key or “elite” figures, we employed an approach which is common within 
the more qualitative business studies (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008), which employs 
convenience sampling instead of more systematic techniques. This ‘convenience sampling’ 
approach allowed us to overcome the typical challenges associated with gaining access to a 
representative sample of key ‘elite’ figures in the business and finance world (Harnett, 2017; 
Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; McDowell, 1998; Harvey, 2011; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004), 
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which is generally considered infeasible. However, this methodological approach necessarily 
limits the study—we cannot assume that responses received are representative of the views of 
the wider market, only that they might be indicative of generally held perspectives. 
 
We followed four steps to ensure that the views were as representative as possible within the 
context of these constraints. The first step was to undertake a literature review to uncover the 
key aspects of stranding risk that may be relevant for key actors across the Irish investment 
chain. In addition, the Global Investor Survey on Climate Change (2012) and Inter-American 
Development Bank (2016) were drawn upon to identify relevant questions. On this basis a draft 
survey was designed which identified the main aspects of stranding risk relevant to Irish 
stakeholders and experts. 
 
We followed the literature review with semi-structured interviews with key ‘gatekeepers’, 
following the approach employed by Harnett (2017) and Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou 
(2015), and akin to the iterative approach suggested by the Delphi method (Okoli & Pawlowski, 
2004). Two specific ‘gatekeeper’ organisations were chosen because of the concentration of 
their members at particular points in the investment chain: 
• The Electricity Association of Ireland (EAI), the representative body for the Irish 
Power Sector, which was used to identify many of the key managers and owners of 
power generation assets. 
• Sustainable Nation Ireland (SNI), a platform for capital market participants, 
corporates, innovators and public-sector organisations focused on green finance, which 
was used to target key investment professionals/asset managers. 
Within these gatekeeper organisations a number of key people were interviewed.26 
Interviewing these key ‘gatekeeper’ organisations served two purposes. First, as proposed in 
Rice (2015), we used responses and feedback to refine the draft questionnaire, thereby ensuring 
that it was targeted on issues relevant to skills and expertise of prospective respondents. The 
semi-structured interviews therefore ensured a degree of flexibility and responsiveness in our 
research design, which has been identified as important when interviewing elite figures from 
business and finance (Harvey, 2010; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Issues raised in initial 
interviews provided questions for subsequent interviews (Ziebland & McPherson, 2006), and 
 




allowed us to design and refine an online survey so that we could reach a wider cohort of 
respondents.  
 
Second, these ‘gatekeeper’ organisations were used to identify key relevant investors in the 
power and green finance sectors, who were owners or managers of assets, and were centrally 
involved in making investment decisions. These organisations recommended we contact other 
key figures to interview and to survey, and we therefore employed a ‘snowballing’ technique, 




Interviews with gatekeeper organisations, and four individuals, were undertaken between 
March 26th and April 5th, 2018. A survey was subsequently circulated by email to 
approximately 203 key experts, divided evenly between the energy and finance sectors. The 
email was circulated on Monday 16 April, a reminder email was circulated on Monday 23 
April, and the collector was closed on Friday 4 May, 2018. Overall, 54 responses were 
collected, which is in line with the numbers recommended for expert consultation exercises 
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Of these, however, 7 respondents failed to provide sufficient data 
for analysis. We were therefore left with 47 completed responses. 
 
There were 24 completed responses from the sector, who were primarily comprised of energy 
transmission, distribution and power generation asset owners, but also included a smaller 
number of respondents from the Transmission System Operator. The second broad cohort was 
comprised of respondents from the finance sector, of whom there were 23. They included 
institutional and private investors, financial asset managers, lenders, investment consultancy 
and accounting firms (Table 1). 








Power sector 103 28 24 
Finance sector 100 26 23 




Respondents were generally at a high level (“middle management” or above) within their 
organisations. Of the 47 respondents, 23 were in senior management positions, while a further 
17 were in middle management positions 14 of the 24 respondents from the energy sector were 
involved in ‘policy, regulation and public affairs’, while 8 were involved in ‘business 
development’ and 2 on ‘investment’, whereas in the finance sector, 11 respondents were 
focused on ‘investment and only 6 on ‘policy, regulation and public affairs’ (Table 2). 
 
Nearly all respondents from the power sector were involved with power generation and 
transmission assets, and about half of finance sector respondents also had some focus on these 
assets. More power sector respondents were focused on ‘commodities’, but fewer were 
involved with bonds and money markets and stocks compared to finance sector respondents 
(Table 2). 
 









Senior Manager 13 10 23 
Middle Manager 8 9 17 
Other 3 4 7 
Key focus 
Policy/Regulation/Public Affairs 14 6 20 
Investment 2 11 13 
Business Development 8 3 11 
Project Finance 0 2 2 
Other 0 1 1 
Relevance of asset 
class to business 
activities 
Stocks 3 14 17 
Fixed income or bonds 7 14 21 
Money market or cash equivalents 5 14 19 
Commodities 14 9 23 
Real estate and infrastructure 13 14 27 
Power generation assets 21 14 35 
Energy transmission/distribution 
assets 
22 12 34 




5.3. Results  
In interviews conducted with the EAI, stranding risk ‘from low-carbon transition’ was 
identified as ‘the most important topic’ on the minds of their members at the time. By contrast, 
SNI observed that stranding risk was only be an issue for a subset of members focused on green 
finance, and that even within this cohort, knowledge and awareness of the issue was mixed. 
These observations were born out by survey results.  
 
A large majority of survey respondents were ‘very familiar’ or ‘somewhat familiar’ with the 
concept of stranded assets, which was defined in the survey as ‘assets that have suffered from 
premature write-downs, devaluations or conversion into liabilities because of the transition to 
a low carbon economy’. Looking at familiarity by sector, we found a higher overall level of 
awareness of the issue among power sector respondents, with 15 of 24 respondents indicating 
that they were ‘very familiar’ with the concept, compared to only 9 of 23 for financial sector 
respondents (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 5.2 Familiarity with the concept of stranded assets by sector 
 
 
A large majority of respondents considered asset stranding a ‘very important’ or ‘somewhat 
important’ issue for their business, but there was a clear difference between power and financial 
sector respondents in terms of how important they considered the risk of asset stranding, with 
14 of the power sector respondents considering it ‘very important’ compared to only 4 from 
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Figure 5.3 Importance of stranding risk to business and investment activities 
 
 
In interviews with EAI, they emphasised the importance of the Irish policy context in 
determining stranding risk for their members. In particular they underlined ‘the central 
importance of capacity auctions’ in determining the continued viability of certain fossil fuel 
generation plants, but also the importance of support schemes for renewables such as ‘quota-
based schemes and feed in tariffs’. On the other hand, SNI had been less specific when it came 
to identifying specific sources of stranding risk for its members, and emphasised the ‘general’ 
nature of the awareness around ‘green finance and responsible investment’ issues. These 
observations were again bone out by survey respondents when they were asked to rate the 
importance of different sources of stranding risk for their business. When weighted averages 
were calculated, 27 the most important source of stranding risk that emerged was Irish policy, 
followed by EU and international policy. However, factors such as ‘technological change’, 
‘consumer or social pressure’ and ‘low demand for fossil fuels’ were also considered to be 









27 In this case (and for subsequent rating questions), we ascribed weights to responses received to analyse results to calculate 
weighted averages. ‘Very important’ responses received a value of 3, ‘somewhat important’ responses a value of 2, and ‘not 
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Figure 5.4 Importance of causes of stranding risk  
› 
 
Looking at responses by sector, power sector respondents considered Irish, EU and 
International policy development as the most significant sources of stranding risk in that order, 
followed by technological change (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.5 Importance of sources of stranding risk (power sector) 
 
However, for the green financial sector, the most important source of stranding risk was 
technological change, followed by EU and international policy, perhaps hinting at the greater 




























































Figure 5.6 Importance of sources of stranding risk (Finance sector) 
 
 
We also asked respondents to evaluate the importance of stranding risk for different asset 
classes, and calculated the weighted importance of responses. As had been suggested by 
interviewees, respondents rated stranding risk for power sector assets as very important, 
whereas stranding risk was considered far less important for all financial asset classes, with 
‘money markets or cash equivalents’ rated as least exposed (Figure 7).  
 

































































For power sector professionals, the importance of stranding risk for power sector assets was 
also emphasised as particularly important (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 5.8 Importance of stranding risk by asset class (power sector) 
  
 
However, it should be noted that a high number of power sector professionals responded, ‘don’t 
know’ when it came to stranding risk for financial assets like stocks, bonds, money market or 
cash equivalents, commodities and real estate assets, and these responses were weighted as ‘0’ 
(the same value ascribed to ‘irrelevant’). This suggests that the lower ranking for these asset 
classes reflected, at least to some extent, lack of knowledge rather than an assessment of low 
stranding risk per se (Table 3).  
 























sector) 11 14 14 8 10 2 2 
Don't know: 
(Finance 
sector) 3 3 4 3 2 0 3 
 
For green finance sector professionals, stranding risk was also considered to be most acute for 
power and other power sector assets. However, unlike power sector professionals, they also 


























for real estate and fixed income bonds (it is also notable that far fewer respondents answered 
‘don’t know’ for these asset classes). Only money markets and cash equivalents were 
considered to face low stranding risk by financial sector professionals (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 5.9 Importance of stranding risk by asset class (finance sector) 
 
 
When it came to assessing and measuring exposure to stranding risk, few respondents (n=11) 
had ‘comprehensively’ assessed their risk exposure to asset stranding, however a significant 
number (n=19) had ‘provisionally’ examined their exposure to asset stranding. More power 
sector professionals (n=7) had ‘comprehensively’ assessed their exposure to stranding risk 
compared to green financial sector professionals (n=4) (Figure 10).  
 




















































Few respondents could measure their exposure ‘with confidence’ (n=5), however, quite a 
number were ‘somewhat’ confident in their ability to measure stranding risk (n=18). Almost 
half of respondents were therefore somewhat confident or better in their ability to measure 
stranding risk. Again, the differences between green financial and power sector professionals 
was notable. 11 finance sector professionals responded ‘no, not with confidence’ or ‘no, not at 
all’, compared to 6 for the power sector (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 5.11 Ability to measures exposure to stranding risk by sector  
 
When it came to the methods used to assess stranding risk, scenario analysis and risk analysis 
were the most popular, whereas stress testing, assessment of emissions testing of assets and 
asset impairment tests were less popular for both cohorts. No discernible differences were 
noted between power and financial sector professionals in this case. 
 
On reporting, less than one third or respondents had reported on stranding risk, and risks were 
more often reported to management and asset owners, and less often to regulators and investors. 
However, power sector respondents were more likely to have reported on stranding risk than 
financial sector professionals, very few of whom had reported on stranding risk to 
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Figure 5.12 Reporting on stranding risk by sector  
 
 
When it came to barriers preventing effective management of stranding risk, EAI had 
underlined the key importance of ‘unclear market entry and exit signals due to changing policy 
direction’, whereas SNI has offered a more general assessment of barriers to effective 
management ‘arising from a number of interrelated issues’. Survey respondents reflected these 
perspectives to some extent.  For example, policy uncertainty (national, EU and international) 
was the most important factor identified by respondents, however, ‘unclear market signals’ and 
the ‘absence of well-established methodologies’ were also cited as significant barriers. ‘Lack 
of resources’, and ‘inadequate company disclosures’ and ‘inadequate data on emissions 
intensities’ were considered less important barriers (Figure 13).  
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This ranking of barriers was reflected by the assessment of power sector professionals, for 
whom policy uncertainty (Irish, EU and international) also emerged as the key issue (Figure 
14).  
 
Figure 5.14 Importance of barriers to management of stranding risk (power sector) 
   
 
However, for green finance professionals, barriers were ranked of roughly equivalent 
importance (with the exception being ‘lack of resources’, which was ranked of low importance 
by this cohort). However, the absence of data (‘inadequate company disclosures’ and 
‘inadequate data on the emissions intensity of debt/bonds’) received a considerably higher 
ranking from the financial sector cohort than from power sector professionals (Figure 15). 
 










































































Finally, we asked power and financial sector respondents to briefly describe actions they or 
their organisation had taken to ‘manage stranding risk from climate change’. Many power 
sector professionals indicated that stranding risk had already affected investment decisions. For 
example, several respondents commented that they had ‘delaying investment decisions’, 
‘reassess investment strategy’, ‘re-evaluated asset management investment case decisions’ or 
‘reassessed investment decisions to manage stranding risk’. Several other respondents said that 
they had focused on investing in low-carbon technologies to manage stranding risk. For 
example, one commented that they had ‘invested in renewable and emerging technologies’, 
while another had invested in ‘a broad range of renewable & innovative low carbon 
technologies to future proof’ their asset portfolio, while another was ‘focused on new 
technology’. Two respondents added that they already written down asset values in response 
to asset stranding.  
 
By contrast, the green finance sector respondents were far less likely to have taken specific 
actions to address stranding risk. Several survey respondents responded: ‘no action taken to 
date’, ‘nil’ or ‘none’ or ‘I have no idea’. Others responded that stranding risk was ‘not very 
important in a diversified portfolio’, or that they did not have ‘any real exposure to stranding 
risk as a lender’ or that they only managed ‘a very small part of any portfolio, so not sure how 
relevant it is for us’. One respondent stated that their organisation was ‘not specifically focused 
on stranded assets as key driver of climate risk’ but that they took a ‘broader view of risks and 
opportunities’ from the transition to low carbon economy.  
 
For those in the green finance sector who had taken specific actions to manage stranding risk, 
‘diversification’ or ‘diversification of portfolio’, or ‘invest heavily in alternative energy 
companies, minimise our investments in fossil fuel companies’ was mentioned by a number of 
respondents. ‘Ethical screening’ and ‘examination of information available in accessible 
published sources’ were also cited by respondents, while ‘risk analysis’ was cited by two 
respondents and ‘constant monitoring of assets’ by another. Another added that their 
organisation had undertaken ‘extensive research on the topic and have made investors aware 
of the risks’. One respondent stated that they had undertaken an ‘Environmental, social and 
governance assessment of all asset managers including asset class specific risks from 
stranding’, while another added that they had ‘integrate carbon emission related data into our 





In this section, we consider our results within the context of our research questions. First, we 
sought to examine if awareness of and attitude to the risk of asset stranding differs for actors 
across investment chain, using Ireland as a case study. Specifically, we looked at attitudes of 
senior professional investors in the Irish power sector compared to senior professionals in the 
green finance sector.  
 
Interviewees had suggested that awareness of stranding risk would be more acute in the power 
sector compared to the financial sector, and this observation was borne out by survey responses. 
We found considerable differences in the level of awareness of stranding risk, with a lower 
proportion of finance sector respondents ‘very familiar’ and ‘somewhat familiar’ with the 
concept of asset stranding. Furthermore, power sector respondents were far more likely to 
consider asset stranding ‘very important’ for their business, whereas in comments provided, 
several finance sector respondents said that they did not know if stranding risk was an issue for 
their business or investments, hinting at an information deficit. Furthermore, all respondents, 
whether from the power or green finance sectors, ascribed the greatest risk of stranding for 
power generation and other energy sector asset, whereas financial assets were judged to be less 
exposed. However, it should be noted that financial sector actors also emphasised the 
importance of stranding risk for financial assets, in particular for stocks and commodities, and 
somewhat less so in the case of real estate and fixed income bonds, whereas power sector 
respondents were somewhat unfamiliar with the exposure of these assets. 
 
Nevertheless, power sector assets were considered to be most exposed by both cohorts.  This 
may be because of the diffusion of risk for financial institutions and investment managers 
across their investment portfolio, compared to the owners and managers of fossil fuel assets. 
Indeed, several financial sector actors emphasised their ability to diversify their portfolio of 
investments as an effective approach to managing stranding risk, and others pointed out that 
they already managed a diversified portfolio and that fossil fuel assets only formed a small part 
of this portfolio. It is inevitable that stranding risk would be more apparent to those managing 
or owning fossil fuel generation assets under these circumstances. Another possible 
explanation for the lower risk assessment by financial asset owners is because of the higher 
liquidity of financial compared to physical assets. It is notable that the most liquid asset class, 
‘money markets and cash equivalents’, was rated by respondents as the least exposed to 
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stranding risk, while the least liquid assets (power transmission and generation) were 
considered most exposed.  
 
As had been anticipated by power sector interviewees, policy changes were perceived as the 
most important factor underpinning stranding risk overall, with Irish policy changes ranked as 
the most important issue. The importance of changes to subsidy regimes, including capacity 
auctions and feed in tariffs, was underlined by interviewees, and this view was reinforced by 
survey results. EU and international policy were also rated as important for power sector 
respondents. For financial sector actors, however, ‘technological change’ was identified as the 
most important source of stranding, while ‘Irish policy’ was considerably less significant. This 
perhaps reflects the greater international reach and global perspective of the Irish financial 
sector, whereas power sector is more domestic in nature, and therefore power sector actors 
would tend to be more specifically focused on the domestic context and national policy and 
market developments. Overall, power sector respondents therefore, had more awareness of and 
exposure to stranding risk than financial sector actors, and the sources of stranding risks were 
also perceived somewhat differently.  
 
Second, we sought to assess if methods used to value and manage stranding risk, and key 
barriers to integrating stranding risk into decision-making, were different for actors across the 
two sectors. While power sector respondents were somewhat more likely to have 
‘comprehensibly’ measured their exposure to stranding, the differences were not stark between 
sectors in this respect. Nor were there differences in the methods employed to measure 
stranding risk across sectors, with scenario analysis and risk analysis the most popular methods 
for both cohorts. On the other hand, many power sector respondents indicated that they had 
taken somewhat drastic action to manage stranding risk, including asset write-downs, 
revaluating their investment strategies, or by ensuring a greater focus on renewable 
technologies in their generation and investment portfolios. Financial sector respondents were 
less likely to have taken specific actions, and where actions had been taken, they were generally 
somewhat milder. For example, several mentioned methods that had been employed to promote 
awareness or to screen investment decisions, although it should be noted that some also 
mentioned diversification of investment portfolios.  
 
Powers sector respondents had considerably more confidence in their ability to measure 
stranding risk, and they were also considerably more likely to have formally reported on these 
	
 136 
risks. However, even in the power sector, less than half of respondents had formally reported 
to management or externally on their potential exposure. When it came to managing stranding 
risk, policy uncertainty was identified as the most important barrier by respondents in both 
sectors. However, ‘inadequate company disclosures’ and ‘inadequate data on the emissions 
intensity of debt/bonds’ received a considerably higher ranking from the financial sector cohort 
than from power sector professionals. This indicates that the availability of accurate data is 
more of an issue in the financial sector than for power sector asset owners and managers, who 
are more concerned by factors outside of their control such as sudden policy changes. 
Information asymmetries therefore emerge as an important consideration underpinning 
investor perception.  
 
Power sector actors have therefore been more proactive in taking decisive actions to managing 
stranding risk and are more confident in their ability to manage these risks. They were more 
likely to see risks arising from sudden changes in policy that were outside of their control than 
from an absence of data and information.  
5.5. Conclusion 
In order to meet climate targets, it will be necessary to mobilise a much greater level of 
investment in low carbon assets in the period to 2050. How different actors perceive investment 
risks can be highly influential over the cost of capital and investment decisions, and has 
therefore been a subject of growing analytical interest. The risk of asset stranding posed by the 
transition to a low-carbon economy is a particular issue of concern for owners and managers 
of physical and financial assets.  
 
The objective of this study was to measures, compare and contrast perspectives on stranding 
risk from climate change for two groups in the Irish investment chain: investors in and 
managers of physical generation and transmission assets in the power sector, and green 
financial asset owners and managers. We sought to assess if awareness of and attitude to the 
risk of asset stranding differed for these two groups, and if the methods used to value and 
manage stranding risk, and perception of key barriers to integrating stranding risk into decision 
making were different. 
 
It is limited by a number of factors. First of all, we used a convenience sampling approach and 
‘snowballing’, rather than a more systematic technique. This method was chosen because of 
	
 137 
the challenge of identifying a representative sample of investors from the power and green 
finance sectors, who were the primary cohorts of interest. Second, we restricted our focus to 
Irish investors, a country with a highly developed financial sector, and a power sector which is 
relatively well advanced in transitioning to sustainability. Third, the number of respondents, 
while sufficient for the needs of a largely qualitative assessment of this kind, was relatively 
modest. On this basis, we cannot assume that our results are indicative of the views of the wider 
international market, and we therefore present our results as indicative and exploratory in 
nature.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our survey is the first of its kind which looks at how 
perceptions of stranding risk differ between investors in financial assets and physical fossil fuel 
assets, and therefore makes a unique contribution to an emerging literature. Our findings 
support the view that stranding risk is perceived to be a more prominent issue for investors and 
managers of power sector assets compared to financial assets, and that stranding risk is 
perceived to arise from different factors by these actors. The power sector investors were, for 
example, primarily concerned with the policy context, while the financial sector actors were 
more concerned with technological change. Power sector actors were also likely to have taken 
more decisive steps to manage stranding risk and were far more confident in their ability to 
assess and manage stranding risk. Financial market actors, by contrast, pointed to a lack of 
information or accepted methodologies for making these assessments, suggesting that 
information asymmetries underpin different perceptions. These findings therefore support 
previous research (Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, 2017), which points 
to information asymmetries as a key issue, and calls for greater reporting of climate-related 
financial risks.  
 
These findings perhaps also reflect a greater diffusion of risk for financial institutions and 
portfolio managers, noted in previous studies (Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change, 
2013), but also perhaps the greater liquidity of financial compared to physical assets. It may 
also be because risks that are typically considered by financial market actors (such as market, 
inflation, or interest rate) are measured on a short-term basis but climate risks demand longer 
time horizons. Power sector actors, by contrast, are used to evaluating investment decisions on 




Overall, our findings suggest that the understanding and ability to accurately quantify 
stranding risk may be less developed for financial sector investors compared to the power 
sector cohort. The former may have not yet developed a comprehensive appreciation of 
stranding risk compared to the latter, and may therefore not be in a position to fully factor 
this risk into investment decisions.   
 
If an information deficit prevents market actors from fully integrating climate risks from 
energy transition into the market prices of financial assets, this could constitute a material 
risk to financial stability. Under these circumstances there is an onus on regulators to ensure 
climate-related risks are disclosed to savers and investors in a standardised manner, to ensure 
some degree of comparability between green versus traditional brown asset classes. In a 
promising sign, the European Commission’s action plan for sustainable finance (European 
Commission, 2018) seeks to establish such a framework, but it remains to be seen if these 












If 'dangerous' climate change is to be avoided, immediate and rapid decarbonisation must be 
achieved over the coming decades, particularly in developed economies. Staying within the 
2° C temperature target would require an energy transition of exceptional scope, depth and 
speed, and about double the current level of investment in low-carbon technologies. The 
widespread deployment of these technologies poses challenges for traditional investors as 
well as opening up opportunities for new actors.  
 
The aim of this study was to investigate investment attributes that are attractive to investors in 
low-carbon and renewable energy assets. A key focus was on understanding the risk-return 
perceptions of investors and how this could affect investment decisions. The risk perception of 
market participants within the context of energy transition is a key determinant of the pace at 
which technologies are deployed in the market place, yet it has been left “almost unaddressed” 
until recent times (West, 2019). Coming to a greater understanding of the risk preferences of 
market participants, from professional to citizen investors, allows for the design of financial 
incentives that are attractive to these actors, and could be highly influential over the cost and 
pace of low-carbon transition.  
 
In previous chapters, a systematic literature review, case studies, a survey of Irish citizens’ 
risk-return perceptions, and a survey of the perspectives of professional investors on asset 
stranding risk under energy transition, were presented.  
 
The specific research objectives were as follows:  
1. To explore the risk-return preferences and investment attributes that are important for 
citizen investors, and identify barriers to these investors at different project stages; 
2. To investigate how financial incentives can be designed that are attractive to non-
traditional (citizen) investors; and 
3. To measure, compare and contrast perspectives on stranding risk from climate change 
for owners of physical and financial assets.   
6.2. Key findings 
 
In the section below, key findings are synthesised and analysed in terms of their implications 




In the case of the first research question—understanding the risk-return perceptions and 
investment preferences of citizen investors and community groups—a key finding that 
emerged from the literature review and case studies was that citizens and community groups 
have responded to financial incentives, especially when that have been tailored to their 
unique preferences. This was the case both in countries with a tradition of local activism 
(Germany and Denmark), and also where no such tradition existed (Ontario and the UK). The 
survey of Irish citizens suggested that that financial participation could be achieved if 
investment options offering reasonable rates of return and low levels of risk were made 
available. This was particularly the case among wealthier cohorts in society with some 
experience of making investment decisions.  
 
Survey findings pointed to the similarities in motivation between citizens across borders. 
While the findings from Chapter 2 suggested that citizen investors may have a variety of 
motivations and do not necessarily respond in an economically rational manner to these 
incentives, Chapter 4 illustrated that the financial characteristics of investments are of high 
importance to Irish citizen investors. Furthermore, the investment attributes that were 
attractive to Irish citizen investors (low risk and a preference for small investment amounts) 
were similar to these identified in surveys of German citizens. This suggested that even 
without context-specific factors identified as important in Chapter 2 and 3, the introduction of 
specifically tailored financial incentives could be effective in mobilising citizen investment in 
new markets. This finding was reinforced by the survey results presented in Chapter 4, which 
uncovered considerable interest in investing in low-carbon technologies among Irish citizens. 
However, there was an important caveat—less than half of respondents were found to be 
willing to invest “up to €5,000”, a relative low level of investment compared to the typical 
equity requirement for a wind farm.  
 
Solar PV projects were found to be more attractive to citizen investors compared to wind and 
biomass projects. These projects tend to have lower up-front investment costs and are 
generally smaller in scale compared to wind projects, and therefore appear to offer better 
potential for citizen investment. Irish citizens, however, were relatively agnostic when it 
came to potential partners and the location of the projects, and did not indicate a preference 




From a policy perspective, the high risk-aversion of citizen investors, and the importance of 
financial factors (no savings or low access to debt finance) as barriers, combined with a lack 
of confidence in making investment decisions, suggests that there is a role for Government in 
managing risk and ensuring access to capital, particularly at the early riskier stage of project 
development.  
 
When it came to the second research question—designing financial incentives attractive to 
non-professional investors—a number of novel findings relevant to the choice and design of 
specific incentives were uncovered. FiTs, FiPs, quota schemes, grants and tax emerged as 
effective in mobilising greater levels of investment. The introduction of a FiT, in particular,  
emerged as a crucial turning point and a critical success factor in mobilising local citizen 
investors in many jurisdictions. A key characteristic of FiTs is that they provide a stable long-
term income stream, thereby reducing risk and making it easier to access bank funding, which 
appears to be a particularly important factor for local citizen actors. On the other hand, abrupt 
changes to FiT schemes undermined regulatory stability and market confidence. Introducing a 
FiT, however, did not emerge as a sufficient condition for success. In many countries, not least 
Ireland, FiTs have not resulted in investment from non-professional project developers.  
 
In contrast to previous literature, an implication from this study is that market-based supports 
such as FiPs and quota-based schemes can also be designed in a manner that is attractive to 
citizen investors. FiPs have been deployed successfully in Denmark (combined with a 
mandatory share offer for local citizens) and quota-based schemes have also been designed in 
a manner which is advantageous to local community groups in Ontario and elsewhere. 
However, while market-based supports can be deigned with these actors in mind, this has not 
always been the case in practice. In many cases, these incentives were not designed with local 
citizen investors in mind, and while the intention may not have been to exclude these actors, 
this was the ultimate effect. 
 
Overall, these findings suggest that instrument choice may be less important compared to 
instrument design. FiTs differentiated according to project size and technology type opened 
up niche opportunities for local citizen, and adders, contract set-asides and mandates have 
also been used to modify FiTs and make them more attractive to citizen investors. Market-
based supports can also be designed with citizen investors in mind, which is an important 
finding within the context of the migration to this category of incentive within the EU 
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(Ragwitz et al., 2012) and Ireland. Another important conclusion is that the timelines for 
citizens and community groups to organise projects will tend to be longer due to their lack of 
technical skills and expertise, and the greater difficulty they are likely to experience in 
accessing finance. This is a particularly important consideration when designing market-
based approaches, such as auctioning or tendering schemes.  
 
The case studies and survey results also revealed the importance of introducing financial 
incentives at both the early and later stages of projects in order to establish a business case for 
local citizen participation. In particular, the case studies revealed the crucial importance of 
introducing incentives to overcome risks at the feasibility and development stages of projects, 
where risks are greatest.  Professional developers can generally offset these risks by developing 
a portfolio of projects, but this option is not available to local citizens. These findings suggests 
that there may be a case for the introduction of a time-bound grant programme, or indeed non-
recourse loans or soft loans, to promote the emergence of exemplar pilot community-led 
projects. Grants typically cover feasibility and development costs, but can also cover a 
proportion of construction costs. However, the intention should be to migrate to a more market-
driven approach over time to control cost-effectiveness and reduce the impact on electricity 
prices. This is because grants, while effective at overcoming early stage project barriers, also 
can be challenging and costly to administer, and they can favour wealthier cohorts in society. 
They are dependent on annual funding allocations from the exchequer and changes to levels of 
support can lead to boom-bust investment cycles, which in turn can make the formation of a 
sustainable market challenging. In some cases, programmes can suffer from an element of path 
dependency. While grants no doubt, therefore, have an important role, their downsides need to 
be carefully considered and monitored. 
 
The favourable tax treatment of income from renewable energy projects emerged as an 
important supplementary consideration. Indeed, the removal of various UK tax incentives in 
2015 undermined the business case for many renewable energy projects with community 
participation. Another benefit of tax incentives is that they do not necessarily require annual 
budget allocations from the exchequer, they can be extended for pre-agreed periods of time 
and they tend to be considerably easier to administer and to access than grants (where a 




Carefully designed financial incentives emerged as a potentially important means of 
mobilising citizen investment. The benefits of using incentives, however, needs to be 
balanced against the cost to the tax payer of using these instruments. On the one hand, 
incentives require exchequer revenue or and funded by bill payers, and Governments would 
argue that controlling the cost of low-carbon transition is important for delivering continued 
societal buy-in and value for money. On the other hand, local citizens often provide their time 
on a voluntary basis (Rijpens, 2013; IEA-RETD, 2016) and their involvement has been found 
to open up access to the optimal sites for on-shore wind and solar PV development, thereby 
reducing cost (Nelson et al., 2016). Access to optimal locations for projects is a particularly 
prevalent concern in Ireland, where many sites cannot be accessed due to local opposition. 
Should local opposition to on-shore wind, biomass, waste to energy or solar plans prevent 
further project development, this would necessitate greater levels of off-shore wind 
development if decarbonisation objectives are to be met, thereby increasing the overall cost 
of meeting climate objectives.  
 
Finally, the third research question— understanding how perceptions of stranding risk differ 
between investors in financial assets and physical fossil fuel assets (generation and 
transmission assets). Stranding risk emerged from this study as a far more prominent issue for 
investors and managers of power sector assets compared to financial assets. Stranding risk 
was also perceived to arise from different factors. Power sector investors were, for example, 
primarily concerned with the policy context, while the financial sector actors were more 
concerned with technological change. Power sector actors were also likely to have taken 
more decisive steps to manage stranding risk and were far more confident in their ability to 
assess and manage stranding risk. Financial market actors, by contrast, pointed to a lack of 
information or accepted methodologies for making these assessments, suggesting that 
information asymmetries underpin different perceptions.  
 
These findings, therefore. support previous research (Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures, 2017), which points to information asymmetries as a key issue, and calls for 
greater reporting of climate-related financial risks. These findings perhaps also reflect a 
greater diffusion of risk for financial institutions and portfolio managers, noted in previous 
studies (Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change, 2013), but also perhaps the greater 
liquidity of financial compared to physical assets. It may also be because risks that are 
typically considered by financial market actors (such as market, inflation, or interest rate) are 
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measured on a short-term basis but climate risks demand longer time horizons. Power sector 
actors, by contrast, are used to evaluating investment decisions on a multi-decadal basis.  
6.3. Unique contribution to the literature 
In each chapter of this study, a number of distinct and unique contributions to the literature 
were made, which are summarised in Table 6. 1 below. In Chapter 2, the first systematic 
literature review of financial incentives that have targeted  non-professional investors was 
presented. While previous research explored the use of financial incentives to promote 
renewable energy investment, the majority of this research focused on attracting investment 
from traditional investors. This study, by focusing on citizens and community groups, 
therefore makes a unique contribution by being the first of its kind, while also extending the 
literature on the choice and design of financial incentives.  
 
In Chapter 3, analysing the use of financial incentives across typical project stages: 
feasibility, development, construction and operation also constitutes a unique contribution to 
the literature. The barriers faced by non-traditional investors are different across project 
stages compared to traditional investors. Specifically, greater barriers may be encountered at 
the early-stages of project development. Looking at incentives across project stages allowed 
for the identification of the key importance of early-stage incentives as a distinguishing 
feature of projects with citizen involvement, which emerged as central to the value 
proposition of many successful projects. Another insight that emerged from looking at 
incentives across project stages is that later-stage project supports are seldom designed with 
citizen investors in mind. In particular FiPs and quota schemes, which are becoming more 
widespread in their use as wind and solar PV mature, have a mixed track record when it 
comes to mobilising local citizen actors. Our unique contribution—assessing the use of 
incentives across project stages—therefore allows policy makers to identify barriers in a 
forensic manner, and to propose more targeted and appropriate policy responses. It also opens 
up a new and promising avenue for future research because the importance of early stage 
support for local community energy projects, while commonly acknowledged in the policy 
world, is not a topic that has previously received attention in the academic literature.  
 
Table 6.1 My Contribution 
Paper Literature gap identified My contribution Literature extended Contribution to 
policy 
Chapter 2: There is an extensive literature on the 
importance and benefits of mobilising 
The first systematic literature 
review on the topic which draws 
FiTs and quotas, grants and tax 








citizen and community investment, but 
the literature on citizen participation in 
the financing of renewable energy 
infrastructures is sparse considering its 
empirical importance (Yildiz, 2014).   
 
There is a comprehensive literature 
exploring the design of financial 
incentives attractive to professional 
investors (e.g. Barradale, 2014; Bolton 
& Foxon, 2015; Mathews et al., 2010; 
Wustenhagen & Teppo, 2006; 
Abolhosseini & Heshmati, 2014; 
Bobinaite & Tarvydas, 2014; Marques 
& Fuinhas, 2012; Mickwitz, 2003; 
Oak et al., 2014; Ozcan, 2014; Polzin 
et al., 2015; Somanathan et al., 2014). 
However, designing financial 
incentives that are attractive to non-
professional investors has received 
less academic attention. Studies that 
exist have focused on  type of 
incentive used, not their design, or are 
highly context specific.   
together findings from dozens of 
studies focused on the effectiveness 
of technology-specific economic 
and financial incentives used to 
mobilise non-professional investors.  
 
Underlines the effectiveness of 
certain types of incentives, 
including FiTs, FiPs, quota-based 
schemes, grants, tax incentives, and 




mobilising greater levels of 
investment from local citizens, but 
soft loans tend to be less effective as a 
stand-alone instrument, thereby 
extending literature on use of financial 
incentives to mobilise citizen 
investors 
 
Extends the literature  (Dewald & 
Truffer, 2011; Romero-Rubio & de 
Andrés Díaz, 2015; Delmas & 
Montes-Sancho, 2011) that highlights 
the importance of understanding the 
natural, social, policy and regulatory 
context under which economic 
incentives operate is necessary in 
order to measure success. 
 
Extends the literature (Michelsen & 
Madlener, 2016), and highlights the 
importance of introducing financial 















There have been many studies looking 
at the benefits and costs of mobilising 
investment from non-traditional actors 
(Bergman & Eyre 2011; Bolton & 
Foxon 2015; Ricardo Energy & 
Environment 2017; Devine-Wright 
2014; Palm & Tengvard 2011; Dóci & 
Vasileiadou 2015; Slee 2015; Viardot 
2013; IEA-REDT 2016), however, 
there have been far fewer studies 
exploring the risk-return preferences 
of non-professional investors, and 
assessing implications for the design 
of financial incentives. 
 
No one has examined how the risk-
return perception of investors differ 
across project stages (feasibility, 
development, construction and 
operation) for renewable projects. 
 
First to explore the importance and 
appropriateness of financial 
incentives by project stage: revealed 
the crucial importance of incentives 
to overcome risks at the feasibility 
and development stages of project 
development.  
 
Emphasised the importance of 
incentive design over incentive 
choice: market-based supports can 
be designed with non-professional 
investors in mind.  
 
Extends the literature looking at the 
attractiveness of one type of financial 
incentive over another (Fouquet & 
Johansson 2008; Butler & Neuhoff 
2008; del Río & Bleda 2012; 
Saunders, Gross & Wade 2012; 
Couture & Gagnon 2010). Different 
financial incentives may be 
appropriate at different project stages. 
 
Extends literature (Feurtey et al. 2015; 
Simcock, Willis & Capener 2016) 














Also relevant to 
policy makers 
in new markets 
seeking to learn 
from policy 
experiences in 
mature markets.  
Chapter 4 There has been a lack of rigorous 
academic research on the risk-return 
preferences of citizen investors, and 
the implications of their risk appetite 
for the design of financial incentives. 
 
Studies on mobilising community 
groups and citizens have exclusively 
focused on mature markets with high 
levels of citizen investment activity, 
including Denmark, Germany, 
Austria, parts of Canada and Scotland. 
 
Lessons from these cases cannot 
necessarily be applied to markets with 
no citizen investment tradition.  
 
There is a high level of interest in 
investing in renewable energies 
among Irish citizens, which 
suggests experiences of leading 
players might be replicated in 
markets with less citizen investment 
tradition.  
 
Irish citizen investors are highly 
risk-averse, and are motivated by 
financial characteristics of 
investments. Investment amounts 
are low compared to typical equity 
requirements, suggesting that 
citizen investor funding will need to 
be complemented by capital from 
other sources.  
Extends literature which explores the 
context of country-specifics in 
explaining the presence of citizen 
investors (Dewald & Truffer 2011; 
Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz 
2015; Gamel, Menrad & Decker 
2017; Fleiß et al., 2017). 
 
Extends literature on risk appetite and 
investment attributes attractive to 
citizen investors ( Dóci & 
Vasileiadou, 2015; Hyland & Bertsch, 
2018; Gamel, Menrad & Decker, 
2017; Fleiß et al., 2017; Salm et al., 
2016; Gamel, Menrad & Decke,r 










Spain, parts of 
the US etc. 
 
Chapter 5 The risk perception of market 
participants in the energy sector is 
crucial in understanding global energy 
sector investment trends within the 
context of low-carbon transition. Yet it 
has been left almost entirely 
unaddressed until recent times.  
While stranding asset risk has become 
an increasingly prominent focus in 
academia and policy, no studies have 
sought to assess how perceptions of 
stranding risk are different across the 
investment chain. 
Compared stranding risk perception 
for power sector and finance sector 
elites. 
 
Suggested that the understanding 
and ability to accurately quantify 
and manage stranding risk may be 
less developed for financial sector 
investors compared to the power 
sector cohort.  
Extends literature on asset stranding 
risk within the context of energy 
tradition (e.g. (Caldecott, 2017; 
Economist, 2013b; Griffin et al. 2015; 
McGlade, 2013; Vergragt et al. 2011). 
 
Extends literature looking at stranding 
risk perceptions across the 
“investment chain” (Thomä & Chenet, 
2017; Harnett, 2017; Silver, 2017; 
Divestinvest, 2018; Asset Owners 















It is generally agreed that understanding the natural, social, policy and regulatory context 
under which economic incentives operate is necessary in order to measure success, and many 
studies also highlight the importance of context–specific considerations when designing 
incentives for citizen investors (Dewald & Truffer, 2011; Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz, 
2015). However, previous research focused exclusively on investigating citizen investor 
preference in markets where there is a long history of local energy activism and a citizen 
investment tradition, such as Denmark, Germany and Ontario. In Chapter 4, however, the 
citizen investor preferences in Ireland, a market with no citizen investment tradition, were 
explored. While some differences were noted compared to more mature markets, overall, we 
identify many similarities between citizen investor characteristics across markets. This 
suggested that citizens are likely to respond to tailored financial incentives, even in the 
absence of a long tradition of local activism. By exploring citizen investor preferences in a 
market with no established tradition, this study added a new strand to a growing the academic 
and policy debate. These findings should be of particular interest to policy makers in other 
countries with a less developed citizen investment tradition, such as Spain and parts of the 
United States. The emerging literature which seeks to come to a greater understanding of the 
unique risk appetite and investment attributes that are attractive to citizen investors was also 
extended. 
 
Finally, stranding risk from climate change is becoming a prominent focus in the finance 
literature. However, research focused on how professional investors across the investment 
chain perceive stranding risk is limited, especially considering its significance. For example, 
no previous studies have explored how stranding risk is perceived by investors in physical 
compared to financial assets. This study therefore made a novel and unique contribution to 
understanding this research question. Overall, the findings suggest that the understanding and 
ability to accurately quantify stranding risk may be less developed for financial sector investors 
compared to the power sector cohort. The former has not yet developed a comprehensive 
appreciation of stranding risk compared to the latter, and may therefore not be in a position to 
fully factor this risk into investment decisions. This insight has important implications for 
financial regulation.  
6.4. Future research 
The analysis presented in this thesis identifies several promising areas for future research. 
First, the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggest that comprehensive ex post 
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evaluations of financial incentives are not common, and that even when evaluations have 
been undertaken, they tend not to be systematic or consistent, and this makes comparison 
challenging. Many case studies employ only one evaluation criteria (usually cost-
effectiveness of economic efficiency), and there is generally less of a focus on distributional 
implications, institutional or administrative factors or social acceptability. Overall the ex post 
literature on the use of financial incentives, particularly those targeting citizen investors, is 
sparse, and this emerges as a useful avenue for further research.  
 
Second, the ex post data on the costs of mobilising citizen investors is both sparse and 
inconclusive. There is also some evidence (see above) that mobilising local citizens as 
investors can reduce the overall costs to society of low-carbon transition, but other studies, 
identify a tension between mobilising local citizen investors and increasing electricity prices, 
which could have a countervailing impact on social legitimacy. For example, Del Rio and 
Bleda (2012) and Butler and Neuhoff (2008) found that total costs of incentives had 
significantly increased in countries such as Spain and Germany. The net costs and benefits of 
mobilising citizen investment is an area meriting comprehensive treatment within the context 
of findings from these disparate studies. 
 
Third, the importance of early stage support for local community energy projects, while 
commonly acknowledged in the policy world, is not a topic that has received attention in the 
academic literature. What emerges from this study is that grants and soft loans have been 
effective at overcoming earlier stage barriers for risk-averse citizen investors. On the other 
hand, time-bound subsidies such as grants can lead to stop-start investment cycles (Cansino 
et al., 2011) arising from the sudden termination of support, rather than the creation of 
sustainable markets. Evaluating the use of financial incentives across project stages is a novel 
approach which helps develop a more nuanced picture of risk from a citizen investor 
perspective, and it could be built upon in future studies.  
 
Fourth, while some challenges associated with designing market-based supports with citizen 
investors in mind are identified, there are few examples to draw conclusions from in practice. 
Future ex post studies might explore the effectiveness of market-based supports in attracting 
investment from citizens, as these incentives become more popular. The extent to which local 
citizens are put off by the greater investor risk associated with market-based incentives, 
	
 149 
including FiPs and quota-based schemes, is unclear from our research, and therefore merits 
further exploration. 
 
Fifth, findings suggest that the understanding and ability to accurately quantify stranding risk 
may be less developed for financial sector compared to the power sector investors. The former 
have not developed a comprehensive appreciation of stranding risk compared to the latter, and 
may therefore not be in a position to fully factor this risk into investment decisions. However, 
there are limits to this study. It is restricted to one jurisdiction and the “snowball” methodology 
is exploratory in nature—it cannot therefore be assumed that responses received are 
representative of the views of the wider market. However, findings indicate that an information 
deficit may be preventing market actors from fully integrating climate risks from energy 
transition into the prices of financial assets, which could constitute a material risk to financial 
stability. Assessing perceptions of asset stranding risk from climate change from key actors 
across the investment chain is another area meriting further systematic research.   
 
What ties the research together is a focus on the risk-return perception of different types of 
investors under conditions of rapid energy transition, including citizens and communities, but 
also professional investors in the power generation and financial sectors. Risk perception can 
alter the cost of capital for different technologies, and therefore the hurdle rates for investors, 
thereby radically affecting the cost and pace of energy transition. These dynamics remain 
understudied and underappreciated in the climate policy and climate finance field, and are areas 
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